THE MEANING OF EDUCATION

F. H. HAYWARD, D. LIT., M.A., B.SC.

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The Educational Science Series.

THE MEANING OF EDUCATION

AS INTERPRETED BY HERBART.

BY

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GENERAL

"The essential task of education must be to cultivate in the mind of the youth the power of vivid and reverent realisation of the external and internal universe. . . . Let him have a broad general vision of the wonders of his dwelling-place and the glories and miseries of his kind."

"KAPPA" in *Let Youth But Know.*

"Not to 'train the mind' nor 'teach the pupil to think' but to widen the range of intercourse, is the pressing business of the school." MR. H. G. WELLS.

"The child faces two kinds of environment—one consisting of real things and situations, to which adjustment is made by intelligent learning; the other the 'spiritual' environment, consisting of the accumulation of knowledge by the race. The school is the instrument of adjustment . . . The teacher mediates the products of culture."

DR. J. W. SLAUGHTER.

"Education is the process in which the educand assimilates the external world and is assimilated by it."

PROFESSOR J. ADAMS.

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PREFACE.

When the proposal came that I should write a series of books dealing with the Theory and Practice of Education for Certificate candidates and other teachers, I realised that the first of those volumes would have to deal so largely with Herbart as to be very different from ordinary books on the subject. Apart from the thoughts and formulæ of that great educator, I should have little or nothing to write about except heterogeneous details, though the latter, of course, might be helpful and important.

Such interest in Education as I possess, and may be able to awaken in others, is solely due to a recognition of the great issues that are staked upon the success or failure of the primary teacher's work, and this recognition is itself due largely to the fact that, a few years ago, Herbart's doctrines (though known to me then very imperfectly) laid hold upon me powerfully. I said to myself, "How true, how helpful, how unifying, or, at any rate, how immensely and immeasurably plausible, is this man's way of looking at education!"

Lest, however, I should be led astray by dangerous errors lurking behind this plausible structure of Herbartianism, I betook myself to Germany for a few months, and collected some score or more of the criticisms directed against Herbart's educational teaching. Sufficiently chastened in mind, I published these under the title of *The Critics of Herbartianism*, and held forth modestly upon the virtues and vices of the system.

I then realised that another duty was incumbent upon me—the last duty, by the way, that is usually recognised either by critics or followers of Herbart. I ought to study Herbart him-

self: which meant that I ought to study, not merely his *Lectures*, but his *General Pedagogy* (*Allgemeine Pädagogik*); not merely play with his concepts, but get to know them at first hand. This I set about—my mind, after its doings with the "critics," being more than usually alert to the possibilities of fallacy and inadequacy. Herbart "ignored individuality"; Herbart "forgot the claims of practical life"; Herbart under-estimated Training and thought of nothing but Instruction; Herbart under-estimated—nay, as one critic said in 1904, was "indifferent towards"—natural science; Herbart would emasculate school work by making it easy and "interesting"; Herbart failed to realise the value of occupational and practical subjects—the factor emphasised by Fröbel; Herbart's system was not "teleological," was "deduced" from a false "mechanical" psychology, not built up from the concept of an ideal.

But, lo! as I studied the author himself, I discovered that all these charges were ridiculously false, were all *the opposite of the truth.* I was surprised, almost dumbfounded, by the realisation of how unnecessary had been my apologies for Herbart. This man had anticipated every criticism. I take the opportunity, therefore, of apologising for my apologies, and of offering the best reparation I can make. I propose to set forth Herbart's leading ideas in his own words, and to challenge critics to deny that those words are wonderfully true, helpful, and coherent.

The following work is therefore predominantly expository and defensive; Herbart speaks and I defend him. Still, there is one leading thought, and as I take some pains to press it home, the work to that extent is my own.

In the pages that follow, I have urged, with a certain amount of vehemence, that a doctrine, at present on the lips of almost all educationists, is misleading—if not worse. That "*education is simply a process of drawing-out*" I must earnestly and ingenuously challenge, or, at the least, hold to be a state-

ment rapidly becoming sterile or dangerous. It has pretty well accomplished all the good that, for the present, it is capable of accomplishing, and its influence is now on the side of evil. It is leading teachers astray. It is helping to dehumanise our schools and to starve the scholars. If I am wrong, I trust that someone will be able to clear up my difficulty, and to show that the "drawing-out" doctrine is more helpful and true than it appears to me. That there is truth in it I do not deny, and when, in a succeeding volume, some of the results of Child Study are chronicled, readers will appreciate that modicum of truth at its proper value. But, concerned as I am with present-day educational thought, and with the fallacies of "theory" that are acting inimically upon "practice," I wish to confess, in all sincerity, that this "drawing-out" doctrine puzzles me, and that I want further light upon it. Having said so much, I revert to the question of the design of the present book.

As already indicated, my ultimate aim is to write a series of practical works dealing with the whole province of Education, and capable of helping teachers, not only to do their daily work, but to pass their examinations. The first volume of the regular series would necessarily deal with general matters—the Aim of Education and the Leading Concepts of Education; and in the course of it I should have to be constantly referring to Herbart, who, on these matters, is precisely the greatest thinker the world has ever seen. This would involve either that I should have to devote many pages to pure exposition of Herbart, or that I should have constantly to refer students to other books, notably to the translations of his own works. Neither plan would be satisfactory. So I have undertaken to write this little expository work of my own, to which, in the succeeding volumes I can constantly refer. Part II. of the present book consists, then, of an exposition of all Herbart's leading ideas, collected from the *General Pedagogy*, the *Lectures*,

and the minor works, but with omission of any detailed treatment of special subjects. Herbart did much good work of this last kind, but the present volume is not the place to set it forth.*

But Part II. is preceded by a Part I. and followed by a Part III. Thereby hangs a tale.

When a writer indulges in tall talk about Herbart being the world's greatest thinker upon such questions as the Aim and Leading Concepts of Education; when he speaks of the "helpful, unifying," tendency of Herbart's teaching, the critic is likely to retort that Education is going on very nicely indeed, and that no voices from distant Göttingen are needed to tell us what to teach, or why or how. I commence this book, therefore, with a plain demonstration that in the realm of educational thought there is absolute chaos at the present moment, despite a hundred years of Pestalozzi, fifty years of Fröbel, and several years of Mr. Harold Gorst and Professor Alexander Darroch.† Owing to the utter absence of any recognised authority on educational matters, we find the non-educational world intruding its suggestions upon the educational world; and, what is worse still, professional educators—teachers, inspectors, professors—at sixes and sevens among themselves.

In Part III. I indicate, though not in seriatim fashion (for I wish readers to make certain applications for themselves), the sources of some of the contradictions adduced in Part I., and I try to show that many of our confusions and difficulties will vanish at once when looked at in the light of Herbart's doctrines expounded in Part II. I try to show, in fact, that Herbartianism is a System of Education, after showing pretty conclusively that no other System of Education exists.

The present book is therefore somewhat peculiar in form and matter. So far as I can judge, its chief merit is sincerity.

* All passages that are *both* in italics and between quotation marks are Herbart's own.

† I think I treated Professor Darroch too severely in my *Critics of Herbartianism*. He only fell into the common blunders about Herbart's position, and I have no doubt will do better in the future.

I do not doubt that I have exposed myself to criticism at several points. But I have striven my best to set forth the leading ideas of Herbart, and to bring them into connection with present-day problems.

A word as to the quotations. I am greatly indebted to Mr. and Mrs. Felkin, and to their publishers, Messrs. Swan Sonnenschein and Co., for permission to use their translations of Herbart's two chief educational works. It was from those translations that I obtained my first knowledge of the subject, and I owe a debt to the authors that cannot easily be repaid. I trust, nevertheless, that some slight repayment will be made if, as a result of the issue of this book, readers are led to study the complete works. I have been compelled to omit much that is suggestive and cogent, especially in the later chapters of the *Allgemeine Pädagogik*.

A word as to the liberties I have taken with Mr. and Mrs. Felkin's translation of two words, *Regierung* and *Zucht*.

If I were writing for secondary teachers, I should accept without hesitation the words selected by the translators, "Government" and "Discipline." Indeed, if any secondary teachers read this book, I hope they will remain faithful to Mr. and Mrs. Felkin's usage, and always read "Government" where I write "Discipline," and "Discipline" where I write "Training." But, unfortunately, the word "Discipline" has come to mean among primary teachers exactly what Herbart meant by *Regierung*, and accordingly I have been compelled to make an alteration which, otherwise, I greatly regret. For the sake of clearness I append a table showing the varying usage:—

Herbart's Word.	Mr. and Mrs. Felkin.	This Book.
Regierung.	"Government."	"Discipline" (sometimes "Government.")
Zucht.	"Discipline."	"Training" (sometimes "Moral Training.")

Other quotations used in this book are from Dr. Eckoff's translation of Herbart's minor works in the International Education Series, but as they are not numerous I have not thought it necessary to ask permission to use them. Some of these works are of peculiar interest, and Dr. Eckoff has done good service in making them accessible. Miss Mulliner's book, *The Application of Psychology to the Science of Education* (really a translation of Herbart's letters), has been used in a similar way; it is full of "points," and has an admirable preface.

I wish most gratefully to thank Professor Adams for kindly reading the work when in proof. The influence of his wonderful book with a forbidding title (*Herbartian Psychology Applied to Education*) will be noticeable throughout. Mr. W. J. Saunders, B.Sc., has also kindly helped with the proof-reading.

F. H. H.

London, *February, 1907.*

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THE MEANING OF EDUCATION

AS

INTERPRETED BY HERBART.

PART I.

THE CHAOS OF THE HOUR.

1. An Inspector, almost as full as myself of Herbartian ideas, once went into a school, and saw a teacher taking "Reading." The book used was a Geographical Reader dealing with England, and the particular passage related to the Thames. One after another the boys read on; not a word of comment came from the teacher; not a map of the Thames nor of England was to be seen. The Inspector inquired, "Why do you not refer to the map? Do you not think the lesson would be made more interesting and valuable if you briefly discussed the subject-matter?" The teacher instantly replied: 'Mr. X., one of His Majesty's Inspectors, objected to that; he said, 'Reading was Reading.'"

"Reading is Reading."

Yes, Mr. X. had said so; but Mr. X.'s successor sent in a Report complaining that there was lack of correlation between the Geography Scheme and the Geography "Readers." Yet, if Mr. X. lives still, he must disagree with his successor's Report; for if "Reading is Reading" and the subject-matter doesn't count, why object to lack of correlation? Surely a Reading Book dealing with the rivers of Kamschatka would teach reading just as well as one dealing with the Thames.

The same Inspector visited a class where an excellent book of literary selections was being read. The piece for the morning was from the *Pilgrim's Progress*. Girl after girl read on. The Inspector asked a few questions about Bunyan, about the meaning of an allegory, and the like. The girls knew next to nothing. It was subsequently explained that Mr. X. had been to that school. All was now clear.

2. I was once told of a happy educational district where one Inspector was of opinion that it mattered very little whether children got their sums right so long as the methods employed were intelligent; while his colleague or successor (I do not know which) held a brief for accuracy of results. A similar controversy—really due to the constantly conflicting claims of the mechanical and the rational—rages elsewhere over the question whether little children should always be taught addition and subtraction by the tens method, or should be allowed a certain amount of mere counting. The arguments are not all on one side; and when one Inspector stands up for this method and his colleague for that, the teacher has no more reason to be happy than when one Inspector approves of upright writing and his colleague of slanting.

Mechanical v. Rational.

3. Fifteen thousand medical men recently petitioned the Board of Education to introduce the teaching of hygiene and temperance into Primary Schools. So far, so good; though there is something a little surprising—if surprise is permissible in educational affairs—in the fact of such a recommendation coming from outside the school itself. But surprise gives way to amusement when we hear of the supplementary suggestion.

Hygiene and Temperance v. History and Geography.

Coming fresh from their vivisectional failures, the doctors proceeded to tell teachers and masters of this country what subjects they should leave out in order to make room for

hygiene and temperance. For some occult reason, they decided on the omission or subordination of *History and Geography*; or perhaps one may more correctly say the lot fell upon those hapless subjects, which, accordingly, were cast overboard, like Jonah. But History and Geography, like Jonah, were not yet done with; for the Associated Chambers of Commerce appeared on the scene. Sir Albert Rollit, within a few weeks of the presentation of the medical petition, had to prescribe for English schools; and his prescription was—*a more careful teaching of History and Geography.* Thus medical men were recommending for schools the omission of the very subjects which commercial men were strongly urging. Now, if teachers, and inspectors, and professors of education had clear views on educational matters, some definite sense of educational values, and, above all, some show of authority with regard to the educational affairs of the nation, they should have the right to tell medical men, commercial men, military men, and all non-educators, to mind their own business before minding other people's.

4. Unfortunately, however, chaos and contradiction prevail among professional educationists themselves. Take two distinguished men like Professor Armstrong of England and Professor Stanley Hall of America. The former is closely identified with the proposals for the teaching of Elementary Science issued by the British Association. What is the sum and substance of those proposals? To make our teaching *exact and quantitative*; to base it on measurement. But there comes along Dr. Stanley Hall, the great leader of the American "child-study" movement, an educator who says equally hard things with Dr. Armstrong about the inefficiency of science teaching, but prescribes a precisely opposite remedy. When we listen to his words we must remember that he is condemning in America the very thing that Professor Armstrong is advocating in England. "The half-score of

Exactness, or Not?

text-books in physics I have glanced over," says Dr. Hall, "seem essentially quantitative, require great exactness, and are largely devoted to precise measurements, with too much and too early insistence on mathematics. . . . The normal boy in the teens is essentially in the popular science age. He wants, and needs, great wholes, facts in profusion, but few formulæ."

For and Against "Facts."

5. Dr. Stanley Hall, in the great work on "Adolescence" from which I have just been quoting, has suggested other contradictions. "Boys," he tells us, need "facts in profusion." Now, this is a very interesting confession, because there is a dead set against the giving of "facts," "information," or "mere knowledge," made by sundry gentlemen, who, seeing clearly enough that the time is educationally out of joint, esteem themselves, like Hamlet, born to set it right. For example, there is Mr. Harold Gorst, who possesses the double distinction of being the son of Sir John Gorst and the father of a book called "The Curse of Education." Now, this book, which is appearing on railway bookstalls (along with "Dr. Nikola" and "Sherlock Holmes") at the modest figure of sixpence, is simply a kind of Rousseau's "Emile," *minus* all the sparkle and *plus* a few additional fallacies. It represents educational reaction dressed in the garb of educational radicalism. Of course the author runs down "facts" as vigorously as Mr. Gradgrind ran them *up*. On the first page he speaks of the British child being "stuffed"—a favourite word, "stuffed"—with "six pounds of facts," the German and French child with "seven pounds"; and he recurs again and again to the expression. Mr. Gorst will therefore be interested—though perhaps also pained—to hear that Dr. Stanley Hall believes the normal boy to need "facts in profusion." What, too, will he think of Rousseau's contention that after the age of twelve the boy needs "no other instruction than facts"? What will he think of

the introduction of a paper on "general information" into sundry examinations? The situation is ludicrous. Here, on the one side, are people discovering that boys are often grossly ignorant of common facts and useful information; here, on the other side, are platform orators and writers of books with sensational bookstall titles telling us that there is a surfeit of "facts" and "information."

The contrast is really sharply marked. I find it, for example, in two gentlemen with whom I have been brought into slight personal contact. Sir Thomas Acland, whose name is known and honoured in the West Country, says that "the great purpose of Education is not to accumulate facts, but to cultivate the powers of observation"; while Professor Laurie brings it as a complaint against mediæval education that the minds of the pupils did not receive "the nourishment of facts." Edward Thring, I need scarcely say, was another "fact" iconoclast, and so, apparently, is his disciple, Professor Armstrong. "Drawing out the powers of the mind," says the former, "is different from packing in dead facts, even when the packing is neatly done." Now it seems to me an extremely difficult task to discover what Edward Thring was generally driving at; so, with regard to the words just quoted, I venture merely to claim that the "neat packing in" of facts—in other words, the conferring of knowledge in accordance with the psychological laws of the mind—is in one sense, if not Thring's, a supremely important thing. Nay, I feel constrained to quote a fellow-Herbartian, if he will allow me to call him so—I mean Professor Adams. On page 131 of his wonderfully lucid book, compared with which Edward Thring's three books seem a London fog variegated with fireworks, he says: "Since each new fact is acted upon by the facts which form part of the apperceiving soul, it follows that, the more facts that have been organised into faculty, the more readily will the mind act." This, of course, is the invariable attitude of Herbartians, who, though they may differ among themselves

upon many things, are not in the habit of joining the hue and cry against "knowledge" and "instruction" and "facts."

I could find other pairs of writers whose views upon the "fact" question are in conflict. The late Mr. Quick's attitude was, on the whole, wise and moderate, and showed a striking absence of that one-sidedness and partisanship which are so often identified with the work of our present-day "educational reformers." But in one place he has a tilt at what he calls "storing the pupils' memory with *facts*—facts about language, about history, about geography." On the other side may be adduced a quotation from the well-known work, *Essays on a Liberal Education*, which represented, forty years ago, all that was radical and progressive in secondary education. In this work we find Mr. Wilson, now Archdeacon Wilson, urging, in connection with the teaching of natural science, that "a certain broad array of facts must pre-exist before scientific methods can be applied."

Of course, I do not mean to suggest that these contrasts of view are necessarily absolute and irreconcilable. Possibly the word "facts" varies somewhat in its meaning and use. Some of the critics really mean by the word, "loose facts," "indiscriminate facts," as distinguished from "knowledge." But I do claim that such real or apparent contradictions as those I have adduced reveal something unsatisfactory in present-day educational thought. Education appears to be in a state similar to that which, theologians tell us, preceded the formulation of dogma—a state in which orthodoxy and heterodoxy, apostolic tradition and wild heresy existed side by side undifferentiated.

For and Against Knowledge.

6. However, general reflections and conclusions must be left for another section. I hasten to add that certain educationists use precisely similar language about "knowledge" and "information" that others use about "facts." This is not surprising, as "facts," "knowledge," and "information" mean much the

same thing. Professor Armstrong tells us that "mere knowledge counts for very little," as if there *were* any "mere" knowledge, as if all knowledge did not possess, as the Herbartians contend, and as I shall presently try to show, enormous possibilities of apperceptive energy, and as if Spencer himself had not declared: "Knowledge is turned into faculty as soon as it is taken in." In contrast to Professor Armstrong's contention, I will again quote from *Essays on a Liberal Education.* "In the education of the upper classes," says Mr. Wilson, "there is too little of positive and exact knowledge and too much of mere training and drill. We have too much distrusted the virtue of knowledge." Again, De Morgan's educational ideal, "to know everything about something and something about everything," goes quite counter to the somewhat absurd attacks upon "knowledge" and "information," to which I have referred; while Sir Oliver Lodge's retort to Mr. Benson is in the same sense. "A master's business," Mr. Benson had said, "is to try to see that there is mental effort." "Not a bit of it," replied the Principal of Birmingham University. "A master's business is to supply proper pabulum."

Pabulum or Gymnastics?

It is plain from such quotations as these that the Herbartian objections to a purely formal or gymnastic ideal of education—objections put into a classical and, I venture to think, almost an immortal form in the fifth chapter of Professor Adams's book—are very living and pertinent objections, aimed at real dangers. Many of our educationists, in their theoretical disquisitions, seem to forget the need for what Sir Oliver Lodge calls "proper pabulum." Time was when the mind was compared to a sheet of paper on which the teacher had to impress certain marks; when societies were formed for the "diffusion of information" among the "working" or other classes; when men spoke of knowledge being "power"; when ideas were supposed to come from without and to enter the

mind and give it a content and a fullness; when Disraeli's words, "The duty of education is to give ideas," would have been regarded as sound sense and not as dangerous heresy. Now all is changed. On every side is heard the voice of the educational prophet (occasionally, too, the educational cheap-jack) assuring us that Knowledge is of little worth; that Education is a process of drawing out and not of putting in; that Training is more important than Instruction; that the mind is not a *tabula rasa*, but a perpetual-motion machine. Educational philosophy is daily stressing more and more the efferent at the expense of the afferent, forgetting that the afferent may become the efferent, or that, in Spencer's words, "knowledge" may become "faculty." True, there are voices coming from the other side, but they do not so catch the popular ear—the ear of the Education Committee-man for example—as the voices depreciatory of knowledge.

7. And here I have a bone to pick with the followers of Fröbel. It seems to me that the stress they lay upon the efferent side of mental life, very easily lends itself to error and perversion. One remembers the words of Professor James: "An adult man's interests are almost every one of them intensely artificial; they have slowly been *built up*." One remembers, too, that the Churches have always, rightly or wrongly, insisted on the early creation in the child's mind of certain apperception masses; and I know, from personal contact with people, how this factor profoundly modifies the whole mental structure.

Fröbel sometimes seems almost to imply that the processes of putting-in or building-up are educationally impossible or vicious; and one of his translators attributes to him (though somewhat mistakenly, I now think) the words, "What can be put into a man is, properly speaking, *there* already." I see, too, that Professor Welton considers it an error to think that "human life can be built up from without, and its form and tendency determined by an artificial arrangement by another

of the ideas it is to assimilate." Well, roughly speaking, I think it no "error" at all, and must refer him to the words of another Professor of Education quoted in a following section.

Must a Teacher Teach?

I suppose there must be something wrong with my educational opinions. I open an excellent and inspiring book, Mr. Skrine's *Pastor Agnorum*, and I read that "imparting knowledge is not the teacher's business. . . . We know now that Education is a name which means what it says, and the educator has not to put something into his pupil but to draw out from him what is in him"—practically what Professor Welton said. It must be true, I suppose. Mr. Skrine says it, Professor Welton says it, everybody is saying it. And yet—and yet—and yet—— with all my reverence for Fröbel, with all my recognition of the principle of individuality and self-activity, I still believe that "imparting knowledge is the teacher's business," and that "teaching" is "a word that means what it says." Like Herbart, I have no conception of Education without Instruction.

I very much doubt whether Mr. Fagin the Jew would have assented to Professor Welton's definition of Education. He was one of the children of this world—if ever there was one—and it is possible that in some ways he was wiser than the children of light. He had had conspicuous success with Mr. Dawkins, Mr. Bates, and Mr. Chitling, and he had every reason to anticipate a similar success with Mr. Twist. Though without strong opinions on the question whether "Virtue" could be "taught," he was firmly convinced that Vice *could*. Of course he was wrong if Education meant "drawing out" and nothing more. Do we not hear, even from Fröbelian authorities, of the immense power of "suggestion," and suggestion is scarcely a process of "drawing out." Furthermore, Dr. Barnardo claims to have "demonstrated the superiority of environment to heredity" by means of his transplanted slum children,

only two per cent. of whom have "turned out bad." Again, the main differences between a Radical and a Tory are the result of ideas received, and these ideas make the motives and actions of the two men diverse in a score of ways. Mr. Fagin, too, obviously believed in "putting in," and was a tolerably efficient master of the process. Surely there is a mistake somewhere. Meanwhile, in my unillumined fashion I shall persist in believing that the teacher's chief business is to teach, and that though there is much truth in the "drawing out" doctrine, the doctrine is quite as dangerous as it is useful.

Putting In or Drawing Out.

8. It is a short step from Fagin to Sherlock Holmes. I have already mentioned both Professor Adams and Professor Armstrong. In reading over their works I came across a reference in each to the famous detective, and was struck by the fact that the two educationists drew exactly opposite inferences from his skill and efficiency. Professor Armstrong seems to trace it to a process of mental discipline rather than to knowledge and apperceptive power; while Professor Adams traces it to these latter. "Holmes's apperception mass," he says, "contained the German word *Rache*, which means 'revenge.' Holmes was right. Lestrade was wrong. But it was not a matter of reasoning backwards or forwards; it was a matter of knowledge." And here let me say that any one who wishes to realise how enormous (superficially, at any rate) is the contrast between the only two systems that arouse any real educational enthusiasm—I mean Fröbelianism and Herbartianism—had better read a chapter or two of Professor Adams's book after imbibing a dose of "self-activity" and "drawing-out" doctrine. He will then read such sentences as the following:—"We seem to find ideas exercising a power that is independent of the mind. . . . The kind of apperception masses in the mind really determines what kind of mind it is. . . . Ideas enter our minds in spite

of us." It is no good mincing matters. The two standpoints are unreconciled by the educational thought of to-day, though I am far from thinking that they are irreconcilable.

Thinking for Oneself.

9. I pass on to another contradiction, though one that is, perhaps, ultimately traceable to the fluctuating views on the knowledge question, to which reference has been made. Our pseudo-reformers assure us that the great thing necessary is to make children "think for themselves." Educationists, in fact, seem to be slowly, and perhaps unconsciously, separating into two camps—those who lay stress on power, skill, sharpness, efficiency, independence (including this capacity of "thinking for oneself"); and those who lay stress mainly on goodness, and, in consequence, on giving to children what Matthew Arnold called an acquaintance with "the best that has been thought and said in the world." Education will never begin to progress in earnest until these views have been synthesized I would like to quote, in reply to the much-in-evidence maxim that teachers must make their pupils "think for themselves," the words of Mrs. Shelley relative to her own son: "Teach him to think for himself? O my God! Teach him to think like other people!" And the words rose to my mind on visiting a school where the process of making children "think" had resulted in endemic "guessing."

This Fröbelian philosophy, with its stress on independence and individuality may, in the end, prove to be the true philosophy of education. But, meanwhile, let us recognise the fact that it is a newcomer in our schools. "Obedience" is a word never found (we are told) in Fröbel's writings, yet the teaching of "cheerful obedience to duty" is officially declared to be a part of the teacher's work, and Mr. Squeers is not the only pedagogue who has contended that "discipline must be maintained." When Fröbel got to Switzerland he found himself bitterly opposed by certain Jesuit priests, who knew perfectly well that new wine would not suit old bottles;

and even in these days a Church which regards "private judgment" as the source of innumerable troubles is not likely to wax enthusiastic over "thinking for one-self."

Books v. Nature.

10. I have a second ground of controversy with the followers of Fröbel, though, in point of fact, my complaint is mainly against some of the unguarded expressions which they and others let fall. Mr. Gorst, and the educational crusaders who draw their inspiration from Fröbelian and Pestalozzian sources, or rather, perhaps, in the long run, from Rousseau, assure us that schools should be less "bookish." Now, I need not give or discuss the reasons for the onslaughts of these men upon books; there is always a reason for an onslaught, and I would be the last to deny that premature devotion to literary work in schools has been a great evil, and that the realities of Nature have a prior claim, though not a final claim, over the invented symbols, and perhaps even the thoughts, of man. But I once lived in a county which, however attractive in many ways, stands in no need of any anti-book movement, and I therefore welcome the words of Mr. H. G. Wells: "The first and most universal function of the school is to initiate into the ampler world and the more efficient methods of the reading and writing man." Miss Charlotte Mason tells us, too, that "No education can be worth the name which has not made children at home in the world of books."

Fröbelians may reply that they do not disparage books, they only object to their premature introduction into school. Well, Mr. W. H. Herford—once a neighbour of mine on the shores of Tor Bay—is an exponent of Fröbel. He assures us in a work which he edited two or three years ago that "one day we shall believe that *all* we truly know, the stuff of all real knowledge, we learn from Nature; *all the rest*—hearsay, rote knowledge—being *vox et præterea nihil.*" That is pretty strong, surely! Are, then, the rhapsodies of the

Hebrew prophets, the "Republic" of Plato, and the "Utopia" of Sir Thomas More products of "Nature" in a real sense? Strange to hear the voice of Rousseau sounding in our ears after half a century of Darwin! Strange that excellent and orthodox ladies do not see, what the Jesuits saw at the time, that Fröbel's standpoint, when divested of gush and delusion, is revolutionary in the highest degree! My own views on "Nature" are far from definite, and, therefore, I do not wish dogmatically to assert that Fröbel's mystical and symbolical way of contemplating her is wrong; but I would urge that, in the course of evolution, latest developments are often the highest developments, and that books, in the words of Milton, "are not absolutely dead things, but do contain a progeny of life in them; . . . they do preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and extraction of that living intellect that bred them. . . . A good book is the precious life blood of a master-spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life." I prefer this to Wordsworth's stanza:—

"Books! 'tis a dull and endless strife:
Come, hear the woodland linnet,
How sweet his music! on my life
There's more of wisdom in it."

11. Another interesting case of chaos and contradiction is concerned with the question of "thoroughness." Some writers make a great point of this. I heard a prominent West Country educationist, who had noted the comparative ineffectiveness of much of our present-day teaching, say that the multiplication of subjects was a grave peril, and he urged the need of "thoroughness." But I turn to the pages of Edward Thring and I come across these words: "There is something so wise, so unanswerable, in the modest yet firm requirement that the lessons must be done 'thoroughly,' and a boy not advance till he has mastered what he is doing, that the request commands assent

Thoroughness.

at once. The fallacy is—*it cannot be done.*" I do not attempt to adjudicate in this case; I merely point out that, while one earnest educationist urges the need of "thoroughness," another urges its impossibility.

Three R's, or Four or Five?

12. Another controversy rages over the "three R's." From the one side come complaints that we no longer teach the "three R's" so efficiently as in the good old times of forty or seventy years ago, when the curriculum was limited and unambitious, and troublesome "theorists" had not invaded our shores. But from another side comes, with the complaint that the teaching of the "three R's" is necessarily a very mechanical business to a considerable extent, an exhortation to apply ourselves to a "fourth R"—namely, Reasoning. Our pupils have not only to read, write, and reckon, but also to reason; this, in the opinion of Professor Armstrong is the "fourth R," which is so infinitely more important than the other three. To all which it may be replied that Education will have to find a place both for the mechanical and for the rational, in the same way that it will have to find a place both for the receptive and the active factors to which reference has been previously made. All these exhortations to apply ourselves to a "fourth R" and the like are mere testimonies to the fact that we have at present no philosophy of Education that possesses any authority. It is just possible that "Reasoning" is out of place with young children—some educators have thought so; it is also possible that the "fourth R" most needed is "Reverence"—some educators are thinking *that* also. I noted at a certain Trafalgar Square demonstration that the "fourth R" there advocated was neither of these: "We want," said a banner, "Reading, wRiting, aRithmetic, and RELIGION!"

13. There would be some consolation if there was harmony *among groups at least* of thinkers, workers and writers; if theologians, for example, were agreed among themselves

upon educational principles; if scientific men were agreed among themselves, and so on. A teacher could then label himself "follower of the Archbishops," or "follower of the Scientists," and everyone would know where he stood. But even this is impossible. Professor Armstrong is an eminent scientist interested in education, Sir William Ramsay is another eminent scientist interested in education. The former tells us "there should be a workshop—don't call it a laboratory; this should be fitted as a workshop, simply. And there should be no lecture or class room; all the work should be done at the work bench." Professor Ramsay says, on the other hand, that "far too much stress is laid, now-a-days, on what is called 'practical work.' It is possible to have quite an intelligent idea of chemistry without ever having handled a test tube or touched a balance. Lectures on chemistry may be well illustrated experimentally, and the necessary theories demonstrated by the lecturer. . . . To spend several hours a day in practical work is, if not a waste, often, at least, a work of supererogation."

Practical or Not?

14. The next on my list of present-day contradictions is taken from a Board of Education syllabus. It is, no doubt, quite right to prescribe for teachers who have to take the Certificate Examination a number of famous educational books for study; but in the present state of educational theory—or, rather, in the present absence of educational theory—there is some danger of teachers losing all respect for educational books. "How much," they say, "have we to accept, and how much to reject? How much of Herbert Spencer's book on Education is established truth, and how much is error?" Nobody, apparently, can say. I was struck, therefore, by the fact that for the Certificate Examination of 1906 Spencer and the two Arnolds were given as alternative subjects. Now, Spencer despised history and the classics, and laid chief stress on

Conflict of the Text-books.

science; while the Arnolds despised science, and laid chief stress on history and the classics: at any rate, this statement is approximately true. Thus those teachers who study Spencer will imbibe exactly opposite principles from those imbibed by teachers who study the Arnolds.

"Mere Memory."

15. Certain of our reformers, not content with attacking "mere knowledge," "mere facts," "mere information," and the like, have some hard things to say against "mere memory." I remember a passage—a ludicrous passage, when you consider the question from all sides—in which Edward Thring spoke of how "secondary" a thing memory is. Could there have been a more unsuitable expression? Is not memory the most primary and indispensable of all mental functions? However, if one attends long enough to the utterances of educational cheap-jacks (Thring was none, and elsewhere he gave "memory" its due), one will be certain to come across an attack upon "memory," and then, perhaps, on looking at the daily paper for January 7, 1905, one will read, in the report of a teachers' conference, that a prominent art teacher laid stress on the importance of "cultivating the memory"; and those who know Bain's book will remember that he said: "The leading inquiry in the Art of Education is how to strengthen the memory."

Design in Art Teaching.

16. In the report just mentioned one will read that the Principal of the Birmingham School of Art spoke of the "great danger in the present system of trying to teach design in elementary schools." I speak with deference, because art is a department of work with which I am not very familiar, but I do know that, if the encouragement of design is a wrong thing, then Fröbel and all his followers are utterly mistaken, and another great educational delusion must be added to the historic list. I am told by art teachers that on the whole subject of art teaching there is complete chaos of view among Government examiners and others; some, in the spirit of Fröbel, laying

stress upon a kind of free and easy creativeness, others upon exact reproduction of objects and copies. It is the everlasting controversy between the claims of the living and the technical, between interest and skill. Sooner or later we shall have learnt to reconcile these claims.

17. For an unusually kaleidoscopic example of educational chaos I would refer to the two dates February 15, 1905, and February 17, 1905. It is not often that, in my exciting researches on educational chaos, I have come across an instance of one voice of authority unconsciously contradicting another within the space of three days. Such, however, is the present instance. Sir John E. Gorst, speaking in the House of Commons on the King's Speech, urged that, if the young mothers of the nation had less grammar and geography and a little more knowledge of hygienic questions, it would be better for the nation. Two days later I opened a West Country newspaper, and read how His Majesty's Inspectors were urging that, "in view of the difficulty experienced in secondary schools, pupil-teacher centres, and evening classes, owing to the lack of knowledge of English grammar on the part of many of the pupils coming from elementary schools, all children in the standards should receive instruction in the elementary principles of grammar, and a certain minimum standard knowledge in this subject be expected of pupils in the higher standards."

Grammar v. Hygiene.

18. Take now the subject of corporal punishment, upon which much difference of opinion makes itself felt. I do not propose to argue the case for or against prohibition; but I would point out that defenders of the practice—and I incline to be one of them—are gravely divided as to the class of offences to which it is most suitably applied. Most Education Committees representing popular and empirical opinion seem to regard corporal punishment as legitimate only in the

Corporal Punishment for Moral Offences?

LIBRARY OF THE

case of "grave moral offences." I could quote many rules issued upon this basis. But Edward Thring, in one of the wisest parts of his suggestive, though often perplexing, writings, argues at considerable length—and, I think, with success—that corporal punishment is specially *unsuitable* for moral offences, and should be used for purposes of external discipline only. Teachers who follow Edward Thring will have to disobey their rulers, and those who obey their rulers will have to go counter to the views of Edward Thring.

Again, I could quote, both from Thring and from Dr. Laurie, as well as from other authorities, the recommendation that when corporal punishment is administered at all it should be administered in private. The Bristol authorities, however, are of a different opinion, and ordered expressly that it should be administered "in front of the class or school." Still again, on the question of punishment, I would adduce the conflict over what are called "natural punishments." The influential little book of Herbert Spencer has introduced the man in the street to the doctrine that punishments should be "natural"; the child who is late should have to make up for the time lost through lateness; the child who is careless should have to repair the destruction caused by carelessness; and so on. In Mr. Llewellyn Williams's *Disciplinary, Civic, and Moral Education* is found a crude and confusing presentation of the same useful though inadequate idea. The moment the reader turns to the writings of Dr. Laurie, he finds this doctrine of "natural reactions" exposed to merciless criticism.

Natural Punishments?

19. Again, questions like co-education are still absolutely unsettled. Dr. Stanley Hall, in his great work on "Adolescence," has pronounced an unfavourable verdict when a favourable one was expected, and when new co-educational schools are being opened in England amid a loud flourish of trumpets.

Moral Lessons?

20. At the present moment proposals are being made to introduce Moral Lessons into the school, and men of high character are pronouncing opposite verdicts upon the advisability of this proposal. Some, quite apart from theological predilections, urge that moral influence should be a bye-product, that "virtue cannot be taught," that "lessons in morality" (though these same critics have never, for the most part, been present at any such lessons) are dull and ineffective. Others contend that the teaching of moral truth is at least as important as the teaching of other truth; that much evil springs from ignorance; and that, with proper safeguards, the subject can be treated very profitably. For example, in Mr. Rowntree's book on "Betting and Gambling" there is the suggestion that in all schools there should be instruction how wrong betting is; and similar attempts are made with regard to intemperance, cruelty, etc. *Is this nonsense?* I wish opponents of Moral Instruction (who, no doubt, strongly disapprove of the Book of Proverbs, and perhaps of the Ten Commandments) would face the question squarely.

Children and Dogma.

21. It would be an unforgivable offence to omit a reference to the greatest controversy of all. At the moment I am writing, the Education Bill is going through the Commons, where some honourable members are claiming, with Lord Robert Cecil, that "children live on dogma." Simultaneously we hear of certain episcopal books being published, which declare that "a child is just the creature who ought to be taught the most dogmatic religion possible."* Meanwhile other voices are heard resolutely affirming that children are the last persons who need or appreciate dogma, that just as creeds were late products of religious development in the race, so they should be in the individual. An echo of this view seems to come from the direction of Keilhau, and Fröbel's voice

*_Thoughts on Education_, by Mandell Creighton (late Bishop of London).

is heard saying something about the "stony, oppressive dogmas of theology."

I turn my head away, wondering when peace will come upon the educational world, and I remember what Mr. H. G. Wells wrote a few years ago: "There is nothing having any authority higher than individual opinion; nothing threshed out and permanently established. From one lecturer in education comes one assertion, and from another another, and the algebraic result is scarcely a matter for boasting." There are hints, prejudices, fanaticisms, half truths, scraps of systems, traditions, cynicisms, hopes, disillusionments—and there is little else. I venture on an answer to my own question. "Peace will come only when men have decided with something like precision what the Aim of Education ought to be." Thus I am brought at once to Herbart. In the course of the following study, all or nearly all of the above questions that are worth consideration, will receive their answers, and many others too. In fact, scores of plausibilities and fallacies will be seen in their true folly and nakedness the moment anyone becomes familiar with Herbart's doctrines. There may be other things to *learn*—priceless conclusions from modern Child Study, for example—but Herbart never gives us anything that, as practical teachers, we shall have one day to *unlearn*. Above all, he gives us a *System*, as we shall see!

PART II.

A STUDY OF HERBART.

CHAPTER I.

The Moral Aim.

1. Morality Suggested as the One Aim of Education.

"*The one and the whole work of education is summed up in the concept—Morality.*"

These are practically the first words in the official scriptures of Herbartianism* Many earnest educationists would instantly reject the really amazing claim here put forward. Education, they would contend, has many and varied tasks to perform; any attempt to resolve these varied tasks into one—even a great one—must result only in a distortion of educational views and a comparative neglect of important elements in human life. How, for example, can æsthetic culture or intellectual keenness be regarded as a part of "Morality"? Needlework, swimming, and a multitude of other tasks commonly imposed on the teacher—are not *they* a part of Education?

One Goal or Many?

This criticism—put forward systematically by Dittes and others—is really as old as Herbart himself. It was, in fact, anticipated by him.

*The *Aesthetische Darstellung der Welt* will now be followed for some sections.

"*We might assume as many problems for Education as there are permissible aims for men. But then, this would involve as many educational inquiries as problems. . . . All parts of the work would be thrown out of their right proportions. If it is to be possible to think out thoroughly and accurately, and to carry out systematically, the business of Education as a single whole, it must be previously possible to comprehend the work of Education also as but one.*"

Herbartianism, in fact, is an attempt so to unify all educational effort as to direct it solely in one direction—the direction of Morality or Character. The goal is to be reached, however, not by depreciating the value of "secular" subjects and exalting certain others (*e.g.*, religious instruction) as solely character-forming, but by taking in hand the entire curriculum and endeavouring to make it morally significant. Whether this attempt at unification is a successful one must rest with the judgment of the readers of this book, but the fact of the attempt—the fact that Herbart set out to do what prophets and reformers have ever aimed at doing, namely, to remove from this world some of its sin and vice—must be recognised from the outset of the study. "*The one and the whole work of Education*" must somehow be "*summed up in the concept—Morality.*" It was because moral evil often seemed to him connected with the wrong working of a psychical machine that he began to plan how that machine could be made to produce better things than sin and vice; in this way he was driven to the study of Psychology—the science of mind.

But the machine—the "presentational mechanism," as some writers call it, the mechanism of ideas or "presentations"*—is not the concern of the present section. We are dealing here with the "Aim" of Education; and, in fact, it was from the "Aim" that Herbart "deduced"

* "Presentation" (*Vorstellung*) will often be used in this work as an equivalent of "Idea," "Perception," "Sensation," and similar terms standing for the simple elements of the intellectual life.

everything else. The very title of his greatest work is "*General Pedagogy Deduced from the Aim of Education.*"

Herbart Deduces His System from His Aim.

Now, it is just this fact that causes much of the fascination of Herbartianism. The teacher suddenly realises that he is face to face with an aggressive assertion of great issues. No system or proposal, political, social, or religious, can, under present conditions, affect more than a fraction of the community; whereas all children go to school. "If only this system of Education, with its strangely arresting terminology, could effect what it claims, and could be revealed as the possessor of a secret for the moral uplifting of humanity! if only! if only!—"; and the teacher who has read Dr. Stanley Hall's *Adolescence*, recalls the words of the great American: "Educators must face the fact that the ultimate verdict concerning the utility of the school will be determined by its moral efficiency in saving children from personal vice and crime."

It is of the utmost importance to remember that, while almost all great educationists have regarded "Morality" as *one* of the aims of education, Herbart is probably the only writer who has ever deliberately "deduced" a whole educational system from that one aim. It is interesting to note that he had arrived at the standpoint by the time he was thirty years of age and was publishing his *Allgemeine Pädagogik*. Fröbel was forty-four when he produced the *Menschenerziehung* (Education of Man), a work which, however great, is the reverse of lucid; Pestalozzi was fifty-five when he published *Wie Gertrude ihre Kinder Lehrt* (How Gertrude teaches her Children), which, though not his first work on education, was the first that possessed much precision. The contrast is very marked. Herbart, like his system, springs on the scene armed for a fray, and with full knowledge of friends and foes, obstacles and resources.

But the fact that he started with a very precise view of the

purpose of Education does not prove that the purpose is correctly stated. *Is* Morality "the one and the whole work of Education?" Earnestly though we must listen to what Herbart has to teach us, is it clear that Education has much *moral* importance? Are there not many uneducated men who, judged by ordinary standards, are "virtuous" and "moral"?

Cannot the Uncultured Man be Virtuous?

"In the way of virtue," as a recent reviewer said, "the way-faring man, though a fool, shall not err." When from the Herbartian camp there comes a whisper, sometimes rising to a loud cry of warning, "Stupid men cannot be virtuous," are we not tempted to say, "What nonsense!"

I may as well admit that here is a point of real debate. The Herbartian way of looking at things is so unusual that the average reader feels impatient when he hears of the "one and only aim" of Education and the necessary viciousness of the "stupid man." I cannot at this stage give the Herbartian argument in detail by discussing prematurely the doctrines of Interest and Apperception; but thus much may be said even here. First, that the uncultured man—the "fool" of our phrase—is liable to gross vices, because his circle of interests is narrow; his mind, in default of other things to engross its attention, turns to the sensual. Secondly, that even if, through rigid training, or a stern sense of religious duty, or other cause, such a man avoid the grosser vices, his moral nature is still imperfect, devoid of delicacy and sensitiveness, incapable of either understanding or obeying most of the higher calls to moral effort. His "heart is hardened," his "eyes are holden." When the late Mr. Rooper, an Inspector of Schools who, had he lived, might have done great things for Education, said that without imagination there was "little discovery in the sphere of Morality," he was hinting at a part of the same truth that challenges us in Herbart's statement that "stupid men cannot be virtuous,"

Dangers of Lack of Culture.

and in the old Greek view that "Wisdom" is a part of morality.

As already said, the working out of this doctrine is not our present concern; but even the slight treatment already afforded may suffice to introduce what may be called the second of the Herbartian canons.

2. An Expansion of the Concept of Morality is Required.

"*Morality,*" says Herbart, "*is universally acknowledged as the highest aim of humanity, and consequently of education . . . But to set up morality as the* WHOLE *aim of humanity and education, an expansion of the concept is required.*"

Negative v. Positive Morality.

The real question is whether, after all, the moral condition of a soul that is narrow-minded, profoundly unintelligent and phlegmatic, is satisfactory, even though every prohibitory moral commandment may have been faultlessly obeyed. Do not our moral intuitions demand more than this; demand, indeed, that the soul rise far beyond the mere avoidance of profanity, impurity, and the like, into a region of real moral dignity; may become positively, and not remain merely negatively moral? Can a stunted soul be morally perfect? Can a starved soul be morally robust?

As already hinted, the Herbartian answer is that, except in those unaccountable cases which occupy the same place morally as genius does intellectually—this is impossible. The stunted soul—the soul of the "fool" (to use the expression suggested by the reviewer)—may be quite capable of obeying prohibitory commandments, and if such obedience be an indication of moral perfection, then the "fool" can be morally perfect. But if, as the ancient Greeks believed, Virtue is more than this, and contains elements which, going far beyond mere abstinence, give fuller dignity to life, we shall be compelled to admit that the "fool" cannot rise to these heights; and we shall admit also that, if these elements

are really excluded from the vulgar concept of Virtue, the concept requires, as Herbart says, to be "*expanded.*"*

Experience and history have shown that it is a thankless and interminable task to discuss the definition of Virtue, and no such discussion will be here attempted. The only point for present consideration is that, in the view of the Herbartians, as in that of the ancient Greeks, the element of Culture or Wisdom is inherent in any complete concept of Virtue: man, in their view, is as morally imperfect, if this element be missing, as he is imperfect if unjust or intemperate. Asked to justify their inclusion of this notion, they reply that, being intuitionists who believe that moral notions carry, in the end, the marks of their own validity, they can but bid us clear the dimness from our eyes and the prejudices from our hearts, and ask ourselves whether we can call a man morally perfect whose mind is undeveloped, whose outlook is narrow, whose interests are few, whose will is feeble and fickle.

It would be folly to deny that there have appeared exceptions to this rule; men of uncultured minds who have been endowed with subtle moral insight or with heroic resolution. There may be moral geniuses, just as there are scientific geniuses and musical geniuses. We cannot very well account for the latter; Herbartianism cannot very well account for the former. But what Herbartians urge is that a negative concept of Virtue is poor and inadequate; that a certain richness of mind is necessary for perfection of character; and that, if this richness is absent from a person, we may—in all normal cases—find not only that the moral ideal of the person is narrow, but that even the negative virtues are in danger.

3. Complexity of the Idea of Virtue.

In the present work no attempt will be made to expound Herbart's Ethics in full. But something must be said on the subject.

* Speaking in another connection, Herbart says, "*Hindrance of offences is only good when a new activity continually takes the place of that restrained.*" These words voice his whole system.

Men have tried for centuries to find one simple formula from which all moral ideas can be derived. Some have found it in "conduciveness to happiness," others in "obedience to the will of God," others in "self-realisation." Herbart analysed moral ideas, and came to the opinion that these attempts were hopeless. Our moral judgments are separate, and must remain so, and the smallest number to which they can be reduced is five.

Ethical Failure.

There is no necessity for the student to understand fully, or to agree with, Herbart's ethical views, but they need to be known in outline, and the following quotation may assist the process of learning.

"*The impartial thinker argues: We all know the concept of morality; if it contained but one definite object of command, we should know this, together with the concept. Therefore it does not contain one definite object. . . . We must entirely give up, once and for all, the idea of one supreme moral law, as the sole voice of pure reason, of which all other moral laws would be only developments. On the contrary, in considering the will . . . in the simplest conceivable relationships . . . there springs up as a result for each of these relationships . . . an original, absolutely independent æsthetic judgment, self-evident, and of peculiar nature.*"

So complex is the notion of virtue—on Herbart's view—so much in need of "*expansion*," that its various elements are not less than five in number; each as incapable of having its validity analysed and shown as a musical chord of having its harmony, or dissonance demonstrated. The moral ideas are our divine endowment; a light that lighteth every man who seeks for light, a light which, when sent through the analytic prism of the philosopher's mind, is found to consist of five strands, distinguishable and eternally distinct, though not completely separable from each other. These strands are the "five moral ideas," the five intuitive judgments which the uncor-

The Five Moral Ideas.

rupted mind spontaneously passes upon the relationships of the human will when these are presented to it. For "*each of these relationships*" there is a moral judgment, and no ethical or philosophical subtlety is able to reduce the number. Artificial unification is disastrous, whether along theological lines (virtue being mere obedience to God) or Kantian lines (virtue being reverence for abstract law), or hedonistic lines (virtue being the pleasant). Nay, so convinced is Herbart that a reduction in the number of "ideas" is impossible—the reduction of them, for example, to *one* principle—that he even admits the possibility of collision among them, a possibility which the facts of the moral life seem to confirm. It is these disparate moral judgments which constitute conscience, and also map out the work of the educator.

Why Five?

Now, there is no doubt that to put forward "five moral ideas," and to confess that they are ultimate and irreducible, and may even conflict with each other, seems at first sight an avowal of ethical failure. Five is not a favourite number. There are three Persons in the Trinity, three Theological Virtues, four Cardinal Virtues, seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost, twelve Fruits of the Holy Ghost, seven Corporal Works of Mercy, seven Spiritual Works of Mercy, eight Beatitudes, seven Deadly Sins, four Last Things, three Evangelical Councils, ten Commandments; three, four, seven, eight, ten, twelve are numbers that have an historical status far higher than five. I am not anxious to defend Herbart's system of ethics. Partly under the influence of evolutionary thought, the origin of our moral notions, and the nature of them, is a subject of constant discussion. But it is a significant fact that, when Henry Sidgwick attempted to discover by searching analysis what were the abstract elements in our concept of Virtue, he alighted upon three (Rational Egoism, Rational Benevolence, and Equity) which were "ultimate and unanalysable": that he found the notion (not necessarily the *fact*) of Inner Freedom to be indissolubly connected with voluntary action: and that

a fifth notion ("Perfection") occupied a challenging position in Ethics. Now, these five are not exactly identical with Herbart's five—Inner Freedom, Perfection, Benevolence, Justice, Equity; but there is sufficient resemblance between the results of these two quite independent analyses to prevent either of them being regarded as reckless or puerile.

The study of Herbart's ethics is especially necessary for those who have been alarmed at the nature of his psychology.

Is Herbart's System Mechanical?

This man, whose language and ideas seem sometimes almost those of a materialist; this man, who seems to regard Virtue as the mechanical result of the working of a certain apperception-mechanism, and Vice as the inevitable result of that mechanism getting out of order—this Herbart is an "intuitionist" in morals, and attributes to the soul the native power of passing judgment on moral relations. True, as his critics say, a mere machine, even an "apperceptive machine," cannot "judge." They need to be reminded that Herbart never said that it could.

This book will be largely devoted to a consideration of the much-abused apperception-mechanism, but as there may be some danger of our forgetting the other side of Herbart's teaching, it is necessary to emphasise not only the teleological spirit of Herbartianism—its deliberate aiming at a moral goal—but the intuitional character of its ethics. How, indeed, could Herbart describe Morality as "the one and the whole Aim of Education," unless he assumed moral distinctions from the first? With Pope, he would say, after gazing at the apperception-mechanism, whose working constituted the main part of men's psychical life:—

> "Yet, if we look more closely, we shall find
> Most have the seeds of judgment in their mind."

The apperception-mechanism is a fact; and that we judge actions as good or bad is another fact. Herbart may not have succeeded—no one ever has, whether theologian or philosopher—in explaining the entire moral life, and in eluci-

dating the relations between the mechanical and the teleological. But the amazing thing is that, in Herbart's teaching, both the mechanical and the teleological get their dues.

The Second Moral Idea.

A word or two about the "second moral idea"—*Vollkommenheit*, commonly translated "Perfection," but much better by the alternative expression "Efficiency of Will." If we really feel a quasi-moral admiration for the "bad" man who has a strong and consistent will; and a quasi-moral contempt for the "good" man who is weak and inconsistent, then Herbart was right in regarding "*Vollkommenheit*" as a "moral idea." He did not mean, as some of his critics absurdly imagine, that a character showing only "*Vollkommenheit*" was completely moral. The burglar, the conqueror, the savant, are not necessarily moral, though, in their different ways, they may show great "efficiency of will." Herbart simply means that this efficiency is necessary to a man if we are to pass an entirely favourable moral judgment upon him; but there are four other ideas also. *Vollkommenheit* stands for the demand foreshadowed in the preceding section—that the human soul shall have outlook, power and coherence, and that the human Will shall possess such corresponding qualities as breadth, efficiency, and harmony.

The Other Four Ideas.

The other "moral ideas"—Inner Freedom, Benevolence, Right or Law, and Equity—correspond in some measure to the common elements recognised in Virtue; they are, indeed, abstract, philosophic forms of these. Into their exact significance there is no special need to inquire; the fact that the total concrete concept of Virtue is a highly complex one, in the view of the Herbartians, has been sufficiently indicated.

But can Education contribute much to the realisation of this great concept? Does not virtue really spring from a mysterious source—Transcendental Freedom of Will; a source that cannot be touched by any efforts, however strenuous, on the part of the educator?

CHAPTER II.

Some Postulates.

4. Transcendental Freedom of Will Must Be Rejected by the Educator.

"*Not the gentlest breath of transcendental freedom must be allowed to blow through ever so small a chink into the teacher's domain. If so, how is he to begin to deal with the lawless marvels of a being superior to natural laws, on whose assistance he cannot reckon, whose interruptions he can neither foresee nor prevent?*"

Rejection of any Alien Kind of Freedom.

When the vision of a completed science of Education first rose before Herbart's eyes, he seems to have realised that a fatal obstacle to the prestige of such a science would be the doctrine held in various forms, popular and philosophical, under the name of "Free Will." Herbart, did not, of course, deny that there was a true kind of "Free Will"—"*a freedom of choice which we all find in ourselves, which we honour as the most beautiful phenomenon in ourselves*"; but such "freedom" had to find its place *within*, not outside, the future Science of Education; it had to be regarded, not as a foreign power, daily and hourly upsetting the calculations of the educationist, but rather as something for which the educationist himself was responsible; a freedom which has its own causes, and is thus a kind of determinism—yet a determinism which the teacher can influence, and is thus the reverse of fatalism. He was challenged, in fact, by the

question, "Can Education really influence the Will to any important degree, and thus build up Character?" If it could not do this, the teacher's task was instantly reduced to one that was very humble, when compared with the task as conceived by Herbart: "*He will give up entirely the most important part of his business, and finally limit his whole care to the presenting of pieces of information.*"*

Importance of the Question for the Teacher.

Such "mere instruction," indeed — totally ineffective for any great task—must be the main *rôle* of the educator, as conceived by men who believe that the human Will is so "free" as to be inaccessible to any educational influence. We must ask, then, "Is the good will present from the beginning; '*a stream whose origin man does not know*'; a stream over which he can really exert no control whatever?" Such a Will would resemble the melancholy of a certain Merchant of Venice:

> "How I caught it, found it, or came by it,
> What stuff 'tis made of, whereof it is born,
> I am to learn."

Herbart denied that the Will was free in this sense. Human action takes place "*as an inevitable effect of certain mental causes, just as necessarily as every effect in the material world, only not in any way according to material laws (e.g., of weight, impact, etc.), which latter have not the remotest similarity with those of mental operations. The teacher, like the astronomer, takes courage to attempt to investigate the conformity to law of the phenomena before him.*" It is difficult to see what other attitude could be taken up by anyone possessing an interest in Education. Admitted that the child is not mere clay in the hands of a potter; that much of its conduct springs from obscure

* Or "stuffing with knowledge and facts," as moderns would express it. This kind of talk about "stuffing" implies that "knowledge" and "facts" are comparatively unimportant things.

causes (largely hereditary), causes which may simulate "freedom"; the fact remains that an educator must believe in Education, and admit that "*the sensuous world, as systematised by the teacher*," appears "*as influencing the pupil's freedom*; *this suffices*; *now we have found our field.*" In Herbart's much later phraseology—he never changed his opinion on this matter—"*the fundamental idea of Education is the pupil's capacity for cultivation.*" The teacher's power is certainly not absolute; "*an unlimited capacity for cultivation ought not to be assumed by the teacher*";* but he must not admit either the doctrine of fatalism—which regards teacher and pupil as alike carried along in a strong current without will of their own—or the doctrine of transcendental freedom, which is, to all intents and purposes, and despite its name, really a doctrine of fatalism, for the influences of Education are regarded as incapable of penetrating into the inner sanctuary of the Will; the Will must thus, to all intents and purposes, be left to take its own mysterious course.

Significance of Instruction.

Herbart, in opposition to such views, urges that Education —nay, Instruction itself—*can* penetrate into the sanctuary of the Will; in his system, therefore, Instruction has a very honourable place. Others, who seem to claim that the Will is inaccessible to Instruction, and only capable of being influenced—if, indeed, even this is possible—by means of Training (Zucht)† reduce Instruction to a minor matter, "*a presentation of memoranda. Many, prematurely wearied with these considerations, will surely throw themselves upon the indolent bed of freedom, even if not on that of fate. To such I have here absolutely nothing to say. And if the bed of thorns upon which they throw themselves does not compel them to start up, then their peace will not be easily disturbed*

* In a later section of the present book, the limitations of the teacher will be considered.

† See Preface for the controversy over this word.

by mere disputation." In other words, to deny that "Virtue can be taught," to claim that the Will, whether owing to fate or to some unaccountable freedom, is beyond the reach of the Educator—such a contention is one of "indolence" and despair. No Science of Education need be dreamt of so long as such claims are put forward; the science would not be worthy of any sane man's pursuit "*As far as the Educator is concerned, Morality is an occurrence, something happening in Nature,*" something that has causes of its own. Indeed, even the opponents of this view sometimes feel forced to recognise at least its partial truth; the teacher has "*to furnish occasions—to remove hindrances*"; thus the "absolute" Will is found to be, after all, immeshed in the natural mechanism, and not wholly independent of this, as some of its advocates would fain contend.

Danger of the Doctrine that the Will is a Faculty.

Possibly Herbart has prejudiced his case by his insistence on this point. Anxious to establish the importance and the value of a Science of Education, he saw that to regard the Will as wholly mysterious—as a "Faculty" largely independent of the rest of the mind and therefore of the teacher's "Instruction"—would be a fatal obstacle to the establishment of such a Science. If medical men were tied down to the old belief that every disease had a supernatural origin and was the work of devils; if the astronomer were tied down to the belief that the motions of the planets were due to certain erratic spirits which severally inhabited them—a science of medicine and a science of astronomy could scarcely arise; at any rate there would be no confidence in its conclusions. Herbart was anxious to remove such a stumbling-block from the path of his projected Science of Education. If the task of Education is to build up good moral characters there must be some assurance that Education is morally effective, and that good characters are not solely or mainly the result of influences beyond the teachers' reach.

For example, suppose that moral goodness sprang *entirely* from the sacraments of the Church, the teacher's work would then be quite ineffective as a character-forming agency, however important in other respects. Though no one has ever deliberately claimed that Education is morally ineffective, Herbart thought it best at the very outset to protest against any doctrine of "Freedom" that might be so interpreted or twisted as to depreciate the importance of the teacher, and throughout the pages that follow the wisdom of this warning will be seen.

5. Possibility of a Science of Education: Need of (*a*) Psychology, (*b*) Observation of the Pupil, (*c*) A Definite Educational Aim.

Education, then, must be no longer subjected to the dictation of amateurs or of non-educationists, but must become a genuine science; "*the centre of a sphere of exploration, no longer exposed to the danger of government by a stranger, as a remote tributary province*"; it should cultivate "*more an independent mode of thought.*" It can never benefit fully from other sources until it has learnt to be true to its "*intrinsic conceptions.*" "*Only when each science seeks to teach in its own way and also with the same force as its neighbours, can a beneficial intercourse take place between them.*" Herbart's words point to a time when it will be as impossible for medical, commercial, theological, or military men, or for men whose eminence lies in other sciences than Education, to dictate the methods and curricula of schools, as it is for them to dictate the methods pursued in a hospital ward. Readers of Part I. will not need to be given examples of this interference and dictation.

Future Independence of Education.

But this ideal of a "Science of Education" will not be realised so long as teachers glory in mere empiricism. "*A nonagenarian village schoolmaster has the experience of his ninety years' routine course; he has the consciousness of*

his long toils; but has he also the criticism of his work and methods?" Clearly he has not. No one will claim that *his* science—least of all, "educational science"—is infallible; but, nevertheless, "*nothing is learnt from* ONE *experience, and just as little from scattered observations.*" Indeed, a single educational "experiment" or "experience" would take no less time than half the life of the pupil, for only when half his life is passed can we judge of the influence that Education has exerted on his character. Scientific knowledge is required as well as "experience."

"Experience" Alone is Not Enough.

In considering the possibility of a Science of Education we come therefore to realise the need of Psychology: "*I think I recognize,*" says Herbart, "*the difficulty as well as the possibility of such a science. Long will it be before we have it, longer still before we can expect it from teachers. Never, however, can it be a substitute for observation of the pupil.*" In fact, Psychology will probably never be able to give us the individual: "*this can only be discovered, not deduced*": every child is somewhat different from every other child. On the other hand Psychology may some day be able to lay down the *possibilities* of Education according as these are limited by changing circumstances. Still, such a Psychology was, at Herbart's time, little more than a pious wish. Herbart himself is regarded as the founder of modern empirical Psychology.

Psychology is Needed.

But one thing of the highest importance is possible for us: we can have clear views of the *Aim* of Education. "*What the Educator should care for must lie open before him like a map, or, if possible, like the plan of a well-built city. . . . With what aim the teacher should grasp his work—this . . . is for me the first half of the Science of Education. . . . Such a map I offer here for the inexperienced.*"

A Definite Aim.

Herbart's modest references to the condition of Psychology must appear significant to those who have been led to believe that his educational principles were "deduced" or "derived" from that science, and that the latter was the "starting-point" of his educational proposals. It is clear that his "starting-point" was in Ethics; or rather (for he had not, at the time, formulated any comprehensive system of Ethics) in an intense conviction of what Education had to do for the moral betterment of man. No doubt, even at this stage in his development, he had attained a certain insight into the relation between ideas and character, a relation which he *afterwards* represented in a mathematical, technical, and (as some would say) "mechanical" form. But at this time no "mathematical" or "mechanical" view had been attained; Psychology still presented itself to Herbart's mind as a completely embryonic science; nay, he even went so far as to say, in his *Allgemeine Pädagogik* that "*Education has no time to make holiday now till philosophical questions are once for all cleared up. Rather it is to be desired that pedagogy shall be kept as free as possible from philosophical doubts.*" Nay, even six years later he still spoke of the "*lack of Psychology.*"§ So far as he "deduced" his educational principles at all he "deduced" them from an "aim," not from Psychology. The very title of his great book is enough to indicate this.

Herbart's System not "Deduced" from Psychology.

Herbart's Psychology, then, was quite unformulated at the time he wrote the *Allgemeine Pädagogik*. And yet the germs of his great and characteristic doctrine—one of the most important doctrines ever enunciated by a human being—can be clearly detected in that work. "*Action springs out of the circle of thought*;" the task of forming aright the "circle of thought" is thus a task of supreme importance. Herbart

"Action Springs out of the Circle of Thought."

§ *On the Dark Side of Pedagogy*, 1812.

emphasises this in his significant remarks on the importance of instruction.

6. Instruction is vitally important in the Herbartian view.

"*I here at once confess that I have no conception of Education without Instruction, just as conversely, in this book at least, I do not recognise any Instruction which does not educate. Whatever arts and acquirements a young man may learn from a teacher for the mere sake of profit are as indifferent to the Educator as the colour he chooses for his coat. But how his circle of thought is being formed is everything to the teacher, for out of thoughts come feelings, and from them principles and modes of action.*"

The connection here suggested by Herbart between Character and Instruction, between action and the circle of thought, has not yet been made clear, and cannot be until the doctrines of Apperception and Interest have been expounded. But Herbart's point obviously is that the ideas conferred by the teacher's Instruction have, somehow, to penetrate into the soul and generate forces; Education has not to remain a mere "*presentation of memoranda*" or "cramming with facts," supplemented by periodical disturbances of the mere feelings. Such a thing as this is "*Education without Instruction*," instead of the "*Education through Instruction*," which Herbart himself aims at. Again and again he tells us that the main part of Education lies in the culture or formation of the circle of thought, on the ground that this latter is the basis of all deliberate action.

Fundamental Importance of Instruction.

Readers may fail to see the significance of this point. For teachers it is really of immense importance. A teacher's work is to *teach*; this, one would think, is obvious. But there are scores of eminent though somewhat traditional educationists who will say that "Teaching," "Instruction," is really far less important for the child than other things:

Is a Teacher's Business to Teach?

than Training, than Example, than Religion. Such a view saps at once the importance of the "teacher." His most distinctive task is suddenly deprived of most of its significance. Readers may here advisably refer back to Mr. Skrine's words.*

It was Herbart's great merit to have seen that, if character-forming is ever to be accepted as "the one and whole purpose of Education," and thus unity take the place of distraction and chaos, Instruction would have somehow to occupy the highest place among educational agencies. It would be disastrous to hold that character-forming was solely the work of Training, while other ends had to be attended to by means of Instruction. This would be to admit that there was no "*one and whole purpose of Education.*" The teacher's main business is to teach; and this business must somehow help the process of character-forming. And this, I may add, is one of the many places where Herbart, despite the technical and scientific form which he throws round his concepts, is really closer to common sense than any other educator. The "man in the street" considers that the teacher's business is to teach. Unluckily academic educationists consider that his business is to form Character somehow, but not by teaching, for "Virtue cannot be taught." Herbart had the sublime audacity, at the age of thirty, to say that the two tasks must be made into one if Education was ever to be placed on a scientific footing.

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* *See* p. 9.

CHAPTER III.

Discipline or Government.

7. The (subsidiary) Position of Discipline or Government* in a System of Education. Measures Employed by Discipline or Government; Supervision, Threatening, Punishment, Occupation.

"*It is doubtful whether this chapter* (*on Discipline*) *belongs on the whole to the Science of Education, and should not rather be subjoined to those divisions of practical philosophy, which treat of Discipline in General. Care for intellectual culture is, in fact, essentially different from care for the maintenance of order.*"

The distinctive, or at least the most prominent, feature in the Herbartian system is its emphasis on the connection between the intellectual and moral sides of man. Character is rooted in the circle of thought; consequently the forming aright of this "circle" constitutes the main, though not the exclusive, task of the genuine educator. But another task, which looms somewhat large in the lives of most schoolmasters —that of maintaining external order—must be considered. Is it, then, a part of Education proper?

Critics have questioned the validity of the distinction here drawn by Herbart. To regard external Discipline as some-

* *See* Preface.

thing different from Education proper—the formation of character through action on the circle of thought and through Moral Training—is, they will tell us, a misleading and over-subtle procedure. The two things interlace.

Herbart knew perfectly well that they interlaced. "*It is impossible to separate them entirely.*" But he knew also that unless the vital distinction between diverse agencies was clearly recognised, no agency would be used with full and clear realisation of its function. The whole history of Education has been a confirmation of this fact. The vast majority of schoolmasters, if asked concerning the Moral Education given in their schools, will point to Discipline, Biblical lessons, *esprit de corps*, and other special and limited means of building up character; the notion of a comprehensive "*Educative Instruction*" as the chief means to this end will not occur to them. There is, in fact, immense need for the very distinction that has called forth the polemics of Herbart's critics. The great task of demonstrating how Instruction can form Character is a task which requires "*special artists . . . so that it may be brought to perfection by the concentrated power of genius.*" In practice, Instruction, Training, and Discipline overlap, but there is great need for "*clearness of conception*," for distinguishing their diverse though not separable functions, especially in the interests of the greatest and most misunderstood of the three. I recollect how, at a meeting of teachers in North London, on the question of Moral Instruction being referred to, one teacher called out, "We are giving it all day long!" He meant, no doubt, that Discipline and Training were operative all day long; he could not have meant exactly what he said. Nevertheless, he said it. Now, just as Herbart analyses the concrete notion of Morality into five abstract elements, which, though distinguishable, cannot exist in complete isolation from each other, so, in the interests of clear thought, he distinguishes between Instruction, Training, and Discipline.

Need of Clearness Here.

Discipline, then, is an attempt to keep in check the native waywardness and lawlessness of the child, who, though in a sense "wilful," has yet no true voluntary "will," for the latter springs out of the circle of thought. A spirit of order—precepts of formal or external morality—may thus be instilled by means of Discipline; but the latter, *per se*, makes no direct attempt to build up character; and Herbart has no special admiration for the semi-military methods in which teachers take such pride.

Herbart Condemns Rigid Supervision.

Supervision, one of the chief means of Discipline, can easily be carried to excess. "*It has been my misfortune to witness too many examples of the effect of strict supervision in public institutions, and perhaps, having due regard to safety of life and strength of limb, I am too much possessed with the idea that boys and youths must be allowed to run risks if they are to become men. Suffice it to remember that punctilious and constant supervision is burdensome alike to the supervisor and those he watches over, and is apt therefore to be associated on both sides with deceit, and thrown off at every opportunity—and also that the need for it grows with the degree in which it is used, and that at last every moment of its intermittance is fraught with danger. Further, it prevents children from knowing and testing themselves, and learning a thousand things which are not included in any pedagogic system, but can only be found by self-search. . . . From those who grow up under the oppression of constant observation, no versatility, no inventive power, no spirit of daring, no confident demeanour, can be expected.*"

The words just quoted will surprise many who view Herbartianism as a system destructive of initiative and energy. It is perfectly true that the most characteristic feature of the system is an emphasis on Instruction; but within its ample folds is found room for every educational agency that has proved its value by its success. Indeed, the

astonishing fact in connection with Herbart's own doctrines is their all-embracing character; the complete absence of one-sidedness, exaggeration, and narrow partisanship. Herbart's successors may not always have imitated their master, and may, in some cases, have laid themselves open to attack on the ground that they destroy their pupils' independence; but it is clear that Herbart himself did not give any countenance to such a danger. Elementary teachers, who have been compelled by the existence of large classes to adopt a stiff system of "discipline," should ask themselves whether Herbart's verdict upon such a system is right. Are those schools where the discipline is firmest, the schools which turn out the best boys? Have the boys really been "disciplined" in the true sense; have they learnt to be self-reliant, self-governing? Or has the military system under which they have been brought up deprived them of inner power, and sent them out into the world unprepared for freedom—reckless hooligans? One of the chief difficulties that faces a translator of Herbart is the fact that the word "Discipline" has two meanings in English; it sometimes means "Training," and corresponds to Herbart's *Zucht*; while for primary teachers it always means "Preservation of Order," and corresponds to Herbart's *Regierung*.

The Immensity of the Task of Education.

The dangers of excessive supervision are no argument for its abolition. We must no more expect to form great characters by "*leaving children to run wild without supervision and without culture*" than by a repressive system of Discipline. Difficulties confront Education on every side; everywhere are we in danger of falling into one error by seeking to avoid another: "*Education is a vast whole of ceaseless labour which exacts true proportion from beginning to end; merely to avoid a few errors is of no avail.*"

Coming to other details we find that Herbart was no sentimentalist in matters of punishment. "*It will be in vain to try and do entirely without corporal punishment.*" But one

remark in the *Science of Education* is of profound importance in this connection. The punishments of Discipline are external; the teacher must "*scorn to take any notice of the bad will, together with the insult implied therein. The Discipline of children is powerless to punish the desire to do evil; to wound this desire is the business of Education, which only begins after Discipline has done its work.*" The distinction here drawn is similar to the one drawn by Edward Thring and Dr. Laurie, which goes counter to most popular prejudices on matters of punishment, but is, nevertheless, a profoundly true distinction. These writers urge that moral offences cannot be eradicated by corporal punishment, and they urge—Thring, especially, with great clearness—that such punishment should be frankly recognised as a valuable measure of external discipline only, and not be associated with moral reproof. This is also Herbart's view. The child's "Will" is not yet formed; his lawless actions have to be restrained, perhaps by severe punishment, but they have not to be regarded as springing from moral delinquency. To speak of the "free will" of a child of eight years—as was recently done in a court of justice—is, on the Herbartian premisses, dangerous and inadmissible; and when writers on Education claim that children can "deliberately, and with full intent, set up their private wills against the common and moral will of the community," the writers are manifesting, in the eyes of the Herbartians, an ignorance of psychical causation that is appalling. Punish by all means; uphold the majesty of external law; but do not attribute full moral delinquency to children. There may be every appearance of this; a child may lie or steal; but, on the Herbartian view, many years will have to pass before the child's circle of thought is rich enough to generate a will that can, with any plausibility, be called moral or immoral.

Punishments of Mere Discipline.

In short, school punishments should *not*, as a rule, be

punishments for immorality, but for violation of external order. If this principle be a true one, most of the "school board" rules relative to punishment, and nearly all school management books on the same subject, are drawn up on wrong lines. In fact, we have here another indication of the need of establishing clear theoretical *distinctions* in pedagogy; the distinction between Discipline and the other tasks of the educator is really a vital one, and though some recent Herbartians appear willing to abandon it, no one who knows the chaotic state of British educational thought will do so. Many a child of nine or ten is being regarded as a vicious criminal because the distinction drawn by Herbart is unrecognised.

It may be pointed out that, on this question of punishment (including threatening) Herbart is partly in agreement, partly in disagreement, with his predecessor Rousseau. Both writers recognise that the very young child cannot be regarded as morally responsible, or deserving of punishment in any strict sense; but whereas Rousseau infers from this that all punishment of children should be abolished, Herbart's treatment of the question is marked by a careful weighing of the possibilities. Young children (here he agrees with Rousseau and disagrees with Locke) should not be reasoned with; at the stage of mere discipline, reasoning is out of place, children have to obey.

Reasoning with Children.

Herbart's insistence on the value of Occupation as an aid to Discipline shows that—contrary to common opinion—he realised the importance of the motor element in man, an element emphasised by his contemporary Fröbel and now winning an increasing recognition every year. He expressly recommends the giving of "*freer scope for the children's activity*" though he sees that his advice is more capable of being carried out in country schools than in those of towns. "*Pleasant and harmless occupations to provide an outlet for restlessness which cannot be pent up*" are eminently desirable, though Herbart makes no

Value of Occupation.

attempt to expatiate upon this department of the teacher's work on the ground that "*so much has been said on this subject.*" We have here another instance of the important truth which readers of Herbart soon discover for themselves, that though Herbart's greatest and most far-reaching task was in the realm of Instruction proper, he was always conscious of the other departments of work which fall to the educator. He may sometimes be over-subtle in distinguishing the strictly "educative" from the "non-educative," but he never ignores anything of real importance.

Before this question of Discipline is left, the reader should note here, as also he will see at a later stage, how great a contrast is on the whole presented between Herbart's actual doctrines and the "soft pedagogy" which, in many modern circles, is supposed to be deduced from those doctrines. There is nothing of the boisterous optimism, nothing of the invertebrate sentimentalism of Rousseau, in the proposals of Herbart himself. It is true, Herbartianism is merciful — merciful in a way that is perhaps only possible with a deterministic system—for it sees the connection between the moral evils we deplore and the causes of those evils; but in mercy alike to the child and to society it refuses to discard even stern measures where these seem called for. It bears no malice against the child it punishes; it attributes no moral depravity; but—realising, as no other educational system realises, that "cause and effect" holds good in the moral as in the physical realm—it pursues the task of character-building with a steady, remorseless persistence. The schoolmaster's task is great; time is short, for "*in the pupil's seventeenth year Education proper is impossible, or at most only possible in those who see what they have missed, and in whom the wish to submit themselves to Education is keen.*" If the child's waywardness stand in the way of the execution of an urgent and vital task, that waywardness must be crushed. With good teachers the task will not be, in normal cases, impossible though it will be

unceasing and laborious; Discipline, by means of Supervision, Threatening, Punishment, and Occupation has but to hold the fort until the forces which Instruction is calling into existence have time to appear on the scene; but, by gentle means or by stern means, the task has to be accomplished. The child must submit, even though the tone of Discipline has to be "*short and sharp.*" It is right for the child to be convinced of the good intentions of the teacher, and thus also of the rational necessity for obedience, but anything of the nature of elaborate reasoning is out of place, for the child is incapable of it. Some day a new nature will have been implanted—a mass of ideas, a circle of thought, an apperceptive mechanism; then ——!

A New Force soon to Appear.

This is not by any means the Fröbelian way of regarding Education. Both Herbart and Fröbel recognised that there was a mysterious "individuality" in the child—a mass of impulses and instincts, different in each case; and both educators recognised that the individuality must be considered and allowed for. But, while Fröbel regarded the individuality as something transcendently divine, Herbart regarded it as something more or less crude, primitive, and healthily barbaric. His stress was always on the conscious, the deliberate; Fröbel's stress was largely on the unconscious, the instinctive. Thus the idea of Discipline or Government has no place in Fröbel's teaching; the idea that there was any "waywardness" needing to be "crushed" scarcely crossed his mind. Some one has said that the word "obedience" is never mentioned by him at all.

CHAPTER IV.

Education Proper. Introduction of the Concept of Many-sided Interest.

8. The Strenuousness of Education.

We now approach the subject of Education proper.

Fundamental though the distinction is between this and external Discipline, they have one thing in common: each is a serious, strenuous business, "*cognisant of something which may be called compulsion.*" Though Education is never harsh it is "*often very strict.*" Even tears may sometimes have to be the lot of the schoolboy.

Herbartianism is not Soft Pedagogy.

Thus at the very outset of his discussion Herbart shows how very far from a mere easy-going "interestingness" is the task of the educator. "Soft pedagogy" is not true Herbartian pedagogy, though it is often identified with it. Indeed, Mr. Hughes, in *Fröbel's Educational Laws*, contrasts Herbart with Fröbel on this very ground, and points out that the former made a much larger use of compulsion, both in forcing attention to study and in controlling the conduct, than the founder of the kindergarten.

But though there is nothing sentimental or invertebrate in Herbart's system, there is a recognition that the teacher must possess a sensibility for whatever is beautiful and attractive in humanity and youth. A sour spirit is no equipment for a

teacher; it will keep him at arm's length from his pupils. He should avoid alike the extremes of stiffness and of excessive familiarity.

'Do not Educate Too Much."

Another of the common errors with regard to Herbart is that his system tends to be so dominating towards the pupils that they are swallowed by it, made into its puppets. Herbart in these preliminary remarks expressly warns against such a calamity. "*Do not educate too much; refrain from all avoidable application of that power by which the teacher bends his pupils this way or that.*"

Moral Culture not Isolated.

And now he approaches what may be called the crisis of his great book. He has declared that Morality is the aim of Education—the sole aim, or at any rate the highest. But Morality is not an isolated phenomenon of the mind. There has never been a thinker more opposed than Herbart to the "faculty" doctrine, which breaks up the mind into separate parts or activities; and we are therefore not surprised to hear him urge that "*the problem of Moral Education is not separable from Education as a whole, but stands in a necessary far-reaching connection with the remaining problems of Education. . . . Moral culture pre-supposes other parts of culture.*" Herbart does not deny, of course, that some parts of Education are more morally valuable than others, he only protests against the view that the formation of Moral Character is a process that can go its own solitary way.

This after all, is only preliminary skirmishing on Herbart's part. He has affirmed, somewhat dogmatically, that the whole purpose of Education can be summed up in the concept "Morality," and he has hinted that Morality is not an isolated thing. He now turns aside to consider whether there is any other *possible* educational goal; for, though everyone admits that Morality is a *necessary* goal of Education—something at which we *must* aim—few would admit that, as commonly

interpreted, it embraces everything. Temporarily or permanently we have to take other factors into consideration.

The pupil has ultimately to select this or that trade or profession; we are quite in the dark as to the future; clearly, therefore, the work of the teacher cannot be to prepare him for any one calling exclusively. But men insist that Education must be, in some sense, a preparation for life. Tell them that its aim is "Morality" and they will not be satisfied; something more mundane, practical, utilitarian, seems to be demanded, and yet the ordinary school cannot possibly teach particular trades and professions; it can only develop such a general efficiency, such a general power of adaptation, that any calling may be subsequently followed with a fair chance of success.

The Demands of Life.

Herbart, looking around him for a term that would meet the case, alighted upon "Many-sided Interest."

9. Many-sided Interest as a Working Concept for the Teacher.

Fröbelian readers will remember how the word "Kindergarten" flashed upon Fröbel's mind as the one for which he had been seeking long and vainly. Much depends on a word. The profoundest truth or the wildest error may be launched on a career of dazzling success if it can be summed up in a plausible and telling formula. Rousseau's astonishing influence was largely due to his use of the ambiguous and seductive word "Nature"; and there can be little doubt that Herbart's is due as much to the terminological skill which he showed in the selection of words like "Interest," as to the inherent truth of his doctrines. He was not the inventor of the word, but he was the first man in all history to bring out its full significance and to give it the place it deserved in educational thought.

Compared with any other formula, that of "Many-sided Interest" possesses undeniable advantages.

"Harmonious development of all human powers"—the definition of Education which stands out amid the fluctuations

of Pestalozzi's doctrines—is unsatisfactory for several reasons. Firstly, the words "development" and "power," especially the latter, almost seem to suggest a condition of fixed attainment, as when we say that a "scoundrelly" prize-fighter is a "powerful" man, or that his muscles are "well developed"; the words are not sufficiently suggestive of living energy; the man whose "powers" have been "developed" may at times refuse to use them. *Nay, he may use them for wrong ends.* "Power," skill, and efficiency may as much belong to a wicked man as to a good one, and may make him doubly or trebly dangerous. This, in fact, is the second objection to Pestalozzi's formula; it is not sufficiently suggestive of useful, wholesome, *moral* activity. The great scoundrels of the world were gifted with "powers" of a very high order. Thirdly and lastly—Is it certain that *all* human powers should be "developed?" Just as there are useless, or almost useless, parts of the body—rudimentary organs that are slowly disappearing through atrophy (the human toes, the mammary glands of the male, etc.), so there may be useless, or almost useless, instincts which Education should check rather than foster. No doubt many of the weird instincts of childhood and adolescence* can be made use of in Education (*e.g.*, the boy's love of wandering, of capturing or hunting animals), but it is quite *possible* that other instincts call for absolute repression. Thus, on the whole, the phrase "harmonious development of all human powers" does not give a very satisfactory working-definition of Education; obviously, too, the word "harmonious" is full of ambiguity and can be made to mean almost anything.

"Harmonious Development of all Human Powers."

"Many-sided Interest" is a much safer phrase. Men can criticise it, no doubt, but it has immense advantages over the phrase just considered. Firstly, it suggests life and movement,

*Lombroso tells us that all normal children pass through stages of "passionate cruelty, laziness, lying, and thieving."

not merely latent "power." Secondly, though scoundrels may undoubtedly possess something of "Many-sided Interest," they are probably better, not worse men, for possessing it. A Borgia or a Catiline is made a more dangerous scoundrel by possessing power and efficiency, physical and intellectual; he is made a better man by an "Interest" in books or nature. The argument could easily be pressed too far, but it is, nevertheless, worth a great deal. Genuine "Interest" is "*dis*-interested"; its possessor, however villainous in some matters, does, to a certain extent, lay aside his villainy when indulging his "Interests." Thirdly and lastly, the word "Interest" is a word possessing dignity; it suggests elevated pursuits of an intellectual or aesthetic nature, and gives no encouragement to the idea that every crude instinct has to be gratified.

Mr. J. L. Paton and many masters in secondary schools prefer the word "Effort" to the word "Interest." But surely Interest implies Effort, while Effort fails to imply scores of things that fall under "Interest." The popularity of the "Effort" theory in secondary schools is due to the fact that for a long time the curriculum of those schools has been mainly Latin and Greek—hard rather than interesting subjects. It is not because the masters of public schools have always carefully thought out educational questions that they place this immense stress on "Effort" and ignore scores of other things equally important; it is partly because they have had to adapt themselves to an exacting curriculum. But how does the plan work with regard to intellect? "The majority of boys turned out are ignorant," says Sir Oliver Lodge. How does the plan work with regard to morals? Mr. Skrine, when dealing with the ideal of the public school boy, speaks of the "narrowness of his moral admirations"; he is "morally colour-blind." These grave accusations would not be so possible if Interest rather than Effort were accepted as a working-formula in secondary schools.

"Effort."

There are objections to the other formulæ commonly put forward by educators. Dr. Davidson, in his *New Interpretation of Herbart's Psychology and Educational Theory*, demonstrates the superiority of "Many-sided Interest" over "Self-realization"; "what is wanted in national, social, and individual life is an outlook *away* from the self." Again, to describe the aim of Education as "Adaptation to Environment" is objectionable on a score of grounds, the chief of which is that many "environments" are bad. To say, with Herbert Spencer, that the aim of Education is "Complete Living" brings us close up to "Many-sided Interest," but the latter phrase is probably the more helpful to the teacher. Fröbel's references to developing or manifesting "the divine in man," or to producing a "pure, faithful, complete and, therefore, holy life," fail just where Herbart's formula succeeds; they do not carry on their face any educational suggestiveness, and the one who hears them first will feel doubtful whether the work of the teacher or that of the clergyman is under consideration.

"Self-realization."

On the whole, then, there is less danger, less ambiguity, and less vagueness in the phrase "Many-sided Interest" than in any other that has been suggested as a working-aim for educators. Difficulties there are, and the phrase needs to be safeguarded. But it has less need of safeguarding than any of its rivals.

The phrase has another advantage which, I think, has not been previously pointed out in any precise way.

Psychologists analyse mental life into three general functions—Knowing, Feeling, Willing; Cognition, Emotion, Volition. An educational formula should do justice to all three. Now "Many-sided Interest" does so in a remarkable manner. I leave readers to work this point out for themselves, and I am convinced that they will come to

Superiority of Many-sided Interest.

realise how wonderfully *central* the idea of Interest is; how it implies *every* kind of psychical process; and how, therefore, it safeguards us against one-sided methods such as would be inevitable if, for example, we chose "Effort" as our working formula, thus exaggerating Volition—however crude or ill-directed—at the expense of the two other factors.

I now return to Herbart's exposition.

CHAPTER V.

The Crisis of Herbart's System. Moral Value of Interest.

10. The Dual Aim.

"*Is the Aim of Education Single or Manifold?*" Herbart asks early in his *Allgemeine Pädagogik*; and even now, a century later, it is a question that presses implacably upon us. He saw clearly enough that to establish an *artificial* unity was useless or pernicious. If it be true that Education, however carefully thought out, has a number of tasks which remain distinct to the end, *e.g.*, the giving of mechanical or professional skill, the teaching of religion, the cultivation of a taste for beauty, the sharpening of the wits; if these are *really and finally disparate*, no object can be gained by employing a common name, *e.g.*, "Efficiency," "Perfection," "Virtue." "*The effort to attain scientific unity often misleads the thinker to force into connection . . . things many and distinct.*" If Character and Many-sided Interest are two, we do no good by pretending that they are one. But if they are two, there will always exist an element of chaos and perplexity in educational work. No man can serve two masters, and no system of Education can aim very successfully at the two distinct ends. There is therefore "*great need of being able to grasp in one conception the whole idea of a work like that of Education, so immeasurably manifold and yet so*

intimately connected in all its parts. From such a conception proceeds unity of plan and concentrated power."

Clearly, there can be no "*unity of plan*" if we regard Character and Will as separate from the other states or functions of the mind, and claim that they are linked only to transcendental, inaccessible, or unintelligible causes. It is no wonder that Education has never gone beyond the stage of "*passable mediocrity*" so long as it has suffered such views to prevail. To carry out educational work under a conviction that it has "sacred" and "secular" sides, and that these are distinct, is exactly as foolish as to carry out medical work under the conviction that some diseases are the result of devil-influence (for which the medical man has no cure), and others the result of natural causes. Herbart seeks to bring the *whole* task of Education down to the teacher's plane; there are to be no flighty, or seductive, appeals to the transcendental until we have exhausted what is actually within our reach; for example, Instruction. "*Passable mediocrity*" is all that can be expected so long as people assert or imply that "Virtue cannot be taught."

Still—this chaos—this conflict between ideals—does it not threaten Herbart himself? Morality—Many-sided Interest; two concepts lie before the teacher. Are they identical? Are they reconcilable? Or must the educator oscillate helplessly between them?

The Crowning Achievement of Herbart—at any rate, his crowning task—is the demonstration of how closely connected are Morality and Many-sided Interest.

Those men who have criticised Herbart on the ground of "dogmatism" would do well to study how cautiously, how tentatively, and with what humility, he sought to establish the relation between the two central concepts of his system. He clung to the view that sooner or later education could be unified by the acceptance of Morality as its one aim, but he saw facing him this other concept claiming an authority almost

as great, a concept that fascinated him, yet a concept not wholly identical with the other. He felt that an ultimate reconciliation was impossible until psychology was a science. Six years after the *Allgemeine Pädagogik* was published, he expressed the hope "*that the time will come when it will be worth while to make the concept of Virtue in the unity of its completeness the principal concept, and to inquire in the case of each of its requisites the means to the purpose.*" But no psychology existed adequate for this task, and until a psychology capable of revealing the foundations of conduct had come into existence, "*man would not be able to boast of the possession of a pedagogy which was in truth a science.*"

The critics of Herbart have not been remiss in declaring that he has never satisfactorily resolved the dualism of his system. Morality and Many-sided Interest hold the field, each claiming the allegiance of educationists. But the critics do Herbart an injustice; for, in the first place, he has shown how closely connected are these two concepts, and has thus effected a satisfactory, though not, perhaps, an absolute unification; and, in the second place, the criticism upon which his critics pride themselves is the one which, with characteristic humility, he directs against himself. Natorp, who has recently been declaiming against the dogmatic tone assumed by Herbart, has surely never caught the spirit of those central chapters of the *Allgemeine Pädagogik.*

"*How,*" Herbart asks in one important passage, "*will Many-sidedness allow itself to be confined within the narrow bounds of Morality, and how will the stern simplicity of moral humility bear clothing in the gay colours of a Many-sided Interest?*" And then follow the words of indignant protest against those who, refusing to study scientifically the connection between Character and the other sides of human nature, allow morality to be "*rocked to sleep in the belief in transcendental powers,*" while all the time there exist forces—such as Many-sided Interest—which would effect the moral end that is

aimed at, if only men would seek and study those forces in a thoughtful manner.

However, this task has somehow to be accomplished: Morality and Many-sided Interest must be shown to be mutually and intimately related or there will exist a dangerous chasm in educational science.

And here, be it observed, this chasm is not of Herbart's making. The term "Many-sided Interest" may be surrounded by difficulty, but the terms which, outside Herbartian circles, take its place, are surrounded by still more. Suppose we admit that "the harmonious development of all human powers" is the educational goal, or make it a collateral goal with "Character"; how are we, even then, to reconcile this Hellenic notion of all-embracing development with the Hebraic notion of stern Morality? We might parody Herbart's words and ask, "How will 'all-round development' allow itself to be confined within the narrow bounds of Morality, and how will the stern simplicity of moral humility bear clothing in the gay colours of 'all-round development'?"

Herbart's merit was threefold. (1) He substituted the living concept of "Many-sided Interest" for dead or misleading concepts like "harmonious development of all human powers." (2) He placed this great educational ideal side by side with the only other possible educational ideal—Character-forming, and he invited himself and the world to bridge over the gap between them. (3) *He succeeded in bridging over the gap; or, at any rate, he showed that Many-sided Interest was very closely related to Virtue.*

How exactly he effected this demonstration will be gradually shown in subsequent sections of this work. Here the words with which the first book of the *Allgemeine Pädagogik* comes to an end may appropriately indicate the nature of the coming demonstration. "*The individuality must first be changed through widened Interest, and approximate to a general form,*

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before teachers can venture to think they will find it amenable to the general obligatory moral law."

11. Significance of Herbart's Experience with the Steigers.

English educational thought is in so strange a state that Herbart is supposed to have "deduced" his doctrines from some stiff and obscure system of metaphysics and psychology, whereas, in point of fact, it grew up through personal anxiety for certain pupils who were placed under his charge. Herbartianism is so infinitely practical and living, because it was the answer of a great man to the demands of a very critical situation.

Moral Value of Interest.

In another book* I have shown that from many sides there are coming testimonies to the moral value of an "Interest" in various intellectual and other pursuits. Instead of tracing human sin and vice to causes that are disheartening and mysterious, thoughtful men tell us that if only "Interests" in books or nature can be aroused, much sin and vice will disappear, and that most of it is at present due to an absence of these very "Interests." In fact, when a modern writer deals with questions like intemperance, gambling, or hooliganism, he is almost certain to use the word "Interest" sooner or later. It is like King Charles's head in Mr. Dick's speeches.

When Herbart was twenty-one years of age (1797), he undertook the tuition of three sons of Herr von Steiger-Reggisberg. Two years later he wrote to a friend on a solemn occasion, "*I think I could have surrounded my garden with a fairly impenetrable hedge, did not my sick mother's wishes call me away.*" His garden consisted of his three pupils, and Herbart's desire was so to surround them by "*an impenetrable hedge*," that the assaults of the venerable Enemy of Mankind would be doomed to failure. That hedge was to consist, partly at least, of Many-sided Interest.

*The Secret of Herbart.

Ludwig Steiger was a youth without any of the more delicate traits of character; he belonged, as his preceptor said, "*to the world of matter rather than of mind.*" Not long after Herbart had commenced a far-seeing course of intellectual culture, the pupil was snatched from him, in order to be plunged into the artificial life of military service. Herbart's remarks to Herr Steiger are significant. "*Can temptation anywhere find more dangerous nourishment than the ennui which occurs when on guard or in barracks? If only a spark . . . falls on this tinder, a fire may spring up which will perhaps glow long in secret, the flames of which cannot afterwards be extinguished till they have consumed everything.*" Not that Ludwig was positively bad; he was merely without internal resources. "*I have never known anyone so absolutely without character, so entirely neither good nor bad, as Ludwig.*"

Ludwig Steiger.

Speaking of the youngest (and very different) brother of Ludwig, Herbart said in 1798, "*How much vivacity have we imprisoned, and with what an explosion will it some time or other force a way for itself, if we do not provide outlets for it. . . .*" It was from reflections of this kind that the doctrine of the protective value of Interest had its beginnings.*

Later, in his essay entitled *On Pestalozzi's most recent Publication: How Gertrude taught her Children*, Herbart gave expression, in a more general form, to the protective power of Interest. "*The man or the child whose eye and ear are given up to nature and human society is to that extent withdrawn from the sensations within himself, in other words, from his own pleasure or displeasure; egotism is rendered impossible in one that pays attention, not to himself, but to the relations of things and of other persons.*" Conversely, in the *Allgemeine Pädagogik*, "*If the intellectual*

*Speaking of the same boy, Herbart said: "*Rudolph makes good progress in music. I consider it very important to him, on account of the excellent employment it provides for idle hours.*"

interests are wanting, if the store of thought be meagre, then the ground lies empty for the animal desires."

Herbart's follower, Ziller, described Interest as a "protection against sensual passions" as well as an "aid to one's earthly activity" and a "salvation amid the storms of fate."

Analysis shows that this order is perhaps one of diminishing importance; Interest is a very powerful "protection against sensual passions,"—is, in fact, no less than a genuine and friendly rival of religion as a protagonist of virtue; it is a less powerful "aid to one's earthly activity," conferring on an individual a certain power of adaptability to the varied conditions of life; lastly, though in some cases it is a true "salvation amid the storms of fate," endowing (to use Dr. Maudsley's words) with "internal resources" which enable men "to bear up against the strain of calamity," yet its value in this respect is generally less than in the other two.

Ziller on Interest.

More recent Herbartians are equally emphatic. Dr. McMurray says that "a Many-sided Interest . . . implies such mental vigour and such pre-occupation with worthy subjects as naturally to discourage unworthy desires." Another American writer,* whose sympathies with Herbartianism are by no means great, urges that "if we would quench interest in the saloon, the pool-room, the dance-hall, the dive, the low theatre, we must offset them by something rousing a *warmer and more enduring Interest.*"

12. Approach to a Synthesis of the Two Educational Aims.

The two educational ideals which seem to move distractingly before us in the early pages of the *Allgemeine Pädagogik* are now approaching each other. "Many-sided Interest" was suggested as the only educational aim that could be reconciled with our ignorance of what calling the individual child would some day pursue. Readers who wish

* Dr. Davidson in his *History of Education.*

to test the soundness of this claim can select any intelligent work dealing with modern educational and industrial problems; they will find that the chief criticism directed by merchants, manufacturers, and sometimes even by military men, against modern schooling, is that boys have "Interest" in very little; and this complaint is accompanied, not by a recommendation of early specialised training (in shorthand or engineering, for example), but of a sounder *general* education.* "Interest" is the noun and "Many-sided" (or its equivalent) is the adjective that they use.

But, as we have seen, there comes from another side the testimony that Interest possesses *moral* implications also; and thus the two educational aims which have been placed before us are not so embarrassingly and fatally distinct as seemed at first to be the case. Not only is Interest valuable as an "aid to one's earthly activity" (because it sends a boy into the world with a bright, flexible, and adaptable mind), but it is also a "protection against sensual passions." Thus, the teacher who aims at arousing "Many-sided Interest" is at the same time working for the formation of Character. It would have been no small service to Education if Herbart had merely pointed out that fact, and had never advanced a step further. The connection between Many-sided Interest and Character is one of immense importance, and the moment we recognise it we possess the power of refuting a good round dozen of present-day fallacies.

It is still a somewhat premature question (see *p.* 56), but so important that a further approach to an answer may be advisable even now: "Has Herbart succeeded in unifying

*For example, *A Report of the Consultative Committee upon Higher Elementary Schools*, 1906. I would suggest, as a whimsical though not useless task, that some teacher select a few of the chief works dealing critically with modern Education and count up the number of times the word "Interest" occurs. He might then take a few works dealing with modern social and moral problems (drunkenness, gambling, etc.), and again count up the number of times the same word occurs. He will then realise why "Interest" has been declared to be the "greatest word in Education"; perhaps it is also the "greatest word" in other departments of human activity. Not only is it psychologically central (as shown on p. 54), but it is sociologically central too.

Educational ends? Can we, without gross straining of language, declare that Morality is the only educational goal?" To the best of my knowledge the following is a fair answer:—

Practical Success of Herbart's Synthesis.

It is not quite possible to demonstrate that every educational agency conduces in equal measure to moral goodness, or that the term "Moral Character" ultimately embraces every aim, however subordinate, which the educator should place before himself; but it is clear that the character-forming power of Education has never been adequately realised; thus Character-forming is almost, and may some day be shown to be quite comprehensive of all subordinate educational aims. The word "Virtue" or "Morality" is the best word that can be chosen to define the educational aim; it may not be a completely satisfactory word, but it is far closer to the truth than any other. By the use of this word the tasks set before the Educator are nearly, but perhaps not quite, unified. The conferring of such mental culture as results in Interest is a contribution to Character-forming; and as this kind of Instruction is the only kind that Herbart contemplates, he has succeeded in giving a degree of unity—a high degree, in fact—to most departments of educational work.

The pages in which Herbart states this profoundly important problem are, in some respects, the most important in the *Allgemeine Pädagogik*. Every thought is pregnant with life; for in these pages is commenced a great battle on behalf of the teacher's calling. There is no exaggeration in saying that if Herbart's attempt to link up Character and Many-sided Interest has failed, the educational profession is doomed to occupy at best a secondary place in the modern state; it can never, as some of us dream, come to occupy the first place. Education, however important for commercial, industrial, and social purposes, will be confessed as eternally paralytic with regard to the deeper moral and spiritual aspects of life. Teachers who despise "theory" little recognise how

great are the "practical" issues of some of these Herbartian discussions.

One of the points under dispute may be referred to briefly.

Many-sidedness is not Virtue.

It may be said—it has been said repeatedly by critics of Herbart—that a man may possess Many-sided Interest and yet not be a moral man; that Character is not Many-sidedness. Herbart himself admits this in language that is unmistakable; or rather—for there is nothing apologetic in his words—he urges the fact on the notice of his readers. "*Many-sidedness is far from Virtue*," he said in his later *Lectures*; while in his earlier work he said that while "*with the growth of genuine many-sided Instruction the rightness of Character is duly provided for, its firmness, decision, and invulnerability are . . . things entirely different.*"

Thus, though one of the most essential features of Herbartianism is its insistence on the relation between Culture and Character, there is never any identification of the two. "*The stupid man cannot be virtuous*;" still the cultured man himself is not necessarily virtuous. The pupil must not be allowed to think "*that the claims of learning and qualification in various accomplishments are the most important, and that, in so far as he answers to these claims, he fulfils the essentials of moral culture.*" In fact, the "Second Moral Idea," though vitally important as being inconsistent with the soul-destroying "stupidity" which prevents Virtue, does not itself constitute or ensure Virtue.

There is need for Moral Training as well as for Instruction; only—Instruction is essential.

But this will become clearer as we proceed. It is hopeless to clear up every difficulty at the moment it suggests itself. And that there *are* difficulties will be seen in the two sections that follow.

CHAPTER VI.

Character, Many-sided Interest, and Individuality.

13. Moral Character *versus* Individuality.

The two possible (and, as it is hoped, ultimately reconcilable) aims of Education—Character and Many-sided Interest—may both come into conflict with the innate Individuality of the pupil.

Present-day Stress on Individuality.

In Mr. Harold Gorst's book *The Curse of Education*—a book that conveniently contains almost all the popular fallacies of to-day and yesterday disguised under an appearance of educational radicalism*—we are mournfully told that the school makes "no effort to differentiate between individuals, or to discover the natural bent of each particular child." "The school does not pretend to discover or to encourage individual talents." Mr. Gorst's complaint is no new one. Pestalozzi declared that "the idiosyncracies of individuals are the greatest blessing of human nature . . . and should be respected in the highest degree." Fröbel protested against "stamping our pupils like coins, and letting them flourish with an image and superscription."

This deification of Individuality, with consequent stress upon encouraging pupils to "think for themselves" at the

* We find the usual undiscriminating attacks on the "bookishness" of schools, the usual depreciation of "knowledge" and "facts," etc.

imminent risk of their failing to know and love "the best that has been thought and said in the world," was discussed with great frankness by Herbart. *Prima facie* there is the possibility of sharp conflict between Individuality and the two educational goals he sets before us—Many-sided Interest, the immediate goal, and Morality or Character, the ultimate goal. There is every reason to believe that Iago possessed strong Individuality; also Goneril and Regan. Nothing shows better the educational sanity of Herbart than the fact that while his contemporaries and successors have glibly and sometimes unthinkingly panegyrised Individuality, forgetful that there are other things than this in heaven and earth needing the educator's attention, he, while yet a young man, was weighing its claims against those of its possible rivals.

First, there is the possibility of a conflict between Individuality and Moral Character. There may be traits in a pupil's hereditary endowment which require suppression—boisterous outbursts from beneath, which may break down for the moment the fragile barriers of Morality. For, be it observed, Moral Character, with Herbart, is not a structure which can grow wholly spontaneously from within. The Fröbelian analogy between the work of the teacher and that of the gardener has but little meaning for the Herbartian, who, though he may gladly avail himself of such innate tendencies in his pupil as co-operate with his own work of forming that pupil's Character, expects but little from those tendencies if they are allowed to act unaided. I do not suggest that Fröbel was actually wrong in any of his proposals; but there are dangers in all analogies, and the "gardener" analogy is as dangerous as it is helpful. The gardener cannot "instruct" plants in any true sense. Now Herbart had "*no conception of Education apart from Instruction*," and the reason was that with him Character involved *Insight*; it was essentially a mental or spiritual fabric possessing for its web and woof—ideas.

Thus he refuses to give the name of "Character" to much that is ordinarily called by the name. "*Children have very marked individualities without possessing Character; they are wanting . . . in what, above all, goes to make up Character in men as reasoning beings—that is, Will, and we mean Will in the strict sense, which is far different from variations of temper or desire . . . Willing—determination—takes place in consciousness. Individuality, on the other hand, is unconscious.*" The words are important. Many present-day educationists are stressing the more subtle, unconscious elements of mental life, such as the vague emotions and impulses of childhood and adolescence; worshipping at the court of this *haute noblesse* whose claims have been so forgotten amid the proud admiration for upstart Reason. Educators, in short, are deliberately discounting the conscious, the deliberate, the rational. Mr. Hamilton Archibald,* for example, is one among the many who represent this present tendency of educational thought, in America at least.

Character means Conscious Character.

Now Herbart insists that "*Willing—determination—takes place in consciousness.*" He does not deny or ignore the existence of the subtle and unconscious factors upon which so much stress is being laid in these days. But he does urge that Education has to deal primarily with conscious states; that morality implies consciousness; that ethical principles have to be implanted; and that serious issues are at stake all along the line. Education is not a fancy business. In 1806 he condemned as dangerous the very standpoint so eloquently urged in 1906. Mr. Archibald and his co-workers have immense sympathy with every wild impulse of childhood and adolescence; they can forgive everything; they have no fears for the future;

A Contrast: 1806 and 1906.

* The interesting lectures of this Canadian exponent of Child Study as applied to Sunday School work were largely attended in the autumn of 1906.

horror strikes them only when they hear of teachers or parents "moralising" with children. But bring up a child in this way, and then—? "*The young poacher has their sympathy, if he sins with some boldness, and they pardon at the bottom of their heart everything which is neither ridiculous nor malicious . . . .*" Herbart—this thirty-years-old philosopher of Education—rejected with something like scorn such an easy-going view of the moral problem. If such were the nature of the boy's moral education "*we need only take care* (with Mr. Archibald) *that he grows up without being teased and insulted in the consciousness of his power, and receives certain principles of honour which are easily impressed.*" But what judgment, Herbart asks, shall we pass on ourselves if some day the boy, now a man, awakens to graver issues?

No; moral education is more than this dilletante and optimistic playing with a boy's enchanting impulses. "*It is never safe to set up as business manager for another if we have no mind to do the work well.*" Now, if "Character" involves consciousness, the teacher's task must be that the '*ideas of right and good in all their clearness and purity may become the essential objects of the Will.*"

We may, if we choose, object to his way of defining Character; most of Herbart's definitions can be criticised on one ground or another. But his distinctions always possess one excellence—they conduce to clearness and precision of thought. We can never safely ignore them. In the present instance we learn to recognise—as perhaps never before—that the task of Character-forming is no small one; no less a task than building up, within the pupil before us, a new and spiritual personality *such as his unaided native impulses can never give rise to*; to generate a microcosm within the material, and perhaps hostile, macrocosm.

It is possible that he laid too much stress upon the

ideational nature of the fabric he wished to raise. There are signs that innate "Individuality"—which Herbart recognises as an occasional foe—will, by the neo-Herbartians, come to be regarded as generally an ally, and that the battle-cry of "Many-sided Interest" will give way to the simpler cry of "Interest," Herbart being synthesised with Fröbel. But though this may happen, the value of Herbart's point of view, even in its most extreme form, cannot be easily over-estimated. A hundred times better that the teacher magnify the greatness and deliberateness of his task, and feel that moral life and death are in his keeping, than that he stand helpless before the vagaries of an unknown "Individuality" which he is compelled, by his educational philosophy, to reverence, but which, hidden in its mysterious stronghold, may as likely possess the lineaments of devil as of angel. The Herbartian seeks to penetrate into the stronghold itself, to lay his hand upon its inmate, and to compel him to receive baptism into a higher life of conscious purposes and ideals.

Vagaries of Individuality.

An illustration of this way of regarding Instruction is found towards the end of the *Allgemeine Pädagogik*, where Herbart distinguishes between "*a rich measure of Benevolence or natural feeling in the objective side of Character*," and the "*Idea of Benevolence in the subjective side*," which is to be "*fostered to maturity as an object of moral taste.*" "*Philosophers*," says Herbart, "*have never assigned the latter its true place and rank.*" He points out that natural Benevolence—a mere instinct or impulse—often passes away with experience of the world; the heart grows cold, prudent, discreet. The task of Education is to prevent this by basing Benevolence on true moral judgment, thus "*calling forth another wisdom.*" Our pupils must learn to see the rightness of Benevolence, and not merely feel a vague unreliable emotion.

Need of Moral Instruction.

14. Many-sidedness *versus* Individuality.

Herbart has another difficulty to face, a difficulty, however, closely connected with the last.

We have seen him admit that specialisation is necessary, but it must not be premature and excessive, and Education must not be the agency for stimulating it. "*Each man must have a love for all activities, each must be a virtuoso in one; but the particular virtuososhiip is a matter of choice*" not of Education. The choice will, of course, be determined by the innate endowments and tendencies of the individual. But now the question faces us, "How can these particular endowments and tendencies be treated in the light of the doctrine of Many-sided Interest?" Many-sidedness and Individuality seem to be polar opposites. Where can a place be found, in the Herbartian system, for heredity?

Another Sharp Contrast

Herbart saw that a place had, somehow, to be found. To attempt any reduction of all individualities to the same level, even to the high level of a uniform Many-sided Interest, was not only unwise but impossible. "*There results a negative rule in relation to the aim of Education, which is as important as it is difficult to observe, i.e., to leave the Individuality untouched as far as possible ... The teacher ... makes it a point of honour that the clear impression of person, family, birth, and nationality may be seen undefaced in the man submitted to his will ... We know how beneficial it is for mankind that different men should resolve upon and prepare for different work.*"

Of course, this advice sounds very obvious in these days; it is on the lips of every follower of Fröbel, and every candidate for educational notoriety. Yet we all know in our hearts that schools have, in large measure, to ignore Individuality, and that the most to be expected of them is an avoidance of such dangerous rigidity as is likely to crush and overwhelm. Schools are for the purpose

Unique Breadth of Herbart.

of conferring the elements of general culture; if each child's Individuality is to be the keynote of education, we shall have to fall back upon private tuition. The thing I wish to point out is that no glib talk ever comes from Herbart; he never forgets one problem in his zeal to solve another.* His was the most amazingly capacious and judicial mind that ever devoted itself to the question of education. All along the line of these discussions about Character, Many-sidedness and Individuality, the fact is striking.

Individuality may even combat the teacher's best efforts; fortunate is he if this is not so. But, at any rate, the problem awaits solution: How are the peculiar and innate characteristics of the pupil to be reconciled with the wider ideal previously put forward as the goal of the educator?

"*Is Individuality consistent with Many-sidedness? Can the former be preserved while the latter is cultivated? Individuality is angular; Many-sidedness is even, smooth, rounded. Individuality is described and circumscribed; Many-sided Interest, on the contrary, presses outwards in all directions.*"

The need for Many-sidedness has been sufficiently demonstrated in a preceding section; without it the man possesses no adaptability to circumstances, no "*receptivity and mobility*"; and these qualities are necessary if we once admit that the school must prepare for the vicissitudes of life as a whole, and not for one calling selected soon after birth.

A Sphere for the Individuality.

Herbart continues:—"*A large sphere yet remains for Individuality in which to exercise its activity—to make choice of its vocation, and to acquire the thousand little habits and comforts which, so long as no more value is attached to them than they are worth, will do but little harm to the receptivity and mobility of the mind.*" But it is clear that Education cannot

* If readers doubt this, I would ask them to try and find a mistake—an *educational* mistake—in Herbart's works. But it must be *in* his works and not in the critic's imagination of what Herbart says.

take the cultivation of diverse Individualities as its goal; no unity would thus be attained; every child would receive different treatment: still starting from the angular outlines of each Individuality, Education may seek to reduce such angularity of outline. "*The projections—the strength of Individuality—may remain, so far as they do not spoil the Character; through them the entire outline may take this or that form.*" Herbart's verdict, in short, is that while the special hereditary bent of the individual may be rightly permitted to express itself in the rough outline of the future Character, this outline must have its roughness softened, its angularity chastened, by the influence of culture. If, as Hamlet said, "there's a divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will," this divinity is, for the Educator, no other than Many-sided Interest. As Herbart says in a later part of the *Allgemeine Pädagogik*, "*By no means should the presence of incidental prominent tendencies in the years of cultivation be regarded as a sign that they are to be further strengthened by Education.*" And yet the Individuality must receive its due. It gives most valuable guidance to the teacher. He has to build upon what is already present in the child, which is only another way of saying that he must take account both of the child's Individuality and of the past circumstances of his life. "*Instruction gladly begins by starting from what is nearest.*"

Herbart, in fact, gives voice to the same conviction that is, at the present time, dominating educational thinkers in America. "Many-sided Interest" may be good, but cannot we attach it somehow to the innate tendencies of our pupils rather than introduce it, so to speak, into a region unprepared to receive it? In short, is Interest to be something wholly built up from without, like a brick-and-mortar structure, or a growth from within, nurtured rather than created by the manipulator? If we adopt the second view we shall be approximating to the position of the Fröbelians, who lay stress

upon the internal principle of Self-activity. Herbart himself approximated to this position. "*Perfect many-sidedness is unattainable.*"

One of his plainest statements on this question is found in his reply to Zippel. (*Observations on a Pedagogical Essay.* 1814.) "*The excellence of a school does not show solely in the Many-sidedness common to all its pupils. It shows quite as much in the diversity of specific excellences reciprocally distinguishing above each other the scholars that proceeded from it. The school of Socrates educates Plato and Xenophon, Aristippus and Antisthenes.*" Multiplicity in school instruction may, conceivably, tear away a pupil from "*the leisure required for self-elaboration . . . This distraction is to be in every possible way prevented.*"

But the prevention is to come, not by narrowing, but by intensifying and concentrating the curriculum. "*Economy of time is pre-eminently attainable by the greatest possible intensity of interest being excited; . . . finally, the interconnections of human knowledge must be investigated in the most accurate manner, so as to enable teachers to set any interest, once excited, to work immediately in all directions.*" Many-sidedness of Instruction is necessary even for the discovery and nurture of special ability. "*It is essential to discover . . . those centres of gravity . . . those axes about which the mind revolves, in order to enable us to heed them and to have reference to them. But only Many-sided Instruction can discover them. For these points of rest are as various as the genius dwelling in them.*"

Individuality Itself Demands a Wide Curriculum.

The point just mentioned is one great importance. Unless our curriculum is many-sided, there is the possibility that Individuality itself will suffer. A child who possesses a genius for a certain subject or pursuit may never begin to employ that genius until, through contact with a wide system of school studies, his special liking is

made manifest. Charles Darwin's genius never showed itself at Shrewsbury School, merely because the curriculum was not wide enough; it contained no natural science. Gray's *Elegy* is here full of educational significance. Men with hearts pregnant with celestial fire, or with hands that might have swayed the rod of empire or waked the living lyre to ecstasy, lie forgotten in the churchyard, because:—

> "Knowledge to their eyes her ample page,
> Rich with the spoils of time, did ne'er unroll."

Thus, not only economic conditions (as we have seen), and not only moral necessities (as we have also seen), but even the claims of Individuality itself drive us to the view that the curriculum of our schools must be "many-sided."

Critics have repeatedly asserted that Individuality is ignored in the Herbartian system. Readers will now see how baseless is such a charge. All teaching, to be effective, must start from the pupil's standpoint. Many-sided Interest was therefore never regarded by him as an ideal equally attainable in all cases. Pupils differ greatly. "*Sometimes it is only needful to give the pupil the first start in certain things, and the teacher continuing to supply motive and matter, he goes forward of himself, and is, perhaps, soon beyond the teacher's sight. In other cases it is extremely difficult to discover anywhere in the stupid head a single mobile spot, the merest trace of craving interest.*" On the whole, Herbart prefers the slow to the quick-minded boy, provided the former has the chance of receiving from careful Instruction that apperceptive sensitiveness which it is the business of Instruction to supply. There is more likelihood that Character will become reliable in his case than in the case of the over-ready youth. "*Those individuals who, when left to themselves, stick to one spot, who are condemned through their tenacity to a certain one sidedness . . . it is in these that it is worth while to arouse interest of all kinds, who, in their healthy Will, after it is*

once won, afford education a sound footing." For it is these who possess the elements of that most essential feature of character—firmness; it is these who can develop the "Memory of the Will," on which Herbart, later in his book, lays stress; and though they may be deficient in sensitiveness or receptivity, this quality is precisely the one which Education, begun sufficiently early, is capable of imparting. "*No one, I hope, will fear that such strong natures would oppose too strong a resistance to the pliant power of Education. This will certainly be the case if we meet them first* AS YOUTHS, *and do not find many points of contact with them; but a* BOY *who is stronger than a sound instruction, a consistently carried out discipline, and a wise training,—such a boy is a monster.*"

Nevertheless the problem always remained a puzzling one for Herbart, as we see more especially in his letters to Griepenkerl, in one of which (xxxv.) he asks whether it may not be necessary to make the observation of different dispositions the foundation of all practical educational activity; and in another (iii.) confesses that it is often impossible to avoid yielding to one-sidedness in order to gain any result at all. His analysis of the various temperaments is subtle. There are "*northern natures*" and "*southern natures*"; in fact, an almost unlimited number of individual types, dependent upon peculiarities of bodily constitution. The Bœotian, for instance, "*is indifferent to everything*"; in other children, "*evil develops so easily and so early that one is involuntarily reminded of original sin*"; there are natures in which a real change through Education is a "*very doubtful*" matter. Similarly, towards the end of the *Allgemeine Pädagogik*, he distinguishes between those individuals who incline to benevolence and those whose tendencies are all in the direction of inner freedom; between the warm-hearted and the sternly resolute.

Herbart's *Lectures*, published late in his life, bear witness to his increasing recognition of Individuality. "*Never will it*

be possible to raise all pupils to the same plane of proficiency. Here, above all, the determining power of Individuality must be acknowledged . . . Nay, Interest itself, "*depends partly on native capacity, which the school cannot create,*" though it also depends on "*the subject-matter of Instruction.*" This is one of the many sentences of concentrated wisdom we find in Herbart. Interest has a double source.*

Springs of Interest.

The opening sentences of the *Lectures* breathe a spirit of strict moderation on this question. "*The fundamental idea of Education is the pupil's capacity for cultivation, . . .* " yet "*an unlimited capacity for cultivation ought not to be assumed by the teacher. Psychology will prevent this error. The degree in which the child can be determined is limited by his Individuality.*" He tells us, too, that we cannot expect the six Interests to be equally powerful in all children.

A leading expositor of Herbart goes even so far as to claim that "Herbart's ideal of Education, to which he throughout his life kept true, is rooted in regard for the Individuality." (Felkin's Introduction to Herbart's *Letters and Lectures.*) Enough has at any rate been said to show that Individuality does occupy a prominent place in his system. On the other hand, Herbart is no idolator. As the same expositor says, "With all the force of knowledge and conviction Herbart shows this view (viz., that the teacher is merely a 'human gardener') to be a false conception of education, because the mind germ is not like the vegetable seed passing onward to a predetermined end. . . . The teacher must leaven . . . the better part of the Individuality . . . with thoughts, desires, feelings it would never otherwise have known."

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* This is rather baldly put, but I wished to distinguish two factors. Many teachers bewail that their pupils have "no interest in poetry" (for example)—the implication being that they are naturally deficient in the springs of Interest. All the time, the fault may be in the mode of presentation; or the subject-matter may be too familiar, or too remote, or too subtle, or . . .

But why, if Herbart stresses Individuality so much, have critics asserted the contrary? Because he has given a definition of the metaphysical "soul" which seems to exclude it. But this "soul" does not concern the educator or psychologist at all; it is a pure abstraction. The child's mind is not this metaphysical soul, but something incarnate in human flesh; individual heredity therefore counts in Herbart's system as in every other sensible system of Education. I would urge all critics to remember that Herbart *never teaches educational absurdities*, and that if ever they discover what seems to be one, the blunder is certainly theirs, not his. I regret that so many books on Herbart begin with a discussion of the "soul." We ought to begin where Herbart began if we wish to understand him. His system of metaphysics is probably no better and no worse than most other systems of metaphysics; and I cannot too strongly urge that we have to judge educationists by their educational proposals, and not condemn Fröbel because he was a pantheist, or Locke because he was a sensationalist, or Herbart because he was . . . well, I care not what he was.

15. The Strenuousness of Interest.

The Herbartian emphasis on Interest suggests a question. Will not the predominance of this educational category emasculate our educational work—make it flabby and effeminate? Clearly, if Herbartianism is nothing but a system of "soft pedagogy," deficient in backone, and showing, as Hubatsch asserts, a coddling preference for easy rather than hard subjects, its claims upon our allegiance must certainly be slight, though even then its claims would be at least as valid as those of a system which aims at training the mind to strenuous work on a basis of mental starvation. In America, the charge of being "soft pedagogy" is frequently hurled against Herbartianism, and the lawlessness which is said to be increasing in the United States has even been attributed by a

Is Herbartianism Invertebrate?

recent writer in the *Outlook* (New York) to the employment in schools of allurement in preference to compulsion. Thus, Herbartian writers, especially those hailing from America, feel called upon to discuss this charge in some detail.

Now I should be only be too glad if I could treat Herbart's doctrines in a perfectly logical way—passing from one to another without any overlapping. But for various reasons, partly polemical, I find this to be impossible. I have to emphasise first one point and then another; and this involves occasional anticipations, as well as repetitions. I am now touching the frontiers of the doctrine of Apperception without having first explored that large and delightful country.

Well then, the first reply to those who think we should emphasise dogged "Effort" in preference to "Interest," is to bring a countercharge. When Mrs. Dombey was dying, one wise woman whispered in her ear that she should "make an effort." It has always seemed to me that those educationists who deprecate "Interest" are adopting the same attitude. When the vital forces are running low, either through imminent death or through want of food, the idea of "Effort" is monstrous. I do not wish to press the "food" analogy too far; the mind is not a stomach; but I do say that there is every whit as much sense in this analogy as in that of Sisyphean toil. In other words, I affirm that there is as much pedagogical wisdom in saying, "Feed your pupils' minds with rich knowledge" as in saying "Keep their minds hard at work." It is just this that advocates of "heuristic" methods sometimes forget. They have stern words for those teachers who "cram with facts"; but they forget that the mind *needs* facts. An empty mind cannot adopt a healthy "heuristic" attitude. Nay, I will go so far as to say that *even if Herbartianism were a system that urged the necessity for the pleasant, though passive, assimilation of mental food, for the easy, unreflecting, acquisition of ideas,*

Food v. Exercise.

its value would be every whit as great as a system that urged the necessity for "mental effort" and made no provision for mental feeding. This truth, an unwelcome one in many high quarters at the present day, needs to be kept in mind in all discussions on "soft pedagogy."

But we must now advance a stage further. Herbartianism is far more than "soft pedagogy." Genuine Interest *always involves hard work*; the hardest work of the world is done under its stimulus. A few great deeds have been effected through "the sheer dead lift of the Will" (as De Garmo calls it), that is, at the behest of mere naked duty, "against the grain." Though even in these cases there may be an element of Interest, we must admit that the Herbartians look with greater favour upon deeds done "with the grain," deeds that spring from the whole intellectual and moral being of the pupil or the man, than upon deeds that he feels to be merely repugnant necessities. Admitting then, that action should, on the Herbartian view, be a joyous thing, we cannot admit that it should be devoid of strenuousness; rather we would urge that the strenuousness is a function of the joyousness, and would point to the world's greatest achievements as having been accomplished to an accompaniment of joyous Interest. Thermopylæ is a witness to patriotic Interest; Darwin's long continued researches on earthworms, a witness to speculative Interest. Interest and Strenuousness, nay Interest and Duty, are allies rather than rivals. Why rely upon the direct lifting power of the human arm if a lever lies at our side; why rely upon "the sheer dead lift of the Will" if Interest will increase our efficiency a hundredfold?

Interest Involves Hard Work.

It may surprise some readers to be told that any method of "sugaring" the education pill, *i.e.*, of making dry lessons palatable by frivolous devices, is distinctly opposed to Herbart's idea of Interest. I say "opposed," not merely alien to it. Interest,

Real v. Spurious Interest.

for Herbart, means Interest in a subject *for its own sake alone;* and experience shows that such an Interest is a very strenuous and exacting thing. If a teacher finds it necessary to arouse "Interest" in a lesson by standing on his head, or letting a hedgehog climb a pole, or starting a competition for halfpence among his pupils, such devices are a clear proof that the lesson itself is not arousing Interest.

Similarly, if the teacher chooses to be so excessively simple or picturesque that real intellectual progress is injured, he is faithless to the Herbartian ideal of Interest, because the children are probably not acquiring an Interest in the subject for its own sake; they are only experiencing a temporary excitement which, instead of actively helping them onwards in mental growth, is delaying and distracting them.

A few quotations from Herbart will help to show what his attitude was.

"*Instruction must be comprehensible, and yet difficult rather than easy, otherwise it causes* ENNUI."

"*That which affords only temporary pleasure or light entertainment is of too little consequence to determine the plan of operation. Nor can the choice of such studies be recommended as stand isolated, as do not lead to continued effort . . . The first place belongs to those studies which appeal to the mind in a variety of ways and are capable of stimulating each pupil according to his individuality . . . they must be made the object of prolonged diligent effort, and thus require time.*"

"*A view that regards the end as a necessary evil, to be rendered endurable by means of sweetmeats, implies an utter confusion of ideas.*" We must not "*descend to all kinds of amusement and play instead of laying stress on abiding and growing interest.*" Yet (and here comes Herbart's inevitable warning against one-sided views of educational work) there may be "*legitimate occasions even for the sweetening of study,*' especially in the case of young children and new subjects.

In one little-known passage (little-known because occurring in his letters to Griepenkerl) Herbart expresses his fear of a well-to-do condition of life; in the lap of fortune, with wants satisfied and the future void of care, children receive no sufficient impulse to earnest work. (Letter VIII.).

The general rule for the teacher should be not to employ "*all manner of entertaining and amusing things*," but to "*work for permanent and increasing Interest.*" "*If the aim is looked upon as a necessary evil, and the sweetening process as the means to make it tolerable, all conceptions become confused.*"

Herbart's followers are equally emphatic:—

"Self-activity is the keynote of success, here as every where."—(FINDLAY.)

Testimony from Herbart's Followers.

"We find that, so far from enervating the pupil, the principle of Interest braces him up to endure all manner of drudgery and hard work. . . . The theory of Interest does not propose to banish drudgery, but only to make drudgery tolerable by giving it a meaning."—(ADAMS.)

"If the attainment of an end is truly an expression of self, even of the self temporarily or unworthily conceived, then we can find in Interest a complete reconciliation of the antithesis between Effort and Allurement."—(DE GARMO.)

"'Making things interesting to children' . . . suggests a wholly erroneous point of view as to what is meant by true Interest . . . If Interest is there, future energy and activity will spring spontaneously out of the acquirements. . . . 'It is our business to make Instruction easy.' It might better be said that it is the peculiar business of the teacher to make Instruction difficult. . . . The greatest Interest which children can feel in their studies is found when they shoulder their own tasks manfully, and work their way through their own difficulties with the least amount of help. Self-activity is the fundamental basis of a strong Interest. . . . Anyone who

supposes that he is increasing the Interest of children in their school work by directly helping them over all their hard places does not understand human nature in children."—(McMurray.)

This section may be conveniently closed by the introduction of two useful terms. Herbart, indeed, is a perfect master of terminology. While all the other educationists in history have floundered about helplessly in their attempts to discover convenient, convincing, and unambiguous formulæ for the summarising of their thoughts, and have either failed completely or, like Fröbel, succeeded in inventing a solitary one ("Kindergarten"), Herbart has presented educational literature with a whole series of illuminating terms. Two of these are "Mediate Interest" and "Immediate Interest." An Interest in a subject because of its future usefulness, or because some penalty is attached to ignorance of it, or because some parent or teacher wishes it to be learnt—is "Mediate Interest." A much higher thing is "Immediate Interest"—Interest in a subject for its own sake.

Mediate v. Immediate Interest.

CHAPTER VII.

Anschauung, Attention, Apperception.

16. Anschauung (Sense-Perception.)

It will now be necessary to expound, though briefly, some of the educational concepts that bear upon the scheme of Character-forming set forth in the preceding chapters. The first of these concepts is that of Anschauung or Sense-Perception. That Herbart has added but little to the doctrine of Anschauung (except in the realm of moral ideas) is due to the fact that another great Educator had made the doctrine his own. Pestalozzi's crowning achievement was to direct Education back to reality. The child had to be brought face to face with the concrete objects that constitute the universe; he had to learn Arithmetic, Geography, and Science, for example, not primarily through rules or definitions or books, but through seeing and feeling objects themselves.

Herbart Supplements Pestalozzi.

Herbart supplemented and perfected this doctrine by his wider doctrine of Apperception; he never ignored the fact, however, that full and rich Anschauung was a necessity for mental life.

"*This indispensable, this firmest, broadest bridge between man and nature, certainly deserves, as far as it is capable of being cultivated by any art, to have dedicated to it one chief line of pedagogical endeavour.*" Such were his words in the *A-B-C of Anschauung*. It is equally important to remember,

however (and this was one of Herbart's chief contributions to educational doctrine), that Anschauung provides but raw material for higher processes. "Intellectual inertness," says Professor W. H. Payne, "amounting almost to stupidity, is frequently the concomitant of an acute and persistent sense-training"; and Dr. Stanley Hall speaks of the "low-ranged mentation that hovers near the coast-line of matter," and "the tyranny of things, the growing neglect or exclusion of all that is unseen," in modern Education. "Concrete before abstract" is a sound maxim, but it must never be interpreted as meaning "Concrete to the exclusion of the abstract."

Dangers of Anschauung.

Herbart saw that the idea of Anschauung was fundamental. But Pestalozzi had worked out the idea "*for only a narrow sphere, that of Elementary Education; it belongs, however,*" said Herbart, "*to the whole of Education, but it needs for that an extended development.*" It was this that he provided, partly in his special treatise on the *A-B-C of Anschauung*, partly in the general treatment of Apperception, soon to be discussed. We shall see that Anschauung shades into Apperception very gradually; even the first time that a sensation is repeated, it is no longer a pure sensation; some trace of the old experience supplements the new and gives it a certain meaning and significance.

Herbartians need to remember that all learning is not Apperception, at any rate Apperception of a complex kind. The latter process cannot take place without a previous acquisition of what may be called "raw material"; Apperception, in fact, rests on Anschauung. Seeing, handling, and like processes must precede it, and may precede it at a considerable distance. For this reason the teacher of very young children need not always be nervously anxious to present material in a strictly logical succession. Material must be *acquired*—somehow, somewhere—before the higher processes can take place; and the exact

order of this acquisition cannot be based on considera tions of "Apperception," because *ex hypothesi*, the very materials *for* future Apperception are being stored up. Herbart expresses this truth in his detailed discussion of "Synthetic Instruction"; "*as to the elements, we must take care, whenever it is possible, that they lie ready long before they are wanted; further we ought always to build on a somewhat broad foundation.*" As Professor Adams expresses it, "very often the teacher must introduce ideas into the mind of the pupil, not so much for their immediate importance as for the use to be made of them at some future lesson."

It is scarcely necessary to point out that the school is not the only means by which the child is made acquainted with concrete realities. Those critics who accuse Herbart of making the teacher into a god can never have read how, on his view, Instruction has largely to base itself upon the Experience and the Intercourse which have previously been the lot of the child; his Experience of material things, his Intercourse with his fellows; in other words, his acquaintance with Nature and with Human Nature.

In a much later section the reader will meet with a striking suggestion intended by Herbart to ensure that even the baby in the cradle might be richly provided with materials for Anschauung.

17. The Two Kinds of Attention.

The concept of "Attention" now needs to be studied before the consideration of the Interest doctrine is resumed. Interest and Attention are closely related.

But a great difficulty faces us. There are two kinds of Attention, and it is of the utmost importance that the terms selected to describe them should be as illuminating as possible. Yet unluckily the two terms chosen by Herbart will not very well bear direct translation into English.

Interest, as we have seen, involves hard though happy work; the child who has a genuine Interest in a subject or

pursuit will attend to it with eagerness; his attention will not flag, for he can scarcely help attending; there is no deliberate or painful sense of effort or strain; the mechanism of the mind is working smoothly though strenuously. Herbart's word to describe such Attention is translated by the adjective "involuntary"; but, in point of fact, the child gives himself up in a very "voluntary" manner indeed to the thing that is interesting him; if he were asked, "Are you doing this *voluntarily*?" he would answer "yes" with enthusiasm. Thus there is great danger in calling such Attention "involuntary." I can think of no good word for it at this stage, but as a temporary expedient, I propose to call it "willing" or "spontaneous Attention."

Willing Attention.

Those educationists who speak as if calling forth "Effort" were the chief thing for the teacher to aim at (by "Effort" they generally mean Effort to do something disagreeable), lay stress upon another kind of Attention. Herbart calls it "voluntary," but I prefer to call it "forced," because, as already pointed out, the word "voluntary" often suggests a kind of happy spontaneity, whereas the kind of Attention here being considered is quite the opposite of happy or spontaneous; it is stern and dogged; it involves going "against the grain"; it implies a "sheer dead lift of the Will."

Forced Attention.

Now Herbart was not so foolish as to ignore the necessity for this latter kind of Attention; indeed, as already pointed out, his recognition of its necessity helps to distinguish him from Fröbel, who scarcely ever contemplated the possibility of the child being called upon to do work "against the grain." Herbart's place, in this as in every controversy, is the place of the clear-eyed and unbiased thinker. While secondary masters like Mr. Paton lay excessive stress, in their talk about "Effort," on the *hard* kind of Interest, and Fröbel excessive stress on the *easier* kind, Herbart recognises both.

For he had been the tutor of Ludwig Steiger, and with that somewhat unintellectual youth, "forced Attention" was necessary. But "*what at first tried his patience, became interesting after long familiarity had made him acquainted with the ideas*"; in other words, "forced Attention" passed over into "willing Attention"; or, to use another expression that may be better understood in a short time, "Apperceptive Interest" sprang up as soon as a certain "*familiarity with ideas*" had been attained. Thus we see that there is a place for "forced Attention" even in the Herbartian system. Give a child knowledge—somehow—and that knowledge will throw a heightened Interest around related things. Thus, if there is no better way, the Herbartian uses "forced Attention."

Luckily, however, there are other educational resources available. The Will has not always to be called upon to struggle wearily forward. Indeed, the first half of Herbart's philosophy of Education may be summed up in the advice, "Don't overwork the Will."

I should like, at this point, to quote a few remarks of the late Mr. Quick relative to the Will. He was no Herbartian; in fact, by omitting Herbart from his *Educational Reformers* he has inflicted a deep injury upon Herbartianism; nevertheless he approaches very closely indeed to Herbart upon a score of questions, and notably upon the question of the vastly greater importance of "willing Attention" than "forced Attention."

Thus, to those who regard "Effort" as the main thing to be aimed at, Quick says: "It is wonderful how insignificant a part the Will plays in the lives of most of us. When we have no Interests to guide us, we fall into inanities . . . Buffon has said that genius is nothing but a power of taking pains, and Interests give this power. Certainly the chief characteristics of a man are his Interests, and he is strong in proportion to the strength of his Interests, and wise according to their

Quick on Interest and Will.

directions. Interests lead to all kinds of involuntary action. But some people have an innate energy prior to Interest, and, though, of course, taking its direction from Interests, capable of working without them." Quick's view, in fact, is practically Herbart's. Both kinds of "Attention" are needed, but "willing Attention" (called "involuntary" by both men) is immeasurably more significant because of immeasurably wider application. It is only occasionally that we have to brace ourselves up to perform some dull or odious task; to lay the chief educational stress upon such a rare type of activity is thus to commit a blunder of no small magnitude. "Interests lead to all kinds of involuntary action," and the best way to win the battles of life is to win them through our "Interests."

One expositor is therefore tempted to say: "Herbart, in his high estimate of involuntary Apperceptive Attention somewhat lost sight of that *direct* moral value of voluntary (forced) Attention in training the Will to exercise self-control upon which Locke insisted."* But though he may "somewhat" have lost sight of this, he did not do so *altogether*; on the contrary, he expressly discusses the rival kinds of Attention and estimates their comparative value. He always seems to me (I repeat) to have been the only man in the history of Education able to place rival concepts in mutual relationship. It is easier to be a partisan than a philosopher.

Under "forced Attention" we must thus include all such Attention as is brought about by the promise of reward, by the stimulus of competition, or by similar means. This kind of Attention was all too prone to be "*faithless.*" "*It has to be compelled by threats and admonitions.*" The other kind "*is much more desirable and productive. The art of Instruction consists in developing it, and in it is contained the Interest which we have in view.*" This will bring us face to face, in a few moments, with the doctrine of Apperception. The reader should note that "forced Attention" corresponds to "mediate

* Felkin, *Herbart's Letters and Lectures.*

Interest"—Interest in things or subjects for some extraneous reason; while "willing Attention" corresponds to "immediate Interest"—Interest in things or subjects for their own sake. All four terms are educationally helpful.

18. The Doctrine of Apperception.

If it were the case that Interest depended wholly upon innate endowment, the educational outlook would be very discouraging. Each of us would be fated from birth to take an Interest in certain things, and to be incapable of Interest in all other things. Education would be able to do little or nothing of an original or constructive kind; its function would be merely auxiliary. The teacher would tend the pupil in much the same way as the gardener tends the plant; nay, he would be even less powerful, for the gardener, by cross-breeding, can bring about many wonderful improvements, while the teacher is utterly unable to exercise any control over births. It is important to remember that Herbart, like all wise observers, recognises that each person's hereditary endowment *does* determine very considerably the directions of his Interest, but he urges that it is not the only determining factor; Education can, to a considerable extent, act *creatively*.*

Interest Not Wholly Innate.

In Part I. of the present book I quoted certain words of Professor Welton to the effect that human life (here meaning "mental life") could not be "built up from without"; however deliberately the parent or educator may arrange the materials intended for the child's Instruction—however great the care he may take to include certain ideas as mental "pabulum," and to exclude certain others—the "form and tendency" of the child's life cannot be profoundly influenced. I am not able to assent to this view. I believe it to be wildly astray from the facts. If it were a true view there would be little use in appointing teachers at all.

*The word is a bold one and open to criticism, but so long as it is understood in the light of the Apperception doctrine no harm is likely to arise.

Fuller justice will be done in the second volume of this series to the "drawing-out" doctrine, for of course there is truth in it. But our present concern is with Apperception; and any one who has grasped the significance of this doctrine will not be likely to over-estimate the importance of the other. In passing, I would call attention to the fact that a certain old philosophical principle—*nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*—("nothing is in the intellect which was not first in sensation")—tells exactly the opposite story to the "drawing-out" doctrine. Pestalozzi, too, says in one place, "A child cannot give out what he has not yet taken in." We are thus face to face with contradictory formulæ. It is my belief that the advocates of "drawing-out" methods do not explicitly mean all that they say; the moment they reflect, they recognise that Education is more than "drawing-out," and begin blushingly to admit that they ought not to make statements of a wildly misleading character. Nevertheless, they make them; that is the strange fact.

The best way to realise the meaning and importance of Apperception and Apperceptive Interest is to study the people we meet.

Practical Study of Apperception.

Study the Radical and the Tory: talk to them on various subjects; try to induce the former to contribute to Rifle Clubs or the latter to Library Schemes; investigate their opinions, their emotions, and especially their Interests. Then ask yourself, "What brought about this difference?"

Study the Catholic and the Protestant in somewhat the same manner. "What brought about this difference?"

Compare the child of uncultured parents with the child of cultured parents; and study especially their *Interests*. "What brought about this difference?"

Ask yourself especially how far the differences were due to innate endowment, and your answer must be "Very little." The differences were mainly due to *ideas received*—mainly, not

entirely, for there are men who are Tories *by nature* or Radicals *by nature*, just as Newman was a Catholic *by nature* even when a Protestant by profession (anyone can see that who reads the opening chapter of his *Apologia*): still, nine-tenths of our opinions and interests are probably due to education and environment, rather than to congenital endowment.

If teachers, when face to face with sluggish Interest or keen Interest on the part of pupils or of adults—Interest in history, or nature, or anything else—will make a point of asking themselves, "What is the cause of this?" *they will learn more about the meaning of Education than by reading a score of present-day books on the subject.* They will certainly learn that Education is more than merely "drawing out."

I do not know that I can improve upon an exposition of the Apperception doctrine which I put forth two years ago.

"Take two children born of the same parents and possessing, so far as we can judge, similar capacities. Bring up one amid a narrow environment; let the other be fed on fairy tales and biographies, be brought face to face with nature in her manifold forms, move daily amid educated people, and be subjected, in short, to all the influences which tend to what we call 'culture.' Now, at the age of fourteen try to apply to them the doctrine of Interest. Offer to each of them a book on King Alfred the Great. The one child will feel no Interest; the other child will feel a keen Interest in such a book. Why the difference? Because in the one case no ideas that bear upon the new material have ever been accumulated, and thus Alfred's name remains meaningless; in the other case there *are* some ideas, and these ideas go out, so to speak, towards the book and give it a meaning. When a group of ideas acts in this way, welcoming a new idea or a new fact and interpreting it, a process takes place which is called by the Herbartians 'Apperception.'

Education as a Spring of Interest.

"Take any subject in which you are interested, and analyse

your condition with regard to it. Is it not true that your Interest in the subject is connected with the fact that you know something about it already, and that thus every new idea bearing upon it awakens familiar echoes in your mind? *You are never interested in that of which you are wholly ignorant.* What is the significance of this? The significance is very great. *When the ideas already in your mind apperceive new ideas, Interest flashes up.*

"Now we have seen the enormous importance—importance for moral purposes—of Interest. We have learnt that an Interest in books, or in nature, or in special subjects like history or astronomy, may help to save from sin and vice.

New meets Old. And now the Apperception doctrine assures us that for such an Interest to manifest itself there must be (unless some strong hereditary impulse can do the work instead) a certain previous accumulation of ideas. These ideas will then act as a background against which new ideas bearing on the subject can give rise to the scintillations and coruscations of Apperceptive Interest. If that background does not exist, every province of the soul, except the province of sensual passion, will be the poorer."

If it be true that we are never interested in that of which we are wholly ignorant, it is equally true that *we are never interested in that with which we are wholly familiar*—unless, of course, new aspects of the familiar things are being opened up. "Revision lessons" are dull; why? Because they are devoted to going over old, familiar ground. Apperception is not taking place; the new is not meeting the old, for there is no new.

There are grades of Apperception, and some are humble. I remember how a theatre-audience roared ecstatically when an actor, in mock style, called out, "On the knee!"—the memory of a 1906 naval controversy was fresh in their minds; in 1905 the exclamation would have been meaningless, and therefore devoid of Interest. Possibly much of the delight in

music is due to Apperception—at any rate, to the recurrence (with variations) of the same haunting refrain; heard once, it might fail to be specially pleasurable. Certainly most of the great scientific hypotheses came upon their creators in the form of Apperception flashes. A simple fact commences the process; Archimedes lying in his bath, Newton seeing his apple, Darwin and Wallace reading their copy of Malthus; then there comes a rush of ideas, a perception of mighty analogies, a feeling of intoxicating triumph—and a great doctrine is born.

The number of examples that might be given to illustrate the Apperception doctrine is illimitable, but I propose to select only two more. They bear upon a subject that is not half so interesting to our pupils as it should be, mainly because of our forgetfulness of this very doctrine—I mean biblical knowledge. I wish readers to note that in both quotations (one taken from the nineteenth and the other from the sixteenth century) there is stress upon the fact that Apperceptive Interest is, in a certain sense, a *new* product—not something whose germs are innate, but something that springs up at the moment when one set of ideas marches out to meet another set.

Two final Illustrations.

Sir Leslie Stephen, speaking of ancient Jewish history as presented in one of Renan's works, said: "The study becomes correlated with all that we have learnt from analogous studies elsewhere, and the whole story (becomes) pregnant with a new Interest."

Erasmus, advocating the teaching of geography, said: "The geography of the Holy Land and Asia Minor has the added Interest of association with Scripture."

Students should note that the "added" Interest of Erasmus corresponds to the "new" Interest of Sir Leslie Stephen, and that the "association," referred to by the earlier writer, corresponds to the "correlation" referred to by the later.

Dr. Lange's definition of Apperception is now intelligible.

"Apperception is that psychical activity by which individual perceptions, ideas, or idea-complexes are brought into relation to our previous intellectual and emotional life, assimilated with it, and thus raised to greater clearness, activity, and significance."

19. Herbart on Apperceptive Interest and Self-Activity.

At the time when Herbart wrote the *Allgemeine Pädagogik* he had not worked systematically at psychological problems, consequently the doctrine of Apperception had not then assumed a scientific form. Nevertheless, even as early as 1802, in one of his Essays, he bids the teacher bring things strange and remote "*into connection with what is near and of everyday occurrence, so as to cast light upon the latter, expand it, freshen it, complement it;*" this process is clearly one of Apperception. But in earlier works Herbart scarcely uses the actual term at all, the fact being that his doctrine of Apperception dates from the second or third decade of the nineteenth century—a clear proof that he did not "deduce" his *Allgemeine Pädagogik* from his psychology, as is so often imagined. I would emphasise that even though the Apperception doctrine, in the technical form which it assumed in Herbart's psychological writings, were proved to be false, *Herbart's educational writings would retain exactly their present value, because they only take Apperception for granted in a general and uncontroversial sort of way.*

An Early Hint of the Doctrine.

In the interval between 1806 and 1839 (when his *Lectures* were published) he worked earnestly at philosophical questions; but even in this later book his references to Apperception are quite free from any technical subtlety. Herbart points out that there is a simple kind of Apperception, and children feel the stirrings of Interest, "*when they recognise and repeat aloud certain words familiar to them, heard in the conversation of their elders, when the rest is unintelligible to them. A little*

later the same fact is illustrated when the children begin to name in their own way familiar objects in a picture book . . . We see here presentations suddenly rising into consciousness from within, in order to unite with anything allied that happens to present itself."

In the preceding section I pointed out that "revision lessons" were generally dull because devoid of any element of novelty. But a lesson is always interesting if, as words fall from the teacher's lips, masses of ideas surge forward in the pupils' minds. I say "masses of ideas" rather than solitary ideas, for these last, though they may give meaning to the teacher's words, do not necessarily involve the highest degree of Interest. "*The words must not only be simply comprehensible, they must also Interest. To do this, a higher degree of . . . Apperception is required.*" A teacher may tell a story every word of which is comprehensible; that is, every word calls forth a meaning, or is "apperceived"; but the richest Apperception takes place when the interpretative ideas are, so to speak, rushing forward in splendid array. Teachers can recognise from the brightness of a child's eye when he is "apperceiving"; and they who rarely call this forth should seek a profession other than that of teaching.

Grades of Apperception.

It is true that Apperceptive Interest cannot always be relied upon, even by the best teachers. In these cases, recourse must be had to "Mediate" Interest, instead of the far more valuable "Immediate" kind, as was shown in Section 17. But the mere dogged resolution of the pupil to attend, stimulated by the thought of reward or punishment, "*leads to no clear comprehension of the subject in hand, and to little co-ordination of what is learnt; thus resolution wavers continually, and finally, often enough, gives place to disgust.*"

For the intelligent, apperceptive grasping of new knowledge a groundwork of existent knowledge is obviously required. "*The*

elements become a mass of apperceiving presentations capable of assisting later studies." Thus there is a fusion of new and old; neither the totally new nor the totally old gives rise, in itself, to Apperception. As Herbart said in 1812 (*On the Dark Side of Pedagogy*); "*He who should tarry at what was wholly expected would meet with almost exhausted receptivity, because the presentation already in consciousness is capable of but little further gain. On the other hand, he who brings in the excessively novel, the totally foreign, has to fear the strong contrast which it will meet.*"

Readers will have noted how true it is that "*Interest is Self-Activity.*" When the child's apperceptive masses are actively playing upon the new material, there is a feeling that the Self is at work, that power is going forth. Thus the praise lavished by followers of Fröbel upon "Self-Activity" might equally well be lavished on Apperception. The main difference between what may be called Herbartian Interest and what may be called Fröbelian Interest is that for the former there must have been a previous *reception* of ideas. But, as Spencer says, "knowledge becomes faculty as soon as it is taken in," and thus in the end there is no essential difference between the two kinds of Interest; each of them is a form of "Self-Activity."

Interest is Self-Activity.

The tendency of Herbartian writers is to regard the "Apperceiving Ideas" or "Apperception Masses" as endowed with energy of their own, and to identify this energy with "Self-Activity"; "They are not," says Dr. McMurray, "to be drawn out by a purposed effort of the memory, but they are living forces which have the active power of seizing and appropriating new ideas." "They stand," said the late Professor Lazarus, "like well-armed men . . . ready to sally forth and overcome or make serviceable whatever shows itself at the portals of sense."

The Power of Ideas.

In the light of this doctrine there can be no more

depreciation of Knowledge. If Darwin and Wallace had never read Malthus they might never have thought of "Natural Selection." "Knowledge becomes faculty as soon as it is taken in"; and the Herbartian agrees that this is so, though he may express the fact in a different manner. Thus, when Professor Adams says "Herbartianism cannot create faculty, but it gives the best means of utilising faculty," his claim for Herbartianism is modest rather than arrogant. I incline to go farther than he has gone.

But it is now time, after our excursion into the regions of Anschauung, Attention, and Apperception, to return to the realm of Interest, and to return—wiser men. Interest depends (partly at least) upon Apperception, and Apperception must depend upon early and rich Instruction. We can now understand Dr. McMurray's words :—

"In most cases the lives of adults are rendered narrow and cramped if their school education was limited to a narrow field. . . . It is the business of the common schools to lay broad foundations, to awaken all those varieties of Interest in the leading fields of knowledge which will serve to make men liberal-minded, public-spirited, of many-sided intelligence and sympathy in adult life. Unquestionably the lives of most people run in too narrow a channel. They fail to appreciate and enjoy many of the common and important things about them to which their eyes were not properly opened in early years."

Lay Broad Foundations.

CHAPTER VIII.

Interest and Instruction.

20. Classification of Interests.

Herbart, as the apostle of Interest, naturally attempted a classification of Interests.

The child obtains his first "Knowledge" from "Experience"; while "Sympathy" springs from "Intercourse." Instruction has to care for both of these great departments of human activity. Man has to know the physical universe, he has also to be made acquainted with "the best that has been thought and said in the world"; he has to know Nature and Human Nature; Education has to embrace both "Realism" and "Humanism."

Comprehensiveness of Herbart's Genius.

To me there seems no fact more conclusive of Herbart's absolute primacy among educational thinkers than his breadth of view upon this question. It is so easy to win a reputation in the educational world by appearing as the champion of some one limited type of Education; for example, to exalt science (with Spencer) or the classics (with Thring). Even Pestalozzi showed a strong bias towards mathematics and science to the neglect of history and literature. Herbart's genius was too regal for limitations of that kind.

The world was informed in a review of two years ago that Herbart was "indifferent to natural science"; indeed, there is

a very general impression abroad that Herbartians regard history and literature as far more important than any other subjects. It is easy to show how absolutely erroneous is such a view. Herbart expressly says, "*The sciences are at least as essential to a complete education as the humanities.*" Nay, his first group of Interests includes Scientific or "Speculative" Interest; and though one of his followers, Ziller, in an exuberance of zeal for a "humanistic" curriculum, made history the basis for "Concentration," the blunder only serves to accentuate the fact that while this educator and that educator have yielded to bias in this or that direction, Herbart *never yielded an inch.* I challenge any critic to find a single passage in Herbart's educational works that shows the faintest trace of narrowness on any question whatever. I assert that even on pedagogical questions that were comparatively new in his time and, therefore, difficult, Herbart's judgment was so infallibly sound that, as a matter of fact every critic stands dumb, and has to exercise his powers of attack upon the iniquities supposed to have been committed by this king of educators in the realm of formal psychology or metaphysics. I do not claim that there are no omissions in Herbart's works; but only that no critic can take any one of his educational assertions and demonstrate bias or blindness.

His sixfold classification of Interests is a sufficient answer to half of his critics.

Nature Interests.

Corresponding to one great department of Instruction—that concerned with knowledge of Nature—are three kinds of Interest: Empirical, Speculative, and Aesthetic; the first, an Interest in objects, colours, and the like, for their own sake; the second, an Interest in the relations of cause and effect—"Scientific Interest" we may also call it; the third, an Interest in beauty of form, rhythm, deed, and so on. The second kind is active, and logically "discursive."

Human Interests.

Corresponding to the second great department of Instruction—that concerned with Mankind—are also three kinds of Interest: Sympathetic, an Interest in individual man; Social, an Interest in the wider relations of society; Religious, an Interest in the destiny of things.

The first kind in each great group is necessarily the first to appear. We acquire familiarity with concrete things and persons before we consider the abstract relationships between natural objects or between human units. Of the springing up of the second kind, Herbart says:—"*The riddle of the world extorts speculation from empiricism, the conflicting claims of humanity extort the social spirit of order out of sympathy.*"

Any person who enters an infant room at once engrosses the attention of the children. They can no more help gazing at him than at brightly coloured or moving objects. Nay, even adults—even the members of the Royal Society—will stare, as if fascinated, at the lighting of a gas jet or the opening of a window; though some gifted lecturer may all the time be expounding the most priceless of truths. Such "Interest" is mainly "Empirical."

As soon as the child has arrived at the stage when he asks the reason for everything, or wishes to investigate the problem of where he came from, or where God lives, Speculative Interest is awake. Social Interest is naturally subsequent to Sympathetic Interest; we do not expect the notion of "citizenship" to be an early one.

The third group of Interests (Aesthetic in the one group, Religious in the other) are chiefly characterised by their restful or contemplative character.

Probably Herbart's classification may be capable of improvement. Professor De Garmo tells us;—

"If perception, reasoning, and sensibility* are made bases

* Note the threefold division, corresponding to Herbart's three kinds of Interest.

for the classification of interests, why should not the active volitional powers of the mind become a basis likewise? Some claim that pleasure and pain rest primarily upon the *motor* side of our activity, rather than upon the sensory. Our interest in *doing* is antecedent to our interest in knowing or feeling. This fact is fully recognised by all Herbartians in the theory of methods, though it finds no recognition in their classification of interests."

Proposed Improvements of Herbart's Doctrine.

Dr. Dewey gives a fourfold classification, "the interest in conversation or communication; in inquiry or finding out things; in making things or construction; and in artistic expression"—a classification which seems to ignore, in some measure, the Sympathetic and Social Interests which man feels in his fellows.

Dittes considers that Interest should be classified in two ways, either according to Form or to Matter. *Formally*, we should have Empirical, Speculative, Contemplative, Mnemonic, Productive, Analytic, Synthetic, Systematic, Methodic, etc. For example, a person who had a passion for arranging things would be endowed with "Systematic Interest." According to *Matter* or *Content* we should classify Interest as Aesthetic, Religious, Historic, Agricultural, Practical, Scientific, Personal, etc. The Interest which Tommy Traddles took in his flowerpot might also perhaps be adduced, and named "Interest of Proprietorship."

I cannot see that any classification is quite satisfactory. For one thing, the line of demarcation between Instincts and Interests is not always so clearly drawn as may, perhaps, be ultimately desirable, and I throw out these proposed emendations of Herbart's classification, mainly because they suggest a profitable field of work for those whose "Systematic Interest" is keen. A thoroughly satisfactory classification of Interests has not yet been made. Meanwhile, the existence of Interest in Nature and Interest in Man is never to be

forgotten. It is obvious, too, that Herbart's Interests are outward-looking. He is primarily thinking of the great educational task of acquainting the child with the facts of the Universe; hence, perhaps, his reason for not expressly tabulating such secondary Interests as Dittes specifies—Mnemonic, etc.

21. Instruction as the Complement of Experience and Intercourse.

The adulation of "Nature" in which many educationists, notably Rousseau and—less emphatically though much more unexpectedly—the evolutionist Spencer, have indulged, finds no echo in the works of Herbart. "*To lead man to Nature, or even to wish to lead him to and train him up in Nature, is mere folly. For what is the Nature of man?*" His impulses are largely indeterminate; they can be directed either in good directions or in bad; to chatter about the "Nature" of man is therefore useless and may even be harmful. Mankind has to decide what it shall become, and the means of carrying out the decision are no other than Education. Human Nature is like a ship, "*constructed and arranged with the highest art that it may be able to adapt itself to every change of wind and wave,*" and awaiting only "*the steersman to direct it to its goal . . . We know,*" says Herbart, "*our aim. Nature does much to aid us, and humanity has gathered much on the road she has already traversed; it is our task to join them together.*"

"Nature" Nonsense.

It has long seemed to me that those four calm words of Herbart, "*We know our aim,*" are among the most significant in educational literature. Herbart certainly knew his aim; I am perfectly sure that most educationists do not know theirs.

For the carrying out of the educational aim, Herbart has indicated, in the words just quoted, that there are two means—conferring Knowledge of Nature, and awakening Sympathy with Human Nature. These are not dependent on scholastic

Instruction for their commencement; no sooner is the baby born than the possibilities of Knowledge and Sympathy begin.

But in each case Instruction is required to complete the process; in the first case because our Knowledge of the physical universe—however accidentally great—would remain relatively insignificant apart from systematic Instruction; in the second case because, however rich our Intercourse with parents and friends, it would still be inadequate for all the subtle distinctions of Sympathy. "*Therefore the gaps left by Intercourse in the little sphere of feeling, and those left by Experience in the larger circle of knowledge, are for us almost equally great, and, in the former as in the latter, completion by Instruction must be equally welcome.*"

Function of Instruction.

Herbart's Anglo-Saxon followers also lay stress upon these two departments, regarding them both as necessary to the completeness of the curriculum, but inclining to lay slightly more stress upon the humanistic than upon the naturalistic department. Mr. Rooper, for example, regarded "Nature and Human Nature as the epitome of educational studies. Of these twins neither should be neglected, although the latter is the more important." Dr. McMurray declares that the question "What is the most important study?" must be answered "by putting the study of man in history and literature at the head of the list. Natural science takes the second place." Most Herbartians, indeed, regard these two groups as together forming the heart of the curriculum, though Ziller, with perhaps excusable enthusiasm for the humanistic department, chose this alone as the centre, and, as we shall see, elaborated a scheme of "Concentration" on the basis of this choice. All Herbartians, however, are agreed that formal and gymnastic studies should constitute rather the appendages than the trunk of the educational organism.

The Core of the Curriculum.

To return to Herbart's exposition. Great, he tells us,

appear, at first sight, the difficulties in the way of Instruction. As contrasted with Experience and Intercourse it is rigid and stern, while these are mobile, abundant, vivid; how, in particular, can Instruction compete with Intercourse when the latter is concerned with living beings, and the former can only deal with characters described in books? In reality Instruction can never dispense with the other two primary agencies; it is they that give "*fulness, strength, individual definiteness in all our presentations, practice in the application of the general, contact with the real, with the country, and the age, patience with men as they are.*" Herbart, said by some shallow critics to "over-value Instruction," sadly confesses and laments that "*Education has not Experience and Intercourse in its power.*" The boy in the farmyard has many advantages which the child brought up in the fashionable world can never share. But circumstances frequently stand in the way of the spontaneous development of many-sided Interest; hence Instruction must undertake the task of "*enlarging the pupil's mental scope by description . . . by taking . . . the light of the past, and revealing to his ideas the immaterial world.*"

And, indeed, despite the threshold difficulties in the way of Instruction, there may be certain facilities in its favour. "*Ought we to conceal from ourselves how often the distant space is more exquisitely illuminated in descriptions and drawing than the present; how much more satisfying and elevating is intercourse with the ancients than with contemporaries; how much richer in insight is idea than observation, and, indeed, how indispensable to action is the contrast between the actual and what ought to be?*" In these words of Herbart we get a partial justification of the preference expressed by his Zillerian followers for stories of the ancient world, and, indeed, a justification of all those who lay stress upon the training of the imagination as a necessity for moral action.

Then follows in Herbart's exposition one of those oft-

quoted and oft-misunderstood maxims, regarded by many as summing-up his teaching, "*To be wearisome is the cardinal sin of Instruction.*" Experience and Intercourse are sometimes wearisome: Instruction must never be. And yet Herbart does not mean that Instruction should be merely easy; elsewhere he tells us that it "*requires toil on the pupil's part . . . if it cannot always wander in pleasant valleys, it can train . . . in mountain climbing, and reward with the wider prospect.*" It is the task of Instruction to open up vistas rather than to do the "spade work" of life; the task is inevitably pleasant and exhilarating, but not necessarily easy.

Wearisomeness.

Bringing system into the chaos of ideas acquired by Experience, bringing full meaning into the operations of Intercourse, Instruction thus stands before us as an agency of an indispensable kind. "*The real kernel of our mental being cannot be cultivated with certain results by means of Experience and Intercourse. Instruction penetrates more deeply into the laboratory of the mind.*"

"*The world and humanity.*" It is these two great hemispheres of thought, together constituting the sum of all things, that the teacher has to reveal to the child's vision, not, of course, in their completed perfection—which would be wholly impossible—but in their essential elements. "*Instruction concentrates all the objects of this Interest in the bosom of the young, which is the bosom of the future. Without this, Instruction is surely empty and meaningless.*"

For any teacher to talk of educating "*with his whole soul*" is to use "*an empty phrase*" unless he recognise that the greater part of his thought should be devoted to the question of "*what he imparts to the boy, what he makes accessible to him*"; unless Education is concerned with this, it has practically nothing of importance to do; the teacher has, in that case, "*nothing to bring to completeness through Education.*" Only when the teacher has before him the ideal

of implanting in the child an Interest in the world and in humanity will there "*flow from his full soul a fulness of Instruction which can be compared with the fulness of Experience*: . . . *an intercourse will grow up between them* (*teacher and pupil*) *which is, at the least, a foretaste of intercourse with the great men of antiquity, or with the clearly-drawn characters of the poet. Absent historic or poetic characters must receive life from the life of the teacher. Let him only make a beginning*; *the youth, even the boy, will soon contribute from his imagination.*"

Must the Teacher teach?

From these and similar passages we realise how pronounced was Herbart's conviction that Education without Instruction —that is, apart from the "Aesthetic Presentation of the Universe" to the pupils—was a meaningless thing. Mere formal studies such as arithmetic, mere "knife and fork"* studies like writing, are devoid of inherent significance; such significance as they possess is dependent on the successful accomplishment of "*the chief business of Education*," this "Aesthetic Presentation" of the two great world-hemispheres—Nature and Man. We see also where lies the latent danger of Herbartianism; that as the "*fulness of Instruction flows from the full soul*" of the teacher, the attitude of the pupil may become too passive. And yet, with such Instruction as Herbart contemplates, this will be difficult, for it will "*impart unfettered movement to the listener also*"; the teacher may "*make a beginning*," but the pupil will soon "*contribute from his imagination.*"

In closing the section from which the above quotations are taken, Herbart claims that Instruction alone can redress any initial one-sidedness of nature.

Elsewhere in the *Allgemeine Pädagogik* he mentions what, on his view, constitutes the most suitable material for initiating

* A useful phrase recently used for such studies as are merely *instrumental* to the purveying of actual mental nutriment.

the child into the two great worlds of Nature and Man; for knowledge of nature, the "A B C of Anschauung"—to which he had devoted a separate work; for knowledge of man, or rather for the development of "Sympathy" with man—the Odyssey. It is in the latter department of educational effort that the "culture stages" doctrine has its chief, perhaps its only validity. "*Taste and sympathy require chronological progression from the ancient to the modern*;" Greek should precede Latin, Latin modern languages. I need scarcely point out that Herbart is here thinking of the middle-class child.

22. Instruction (continued). Things, Forms, Symbols.

But there is another way of considering the materials of Instruction. They may be classified as Things, Forms, and Symbols.

With respect to the third—among which, languages hold the chief place—Herbart had an opinion of a decisive kind. "*They afford Interest only as the medium for the presentation of what they express. . . . They are an obvious burden which, if not lightened by the power of Interest in the thing symbolised, throws both teacher and pupil out of the track of progressive culture.*"

The doctrine here expounded is one of the most important—perhaps the most important of all—among the practical deductions from Herbart's central convictions. If Character is in large measure a question of Apperceptive Interest, those subjects which confer ideas, and thus provide Apperception material, must be the most important of all. Now, language and its connected arts (writing, reading, etc.), are of immense and indispensable value *as the means by which ideas are conferred*; but, apart from this function, they have little significance. Herbartians have therefore little sympathy with language-study *per se*. Disconnected books of extracts, however scientifically selected for purposes of exercise, awaken no enthusiasm.

Symbols as Means, not Ends.

Books of Extracts.

"*That book alone has a claim to be read which interests* NOW, *and can prepare the way for fresh Interest in the future. Over no other, especially over no sort of chrestomathy* (*book of selections*), *ought a single week to be lost.*"

The long monopoly enjoyed in the school by languages awakened Herbart's protest; as commonly taught, languages were not a character-forming, but rather a deadening and Interest-killing pursuit. "*Make therefore a stand as long as possible against every instruction in language, without exception, which does not lie directly on the high road of the culture of Interest. Whether ancient or modern languages, it is all the same.*"

Of course, a certain amount of definite practice in symbols is necessary: they are, in a sense, *things* themselves, capable of being perceived, observed, copied; "*the more powerfully and variously they impress themselves on the senses, the better.*" Nay, there is no need, in the early stages, to insist too hastily upon the *meaning* of symbols. But the broad principle holds good: *let us learn symbols for the sake of the things symbolised*; this principle will check us if we wish to spend undue time upon them. "*Only so much should be taught as is absolutely necessary for the next interesting use of them: then the feeling of need for a closer knowledge will soon awake, and when this co-operates, all will go on more easily.*" Thus, Reading, a form of skill or dexterity, is a means to an end, not an end in itself; a "knife-and-fork study," not a "dinner-study"; "*if children are slow about learning to read, the blunder must not be made of neglecting their mental culture in other directions, as though reading were its necessary pre-requisite.*" "*Languages alone give to a boy a picture neither of bygone ages nor of men.*"

How modern, how up-to-date, and yet how necessary, is all this! Teachers are all too prone to forget that unless a child acquires a love for Reading—that is, a love for History,

Literature and so forth—the mere *power* to read is useless. The remark applies alike to the study of English and of other (including the classical) languages. Just as primary schools for thirty years have "taught Reading," and yet have often failed to make children love English books, so secondary schools for three hundred years have taught Latin and Greek, and yet have often failed to make their pupils love Latin and Greek literature. Primary teachers should remember that children can be introduced to good English literature long before they can read; secondary teachers should remember the value of classical translations and of ancient history.

Reading: Power v. Interest.

I pass on to the second of the three matters with which Instruction is concerned—"Forms." Herbart claims that these—the abstract or general ideas derived from contemplation and comparison of concrete things—are not only interesting in themselves, but of much practical value. All such abstractions, however, are based upon the concrete: and it is a mistake to elevate them into a false independence.

Even the "formal discipline" of mathematics awakened but a modified sympathy in Herbart's mind, great though his admiration of the subject was. The mere performance of mathematical "*feats of ingenuity*" was incomparably less important than "*familiarity with the facts of nature*;" for though "*Self-activity*" is an educational goal it is only a subordinate one, unless interpreted in a wide Herbartian sense. All along the line in Herbart's system we find that "skill" and merely "formal" culture are sharply contrasted with "Interest." "*Skill of various sorts can be obtained by force, but it is of no value to general culture when the corresponding Interest is lacking.*" Men claim that "*if this or that had been converted earlier into ability to do, greater progress would have been made. But when Interest has not been aroused, and cannot be aroused, compulsory acquisition of skill is not*

Mathematics: Power v. Interest.

only worthless, leading as it does to soulless mechanical activity, but positively injurious, because it vitiates the pupil's mental attitude and disposition." This is exactly the message which many teachers, inspectors, and other people need to-day.

Thus the stress of the Herbartian system is ever on "*things*," not on "*forms*," or "*symbols*." The world of Nature and of Human Nature has to be revealed to the young. "Forms" and "symbols" have their place and value, but even they will never come to their due rights if to them is assigned a supremacy which they do not intrinsically deserve.

A quotation from Herbart's follower, Ziller, may suffice to suggest the unanimity of Herbartians upon this point. The teaching of "forms" and "symbols" is so dreary a task that men have invented a doctrine to sanction their methods—the doctrine that the hard work involved in learning these dry subjects is splendid training. Ziller remarks, on the other hand: "It is a mistake to find in the simple pressure of difficulties a source of culture, for it is the opposite of culture. It is a mistake to call the pressure of effort, the feeling of burden and pain, a source of proper will training."

There is very little doubt that if teachers will arouse an Interest in books (to take the most obvious example), their teaching of Spelling, Composition, and almost every other subject, will be a far easier task than it is at present. An educational "theory" that places "Interest" in the fore-front, is really the most "practical" thing that any teacher can be presented with.

CHAPTER IX.

Method.

23. Instruction, Analytic and Synthetic.* "Heuristic" Methods.

In these wonderful days, when some educationists are telling us that "the imparting of knowledge is not the teacher's business," while others are urging that the teacher's business is "to supply proper pabulum," it is consoling to know that a hundred years ago Herbart declared that Instruction had to be both Analytic and Synthetic.

Work up the Old and add the New.

At the moment when the teacher commences his work of Instruction he finds that the pupil already possesses a Circle of Thought based on Experience and Intercourse. Two things are possible in the first instance: the teacher may seek to analyse and systematise the stores of thought already existent in the child's mind, or he may seek to add to these stores, bringing forward material akin to that already provided by Experience and Intercourse, and therefore capable of being "*placed in the light which radiates from them. From the horizon which bounds the eye we can take measurements by which, through descriptions of the next-lying territory, that horizon can be enlarged.*" Sometimes young teachers are

* I am not entering into Herbart's threefold classification of Instruction as analytic, merely presentative, and synthetic.

so laboriously "analytic" that they seek, by questions, to "educe" facts of geography which are simply unknown.

Word-pictures of foreign towns, countries, customs, or of historical events; pictures in the literal sense also—these are some of the "synthetic" means that have to be used to increase the child's knowledge; but we must also take familiar things, and abstract from them, or discover "analytically" in them, their inherent properties or laws. There should be similar analysis in the case of *Intercourse* if the feelings are to be made pure and fervent. The result of such Instruction is to facilitate and assist all kinds of judgments. "*For the matter to be judged is there purified from confusing side issues*; . . . *distraction caused by the number and variety* (*of presentations*) *is at an end.*" The scientific imagination, the power of drawing logical conclusions from out of the confused materials presented by experience, is likewise aided by careful analysis of familiar objects and events.

The mention of science suggests a brief consideration of the "heuristic" problem.

The scientist aims at discovering the laws of nature underlying concrete facts. It is true this task is not always possible or advisable in the early years of life; "*on the other hand, it is just as little desirable to leave the mind altogether unpractised in speculation till those years when an impatient longing for certitude develops of itself, and obstinately seizes the best theory which first comes to hand, with which to satisfy itself. . . . The teacher must seek out,* ENTIRELY REGARDLESS OF HIS OWN SYSTEM, *the least dangerous ways to prepare, as much as possible, the capacity for investigation.*

In these last three words we find another proof how massive and all-embracing was Herbart's genius. At this moment there are prominent men, mainly scientists, who lay stress upon the development of a "heuristic" attitude of mind towards the facts and occurrences of nature; they are advocates of the "method of discovery." Years ago, Mr.

Spencer urged that "children should be led to make their own investigations, and to draw their own inferences. They should be *told* as little as possible"; they should "become their own teachers." The most prominent present-day advocate in Britain of this doctrine is, of course, Professor Armstrong; but there are many, even among classical teachers, who subscribe to it; indeed, it is clear that the "heuristic" attitude can be assumed, not only in connection with natural science, but, to a certain extent, in connection with historical and literary pursuits. Thus the teacher might set "problems" on the Civil War or on the characters of Shakespeare.

Heuristic methods are sometimes advocated as an exemplification of the "culture stages" doctrine to be expounded later. Just as the human race has discovered scientific facts in a certain order, so the child should be led to discover the facts in the same order.

In contrast to the "heuristic" attitude on the part of the pupil stands the purely receptive. I would remind my readers, in order to suggest what great issues are here at stake, that some educationists lay the primary stress on "Reverence" (a very different quality from "being one's own teacher"); similarly, that Matthew Arnold urged the value of imparting to children "the best that has been thought and said in the world" ("thought" by others, not "discovered" by the pupil); and that a great historic Church regards "private judgment" as the peril of the age. What does Herbart say? As ever, he sees the truth on both sides.

Opposing Views.

It has been supposed that the logical outcome of Herbart's doctrine is an encouragement of the receptive attitude. The stress he lays upon Instruction, upon the Circle of Thought, has given rise to this impression. In point of fact, he saw, fifty years before the publication of Mr. Spencer's book, the need for stimulating "Speculative Interest," but he also saw—which many moderns do not see—that Education has a far

greater task than this; that the mind must be fed as well as exercised; that the chief work of Education is to give an Æsthetic Presentation of the Universe in its two great aspects.

But not only did Herbart admit the necessity (though not the sole necessity) for awakening "heuristic" or speculative Interest, he gave to it a very wide field of activity. Mathematics, which had "*unfortunately degenerated into a game, assisted by lines and formulæ*," had to be "*led back, as far as possible, to the thinking out of the concepts themselves.*" "*Logic*," says Herbart, "*is also serviceable, but too much must not be expected from it. Among the problems of philosophical speculation, those are to be most thoroughly developed which are connected with mathematics, physics, chemistry; the youthful mind can, under skilful guidance, be variously employed to its great advantage in those which concern liberty, morality, happiness, right, and the State.*"

In his later *Lectures* Herbart says that the tendency on the part of children "*to ask questions, should, generally speaking, receive constant encouragement.*" Nay, in a far more significant passage (significant, that is, in view of the common belief that Herbart ignored self-activity, and significant also because only in the last few years has "Composition" begun to oust the over-valued subject "Dictation" from English schools) he says, "*Three lines of the pupil's own work* (*in composition*) *are better than three pages written by directions. It may take years before the self-deception due to leading-string methods is superseded by a true estimate of the pupil's actual power.*" Forty years before (first letter to Herr Steiger) Herbart had encouraged a "*watchful spirit of research*" in his eldest pupil by means of experiments in natural science. Indeed, if emphasis upon the value of natural science is to be regarded in Spencer and others as a sign of inspired nineteenth-century wisdom, a high place must be given to Herbart, who was actually teaching science twenty-three years before Spencer was born. In

Self-Activity.

his *A B C of Anschauung* he describes it as a "*cardinal fault*" that men had not "*assigned to the investigation of nature its true place and rank among the forces that must co-operate in the mind of an educated person, and hence in a mind that is being educated. Whenever this is done,*" he continues, "*mathematics, the indispensable handmaid, will also soon be put in possession of her rights.*" She is, in fact, "*a gymnastic of the thinking powers, needful even in the earlier years of childhood,*" as well as essential to the interpretation of physical nature. Herbart, as already indicated, saw much value even in the imperfect chemistry of his day, but, because of experimental difficulties, preferred it to be taught, not to young children, but to youths whose earlier education had been neglected, like Ludwig Steiger.*

Herbart on Science, 1797.

24. Absorption and Reflection.

In the course of considering "Interest" Herbart felt constrained to utter a warning. There is a danger that "many-sidedness" may fritter away concentration of mind. A mere butterfly existence was not the "many-sidedness" he advocated. "*All the interests of a single consciousness must find their place in the person . . . . like different surfaces of one body. . . . The frivolous man is a new person every moment . . . . he himself is properly nothing at all.*" The truth is that many-sidedness contains the promise both of danger and of safety; danger of frivolity, safety in the matter of sensitiveness and moral accessibility; while of the opposite quality ("narrow-mindedness") exactly the opposite may be said. Borrowing two of Matthew Arnold's famous terms, one might say that at first sight many-sidedness has all the glories and defects of Hellenism, while narrow-mindedness has all the

Many-Sidedness is not Frivolity.

* Herbart's remarks on "Æsthetic Interest" are omitted, not because they are unimportant, but because space is valuable. I would suggest that the many beautiful pictures provided in London schools may be used by teachers far more than they are.

glories and defects of Hebraism. One of Herbart's chief services to Education was to show that Hellenism is necessary for the development of some of the finer shades of Hebraism; the mind must be "changed through widened Interest" if full moral development is expected.

Still, with the dangers of the situation looming up before him, Herbart saw the necessity for some strenuous mental factor that might act in the opposite direction to frivolity and diffuseness. He finds it in "*Absorption.*" The mind must, at times, give itself up wholly and *con amore* to a single object. "*A suitable Attention is due to everything worthy of being observed, thought, or felt, in order to understand it wholly and correctly, and to transport oneself into it.*" And yet, if this attitude of mind be persistent in relation to any one object or any few objects, there is a danger that everything else coming to a man will be falsified or disregarded. Hence the counter necessity for Reflection, which preserves the unity of consciousness by assembling together the contents of the mind. Acts of Absorption are followed by acts of Reflection; the many-sided man is the one who is able at will to concentrate his mind, now on this matter and now on that, and to embrace all these acts of Absorption or Concentration within his own Reflection. There is moral significance in this. There may be contradiction between one act of Absorption and another: a man may have two or more selves (a "business self," a "Sunday self," and so on); or the blending of the selves may be imperfect, as in the case of the savant, pedant, or "scholar" (in the bad sense) whose scholastic notions form in large measure a closed circle, a circle apart from the rest of the affairs of his life.

Elsewhere in his works, Herbart compares the alternations of Absorption and Reflection with acts of respiration. The discussion takes up an inordinate space in the *Allgemeine Pädagogik*, and gives some colour to the charge put forward by Dittes that Herbart dresses a comparatively common-

place thought in elaborate and technical attire. In this case the thought is commonplace and obvious, but not to be despised; we must *first* strive to know individual things or groups, and *then* must compare them. Confusion of ideas is injurious to mental life. "*There can be no system, no order, no relationship without clearness in single things. Relationship . . . exists only amid separated and re-united parts.*"

Pulsations of Mental Life.

Summing up the situation, I would say that the pupil must be able both to concentrate himself on a subject and to take stock at other times of *all* the subjects and concerns of his life. Once again we observe how Herbart does justice to rival concepts.

25. The Doctrine of the Formal Steps of Instruction.

We have now arrived at the "Formal Steps" doctrine, elaborately developed by Ziller from the few hints dropped by Herbart in the *Allgemeine Pädagogik* and the fuller hints in the *Lectures*. Much has been made of it; a highly technical form has been given to it; but its essential features are, after all, not difficult to understand, and are quite free from subtlety. "From concrete facts to abstract laws, and then to practical applications," is a summary of the doctrine; "Observing, Thinking, Applying"—is Dörpfeld's formula; "first Observation, then Varied Observation, Comparison with Earlier Observation, and finally—as the crown and completion of these particular experiences—the new, higher form of Thought"—is Dr. Findlay's; and it is defective only in its omission of the last step—Application. Herbart's outline is similar, though not quite identical: "*clearness of every particular, association of the manifold, coherent ordering of what is associated, practice in progression through this order.*" The mind, "absorbed" for a time in particular facts, passes on to that relaxation, or at least amplification, of attention which Herbart calls Reflection; and then, when general

The Five Steps Summarised.

principles have been attained, these are applied deductively to new, concrete cases. There is nothing here that is really profound or novel; any apparent novelty is in the form and the systematic presentation of the doctrine.

Only in one particular have Herbart's four steps been seriously altered by his followers. The first of the four has been sub-divided into two, usually named "Preparation" and "Presentation"; the former is of the nature of a preliminary chat, intended to bring into the pupils' minds such apperceiving ideas as are related or pertinent to the matter about to be presented. Herbart, like Ziller, condemned purely "lecture methods"; in his reply to Zippel he recommends that pupils take a certain part in the general discussion; thus "*some freedom is given to accidental associations of ideas.*" In his *Lectures* he gives as a "*cardinal rule*" that "*immediately before the pupils are expected to work independently they must be placed in that circle of thought connected with their work. Thus, especially at the beginning of a lesson, a short résumé should be given of the coming lecture or reading,*" a suggestion developed by Ziller into the rule that the "aim" of a lesson should always be stated clearly to the pupils.

Perhaps it will be best at this stage to set forth the "Five Steps" in their most modern form:—

I. Preparation
II. Presentation } Observing.
III. Association
IV. Formulation } Thinking.
V. Application ... Applying.

The "first step" has been already described; it is a preliminary talk, bearing directly upon the new material to be "presented." The chief danger for the teacher is that it may be too lengthy and discursive. Unless it really bears on the subject in hand, and arouses Interest in it, the teacher may as well omit this "step" altogether and plunge at once into "Presentation."

In the "second step" the teacher brings forward the new material, whatever it may be: geographical facts, concrete objects for observation, etc.

In the "third step" teacher and pupils compare and contrast, so as to discover underlying resemblances, differences, and laws. For example, in a lesson on vertebrates, various animals of this kind would be compared with each other in order that their common characteristics might be discovered; vertebrates might also be contrasted with other creatures, for contrast aids in the discovery of similarity, and the contrast between vertebrates and invertebrates helps us to recognise the resemblances among the vertebrates themselves.

Exposition of the Five Steps.

The "fourth step" is a precise defining or summarising of what has become plain in Step III. For example, we might define a vertebrate and an invertebrate.

In the "fifth step" we apply our new knowledge or definition to unknown cases. For example, we might try to decide whether such an animal as a worm is a vertebrate or not.

This plan of "Formal Steps" undoubtedly provides the teacher with the most logical scheme for a lesson, or for a series of lessons, that has ever been set forth in the history of the world. But warnings are necessary. For example: It is not always possible or desirable to include all the five "steps" in one lesson; in fact, it is rarely possible to do so, and teachers should never force their material into unnatural forms. Some lessons must consist mainly of "Presentation" (Step II.), others mainly of "Application" (Step V.), or of one of the others. Again, the scheme is largely or quite inapplicable, as Professor Findlay points out, to "skill" subjects, such as Singing or Writing; these chiefly involve sheer imitation. But, within certain limits, the scheme of the "Five Steps" is admirable, and every teacher should be familiar with it, and criticise his work by means of it. For example, he might ask himself, "Do I lay undue stress,

in my lessons, on Step I.—in other words, is my Introduction too elaborate? Do I tend to forget Step V.—in other words, do I fail to make my class put their newly-acquired knowledge into practice?" This, indeed, is the chief value of any educational "theory"; it cannot make a hopeless teacher into a good one, but it helps all teachers to criticise their own work.

Value of the Steps.

Two other points should be mentioned. Ziller was emphatic in urging teachers to state clearly, at the close of Step I., the subject of the coming lesson. The class should feel no uncertainty as to what was about to be learnt. Sometimes there is difficulty in carrying out this advice, for anything that is largely new and unknown cannot be described clearly in advance; still, teachers should be careful that their class is not mystified as to the purpose of the lesson. This often happens with young teachers, who beat about the bush far too much in their "introductions."

Stating the Aim.

The other point is that there is no mention of "Repetition" or "Recapitulation" in the scheme of the Five Steps. Herbartians do not despise these things; but, after all, Repetition or Recapitulation are not "steps" or "stages" at all; they do not imply advance, but merely going over the same ground; whereas each of the five, except, of course, the first, does represent movement beyond its predecessor,.

Recapitulation is not a "Step."

26. Dangers of an Exaggerated Methodology.

To many British readers the chief feature in the Herbartian system is the "Five Steps" or "Five Stages of Instruction," to which reference has just been made; and many a critic, if not in this country, at any rate abroad, has devoted himself to warning teachers against a slavish and mechanical adherence to them. Such individuals may learn with surprise that the "Five Steps" are nowhere mentioned by Herbart (though, as we have seen, he mentions four processes, in large measure

identical with Ziller's five), and that no man was more earnest in advocating a free treatment of lessons than Herbart.

"*Let every affected manner be banished from instruction! Catechising as well as dogmatising, fun as well as pathos, polished speech as well as sharp accent—all are distasteful, as soon as they seem arbitrary additions, and not to proceed from the subject and state of mind. . . . The teacher must be capable of many happy turns; he must vary with facility, must adapt himself to opportunity, and while playing with the accidental must so much the more emphasise the essential.*"

Teaching must be Natural.

During the child's early years no Instruction, Herbart tells us, can be completely systematic; the school can only prepare the way for logical system.

A feeling of ease and freedom is necessary alike for teacher and for pupils. "*Everyone has his own individual way, which he cannot altogether ignore without loss of ease.*"

There is a special danger in an over-developed methodology —that it will check the pupil's "Self-activity," and tend to force his mind along a groove that is not the best for his individual case. Herbart sees the danger. "*All mannerisms that compel the listener's passivity and extract from him a painful negation of his proper activity, are in themselves unpleasant and oppressive. . . . That manner is the best, which provides the greatest amount of freedom within the limit which the work in question makes necessary to preserve.*" Instead of being rigidly continuous the lesson may "*permit interruptions, or itself cause them.*" A little later Herbart stresses the fact that much mental work is done spontaneously by the pupil, and says that where this is the case "*the teacher ought to detain neither himself nor the children.*" I have heard of cases (nay, I have seen something of the kind) where teachers have carefully worked out a logical lesson; but, because some pupils grasp the main point before the teacher has led up to it

No Procrustean Bed.

in his own formal way, he feels aggrieved. "But you don't know that yet!" he says. In point of fact the teacher should be glad, not sorry, if his pupils arrive at the point of the lesson quicker than he anticipated. It is a compliment to both parties.

In many cases, however, there is no need for a subject to be made completely comprehensible to the pupils; "easy assimilation"—sometimes regarded by critics as Herbart's ideal—by no means always wins his favour. "*Intrinsic comprehensibleness of the instruction is a matter of far greater importance than that the child shall understand on the instant what is taught at that instant. . . The happy moments of comprehension do not fall exactly within determinate lesson periods.*"

I sometimes think we "explain" too much in our schools, and are too fond of rummaging for definitions. A teacher who can read impressively, and directs his pupils to stimulating sources of information, will not need to ask many "meanings."

CHAPTER X.

The Curriculum.

27. Correlation and Concentration.

It is supposed in many quarters that in the Herbartian system the most distinctive doctrine is "Concentration."

Meaning of Concentration.

The curriculum has to he grouped around a definite central subject—humanistic material, on Ziller's view; this central subject has to dominate all others, give laws to them, receive apperceptive wealth from them. The pupil's thoughts must swing round this central material; other subjects, occupying less favoured positions in the plan of studies, must rather support the central material than put forward claims of their own.

The plan was supposed to conduce to various desirable ends, among them, unity of mind (in consequence of the supposed unification of the circle of thought); predominance of moral ideas (in consequence of the central position of the humanistic material); enhanced apperceptive power and Interest (in consequence of the fluidity of ideas encouraged by the destruction of barriers between subjects); and general simplification of the curriculum or time-table. As "centre" for the first year, Ziller selected certain "fairy-tales"; for the second year, Robinson Crusoe; for the third year, early Bible stories; and so on to Christianity and modern times.

Now, though I propose to discuss Ziller's proposal at some length, I wish to point out that Herbart never proposed

"Concentration" in Ziller's sense. At the same time, it is easy to quote passages from Herbart that have significance in this connection, and we will consider Ziller's proposals in the light of Herbart's words.

We saw (p. 73) that he laid stress upon establishing the "*interconnections of human knowledge.*" We now learn that "*great moral energy is the result of broad views, and of whole unbroken masses of thought*"; mere disconnected hints, maxims, or stories are not the soundest basis for moral instruction, though they may be useful. "*Isolated points of contact*" could not adequately replace "*masses of thought.*"

Large Masses of Thought.

We must cultivate "*a large circle of thought, closely connected in all its parts, possessing the power of overcoming what is unfavourable in the environment, and of dissolving and absorbing into itself all that is favourable.*" Personal unity is preserved by "Reflection," which (as already explained) brings together sundry "Absorptions"—otherwise detrimental to such unity. The point is, that unless our thoughts can move freely from one subject to another, and from one Interest of our daily life to another, there is the danger of our acquiring several "consciences," several inconsistent points of view. "'Six days shalt thou labour and do all thy work, *but*—' quotes the adult John, and feels that he has, by this antithesis, justified his separation of the two worlds. If driven into a corner, he settles the matter with his ultimatum: 'Business is business,' which is manifestly only an explicit statement that the system of business ideas must stand apart from all other systems."* Many men are regarded as hypocrites, or at least as grossly inconsistent, in consequence of some such cleavage of their mental possessions; and there is no doubt that the narrow limits assigned to "sacred" things—in other words, the overdoing of the distinction between the "sacred" and the

*Adams. *Herbartian Psychology.*

"secular"—is one cause of the ineffectiveness of Education to "*overcome what is unfavourable in environment*," and, indeed, in heredity also. If it is true that "*action springs out of the circle of thought*," there is immense significance, moral as well as other, in Herbart's claim that "*the stronger the connections in the complexes and series (of presentations) are, the more invariable are the laws which govern the movement of the presentation-groups in consciousness.*"

Predominance of the Moral Element.

We turn now to the second purpose aimed at by Ziller. By placing humanistic material at the centre of the curriculum and linking all other material on to that, he hoped to secure the constant predominance of moral ideas in the mind; just as "all roads lead to Rome," all trains of ideas were to lead up to the central mass of ideas. The plan was ingenious; perhaps it may fairly be called "Herbartian"; but it was certainly never contemplated by Herbart himself.*

While he praises unstintedly the value of "humanistic material" (history, poetry, and the like) he makes no attempt whatever to exalt it into a position that shall cause the rest of the curriculum to be overawed or dominated by it. There are, for him, two ingredients in that Æsthetic Presentation of the Universe which it is the business of Instruction to confer; Knowledge of Nature, and Sympathy, which is itself based on familiarity with the history and aspirations of mankind—in Matthew Arnold's phrase, with "the best that has been thought and said in the world." To subordinate the former to the latter in Ziller's way, so that, for example, the properties of limestone should be studied for the first time when the pupil was introduced to Abraham's wanderings among the limestone hills of Canaan, would have seemed to him, as it seemed to his stricter followers, a highly artificial and questionable procedure. He fully approved, on the grounds of the

*It is only right to say that Ziller came practically to abandon this view. He says many excellent things about the value of natural science.

Apperception doctrine, of connecting together related facts; so do all his followers; but a "Correlation" that took the form of a literal "Concentration" around one subject, he certainly never contemplated.

It will be useful to bring together the chief passages in his works that bear upon the present question. In his reply to Zippel (1814), who had aimed at simplifying or concentrating the curriculum by having mathematics and natural science taught "incidentally" in connection with literary subjects (a proposal that recalls Ziller's), Herbart took up a significant standpoint. Such a plan was "*absolutely impossible.*" "*Mathematics and ancient languages*"—Herbart is not thinking of primary instruction—"*will always necessarily remain the two trunk lines of instruction. The natural sciences in the main lean upon the former, history and the whole of æsthetic culture on the latter.*"*

Herbart Rejects this Type of Concentration.

He uses similar words in his *Lectures*, and these, in view of the fact of Herbart's supposed "indifference to Natural Science," are deserving of careful attention.

"*The existent groups of presentations are gained from two main sources—Experience and Intercourse. From the former comes knowledge of Nature, a knowledge defective and crude; from the latter come opinions concerning individuals, by no means always praiseworthy, often, indeed, extremely censurable. Correction of these opinions is most necessary, but neither must knowledge of Nature be neglected, otherwise error, fanaticism, and extravagances of all kinds are to be feared.*

The third reason for attempting "Concentration" is that increased Interest arises when one subject helps another. Apperception involves the blending of old and new, the interpretation or illumination of some new fact or experience by

* The words are a little misleading as they stand; we shall see that formal subjects must really "lean" on non-formal ones. Herbart means this.

means of older facts or experiences. "I heard something like that before!" says someone to whom you have just imparted an idea. Apperceptive Interest has been awakened, as it would not have been if the idea were entirely new or entirely old. Facts that are isolated cannot be apperceived—cannot awaken Apperceptive Interest—and though they may themselves leave traces in the mind and help in the apperception of other ideas, they are not always so *consciously* retained as ideas which fit spontaneously into a system of ideas already possessed. However, these practical reasons for "Concentration" are still more applicable to the much saner proposals for "Correlation," and will be discussed in a moment.

Increased Interest.

The fourth reason for attempting "Concentration" was the multiplicity of subjects—the overcrowding of the curriculum. It dated back from Herbart's time, and he has many references to it, especially in his little known essays.

Simplification of the Curriculum.

As early as the *A B C of Anschauung*, after recounting the multitude of demands on school time, he says that "*the educationist cannot help being frightened at the fearful amount. Nor can he help pitying himself and the poor brain of his pupil into which so many and so heterogeneous things require to be crowded.*" These words of 1802 are as applicable as ever to the condition of schools; nay, since Herbart's time, the overcrowding of the curriculum has proceeded apace. Twelve years later Herbart wrote: "*Great is the number of those who have held forth with zeal against the excessive number of studies,*" (*Observations on a Pedagogical Essay*). Herbart's own concept of "many-sided Interest" seemed itself to point in this direction. But he could not agree that "*the quantity of subject matter should, or even might, be diminished considerably.*" His opponent had contended that "multiplicity brought about confusion;" Herbart responded that simplicity was equally likely to bring about exhaustion, for the

reason that the human mind cannot busy itself for more than a brief time with any object, however agreeable. "*Children demand change. One kind of interest, albeit the highest, cannot fill their minds. There is, then, such a thing as too little, just as there is such a thing as too much. Mid-way lies a point of greatest vantage which is to be searched out.*" Once again I would point out the wonderfully judicious and judicial attitude taken up by Herbart.

"*This point of greatest vantage*" can only be discovered—such at least is the view of Herbart and his followers—by moving along the lines of "Correlation." Subjects have not necessarily to be diminished in number, but must be brought into more intimate connection with each other. "*The interconnections of human knowledge*" as we have seen, "*must be investigated in the most accurate manner, so as to enable teachers to set any interest, once excited, to work immediately in all directions, in order to accumulate the usury of learning on this interest as well as on the capital that has been acquired.*" But economy of time will spring, not only from establishing interconnections of knowledge, but from "*the greatest possible intensity of interest being excited; since what we pleasurably learn we learn very quickly and apprehend profoundly.*" "*The view of the intimate connection of all the sciences and of the aid they lend each other strengthens the charm of each.*"

Correlation, not Concentration.

In his *Lectures*, Herbart throws out many hints of a more concrete kind. Geometry and Arithmetic must be "*properly combined.*" In History there must be a grouping of facts around "*the notable names,*" and the subject should also receive support from Literature so far as to be "*accompanied by illustrative poetical selections which, although perhaps not produced during the different epochs, yet stand in some relation to them.*" Physics and Chemistry, in their early stages, should be regarded as one subject, just as Professor Armstrong suggests in these later days. Language work

should be connected with other work. "*The interrelations of knowledge, as well as its connection with action, must be brought before the pupil's mind with the greatest possible distinctness. One subject must not be split into several according to the names of its branches. . . . Saving time depends on methods better than these.*" Mathematics must be united with natural sciences; Herbart advises this, not only in his latest work, but in his first Steiger letter (1797): "*he* (*Ludwig Steiger*) *is busy with mathematics and chemistry, which, through their close connection with other natural sciences, give to the latter, and receive from them, a heightened Interest.*" Drawing, however, Herbart regarded as less capable of being connected with other studies—an opinion with which many moderns would disagree. A passage from the *A B C of Anschauung* may be finally adduced as summarising Herbart's view. The way of thinking on the subjects of instruction "*as of a mass with mutually extraneous parts*" was "*radically wrong*"; and many of the common divisions and sub-divisions might very well "*disappear by condensation.*"

Hints for Correlation.

Now these hints and warnings of Herbart are most pertinent and helpful at the present time. They might have been taken from the recent *Suggestions* published by the Board of Education. The opening words of the present book illustrate the point; a teacher, under the stimulus of official dictation, had separated "Reading" from "Geography." Now I could give twenty examples of similarly illegitimate separations. A child answers a question ungrammatically in a Geography or Arithmetic lesson; the teacher omits to correct the bad English, because the lesson is not an "English" lesson. A teacher is teaching the Bible and forgets to use the map of Palestine; or teaching History, and forgets to use a map of England; Scripture is "not Geography," History is "not Geography"! A boy writes

Illustrations of Lack of Correlation.

down an account of his "Science" lesson; the teacher refuses to consider his "Composition" or "Writing" because the real subject is "Science"; "Composition" or "Writing" comes "to-morrow." The "History" of one class may be the Tudor period, of another the Plantagenet period; yet the former class is taking Shakespeare's *Henry V.* for "Literature," and the latter *Henry VIII.* I am convinced that this lack of Correlation, for which teachers are not wholly responsible, is one of the most conspicuous faults of present-day educational method. It is an unintelligent and pernicious fault, rendering much school work artificial, unnatural, and uninteresting A little further consideration of it will be given in Part III.

This is not the place to discuss at length the more recent attempts, German, American or English, in the direction of "Concentration," or rather (for most educationists have frankly admitted that a literal "Concentration" is unattainable) in the direction of "Correlation." "Children," says Professor De Garmo, "readily form a network of associations among various studies if the connections are brought into consciousness; but we must wait until the stages of higher education are reached before there can be any intelligent grasp of far-reaching interrelations." This, no doubt, is true; but, on the other hand, specialisation must increase with the age of the pupils, and therefore there is greater possibility of a literal "Concentration" at lower stages than at upper. Subjects can be allowed to flow into each other and into the central subject.

Other Attempts at Concentration or Correlation.

The scheme of "Concentration" worked out by the late Colonel Parker of America differs from Ziller's in selecting quite different material for the "centre" of the curriculum. Instead of "humanistic materials" he chose the materials dealt with by natural science. Like Ziller, therefore, he had departed from Herbart's sane and safe standpoint that the study of Nature and the study of Human Nature—realistic study and humanistic study—are two co-ordinate and equally

indispensable provinces of the teacher's work. But both men were faithful to him in holding that merely "formal" studies required solid and concrete studies as a basis. I have also heard of attempts at "Concentration" round Hygiene and other subjects. I suggest that original-minded teachers might work at the entire problem here raised.

Dr. Frick's scheme, on the other hand, was one of "Correlation," not of "Concentration" and is a much more orthodox presentation of genuine Herbartian thought than those just mentioned. The schemes of most recent Herbartians and semi-Herbartians, like Professor Rein, Professor Findlay and Miss Dodd, recognise that *one* centre is impossible, and revert to Herbart's dualistic scheme.

CHAPTER XI.

Instruction and Character.

28. "Educative Instruction" (Erziehender Unterricht).

As early as 1802 Herbart had spoken (in his "*Introductory Lecture to Students in Pedagogy*") of "*Instruction which at the same time is Education.*" This is the dominant idea of his whole teaching.

It has been already pointed out that no language is more common in these days, or more misleading, or more disintegrative of the teacher's influence, than the claim that "mere Instruction" is not "Education"; that "Training" is more important than "Teaching." The only justification that can be found for such language is that much "Instruction," as Herbart says, may not exceed the standard of "*passable mediocrity.*" But to depreciate Instruction in general—to say, as Locke said, that "Instruction is but the least part of Education"—was impossible for Herbart. For it is no theory, but a psychical fact, that presentations or ideas are of momentous importance, conferring upon the mind an apperceptive sensitiveness to high things and the capacity for an Interest in them. If, then, starting from the "Interest" standpoint, we work backwards to an analysis of the conditions under which Interest can be aroused, we shall alight upon the doctrine of Apperception. Another step backwards will lead us to the conclusion that

Linking-up Character and Instruction.

Instruction—the conferring of ideas—is not the comparatively unimportant thing that many educationists would fain persuade us that it is. "Many objects of the greatest value," says Dr. McMurray (and under "objects" we may include spiritual or moral truths) "we pass by with an indifferent glance because our previous knowledge is not sufficient to give us their meaning."

But Instruction must be "Educative Instruction"—Instruction which, by way of Apperceptive Interest, becomes a life force.

29. "Humanistic Instruction" (Gesinnungs-Unterricht).

But though all true Instruction must, by way of Many-sided Interest, help to form Character—though all *Unterricht* must be *Erziehender Unterricht*—Instruction in certain subjects may have greater moral potency than that in others. It is quite obvious that Herbart never despised mathematics, natural science, or art; we have seen, indeed, that he was an advocate of the teaching of "natural science" long before schools had properly awakened to the need. Nevertheless, he undoubtedly laid great stress upon the humanistic subjects, those, like literature and history, which provide material for the moral judgment and help to make it delicate and true. Such subjects have been called "the Humanities," because of the humanising influence which they exert.

Material for Moral Judgment.

It is a common charge against a purely mathematical or scientific education that, while making men keen, clever, and efficient, it may leave them with a large share of barbarism in their nature. Such men may feel but scant sympathy with the fortunes of their fellows, little interest in the moral and social problems of the past or present age, little appreciation of the heroic and the delicate and the beautiful in word and deed. They may, though it is not certain that they will; for to exclude humanistic influences completely is impossible.

Dangers of Neglect.

Similarly, though men who have been educated in a narrow, utilitarian way, compelled by circumstances to face the grinding facts of life when young boys, may possess a power and energy of their own, there is almost certain to be a lack of moral sensitiveness in their natures, unless, of course, they have been brought into exceptionally rich personal intercourse with noble and sympathetic people.

We must never forget this last qualification. Even if no schools existed, we should learn much of Human Nature from Intercourse, just as we learn much of Nature from Experience; Herbart admits that Education can only fill out the deficiencies of Intercourse and Experience. Still, the fact remains that if Education fail to provide "humanistic" material in rich abundance there is grave peril for the moral life, and this peril is especially great in cases where Intercourse is limited (as it is with poor children) to a very few persons, and those not necessarily of a very noble type. We need to know something of the infinite variety of Human Nature if we are to sympathise with it. This leads us to Herbart's remark:—

"*To men above all, to humanity diverse as it is, and as it may and will be found by us, a sympathy is due, which cannot merely develop analytically from Intercourse with individuals known or described, and which is still less likely to grow from any general concept of race, such as humanity. Those alone partly possess, and can in some degree impart it, who have created within themselves numberless varied pictures of humanity—only the worthiest, as supplied by poets, and next to them by historians.*"

Function o History.

"*History*," Herbart says elsewhere, "*should be the teacher of mankind; if it does not become so, the blame rests largely with those who teach history in schools.*" And again: "*History awakens sympathy with distinguished men and the weal and woe of society, indirectly contributing in either case even to religious*

Interest." It must impart to pupils a "*glow of sympathy*"; it may "*co-operate with religious Instruction, otherwise the truths of religion stand isolated.*"

And yet Herbart was no undiscriminating advocate of History teaching. Followers or critics who read his Steiger letters will find passages which will disabuse them of this notion if they possess it, though these letters, of course, are not authoritative documents in the same way as his other works.

It is significant that Herbart was unwilling to place before an unresponsive pupil, like Ludwig Steiger, "*in whose bosom so many human emotions slumber, ... the doings and sufferings of all the human beings who have determined our present standpoint, who have prepared social security and art and science for us, in whose infinitely manifold forms we ourselves are depicted. . . . Where ought we to search for and discern a wise providence if not in the sanctuary of history? But what shall the uninitiated do here?*" In a later letter he said: "*I have never noticed that any single great character excited in Ludwig more than cold admiration. . . . It is difficult for young people to imagine clearly human beings of a remote age in their mode of life and thought.*" In short, the very importance and dignity of history forbid us from forcing it prematurely upon pupils devoid of apperceptive power. Again, writing to Karl Steiger during the first year of the nineteenth century, Herbart remarked that history was, in a certain sense, a dangerous study; the reason being that though it afforded material for the exercise and development of moral judgment, that judgment might, under certain circumstances, go very wildly astray. Again he says: "*Real characters are always too uncertain and changeable; their differences are too fine, their moral springs of action too complex.*" Imaginary characters have advantages for the instruction of the younger children, and are more of the nature of "test cases."

Fortunately, however, history is not the only "humanistic" subject; there is literature of every grade and kind, from the highest dramas of Shakespeare down to the ballad and nursery rhyme. In literature, characters stand forth in greater simplicity than in history; consequently the moral judgment upon them is less likely to err in its individual decisions and more likely to grow in delicacy and precision. To study the great characters of Shakespeare is a liberal education in itself.

Function of Literature.

For very young children, even literature (in the ordinary sense) may set forth characters that are morally too complex. The young child's "circle of thought" is as yet fragmentary; he has immense physical activity, a love of handling material objects, a roving imagination; but his knowledge of motives and of human nature in general is but narrow. Test him on some moral question and he will judge in a strangely crude and perverse way. If proof of this be needed, it is found in the results of the question proposed a few years ago to several thousand children; "What ought to be done to a little girl who, being presented with a new box of paints, beautified the parlour chairs with them in order to please her mother?"

It was for young children, with unformed moral judgment, that Ziller brought forward his "Fairy Tale" proposal.

"Fairy Tales (Märchen) are adapted, as is nothing else, to the individuality of the child, and especially to the predominating faculty of imagination, which is by all means to be cultivated, since in this are rooted all the higher strivings. For this reason the concept matter must be poetic. Only poetic thought-material allows the imagination free play, especially the fairy-tale material, which contains no names of persons or places, whose events are defined precisely neither as to space or time. The child who becomes absorbed in fairy-tales remains longer a child; he contemplates them with delight, for he himself rises, as do the fairy tales, above

the conditions of reality; he vivifies the lifeless; he animates the soulless; he associates with all the world as with his equals, and loses himself in adventurous impossibilities. Thus to favour the childlike views of things by means of, to him, congenial fairy-tales, cannot react harmfully upon him, because the fairy-tale contains, besides that subjective conception which deviates from the nature of things, also an abundance of objective, rational, not only æsthetic but also ethical, notions and principles, which lead far beyond the sphere of imagination. They serve especially to exercise the ethical judgment, and because the circle of acquaintance is extended to include inanimate things, the child finds a rich field unlocked, where, on account of the simplicity and correctness of the cases, it learns to decide easily, rapidly, and correctly."

Ziller on Fairy-tales.

Child Study has shown that until ten or eleven years of age, there is no very definite sense of space and time; now the fairy tales set space and time at defiance, and are thus peculiarly suitable for the young child. Again, as Fröbel, Ziller, and many others have pointed out, the child is an "animist," he attributes a human soul to animals, plants, and even stones; so does the fairy tale.

The tales give wings to the imagination, elasticity to the mind; they help to prevent rigidity, unresponsiveness, the triumph of the commonplace. They conduce, in short, to Apperception and Interest.

The proposal of Ziller, to use the Robinson Crusoe story as the chief "humanistic" material for the second year, and various other proposals for the use of the "Sagas" and the like, need not and cannot be discussed here. The main point to remember is that the whole Herbartian school stress the "Humanities." Any kind of Education that dispenses with them, or perverts them into grammar-grind, is drying-up the moral nature of the child, making him "morally colour-blind," and leaving him with "low moral admirations."

30. Religious Instruction.

During the course of his general discussion on Synthetic Instruction, Herbart feels obliged to refer to the question of religious teaching. But his caution is here extreme. "*Everything bordering on religion needs great discretion. As long as possible the religious feeling, which ought, from the earliest years, to depend on a single thought—Providence—must be preserved undisturbed. But all religion has a tendency to enter . . . . into speculation, and expand itself into . . . . dogmas. This tendency will not fail to be aroused in a mind beginning to be trained by many-sided culture.*" But Speculative Interest, so valuable in other departments, is here, on Herbart's view, positively perilous. "*It is time*" (when the germs of such Interest appear) "*to speak a serious word of the fruitless attempts of many mature minds of all times to find fixed doctrines in religion,*" time, in fact, to dissuade from premature speculation on theological matters. "*Positive religion does not come into the province of the teacher as such, but into that of the church and parents.*" Elsewhere Herbart says that from the standpoint of Education, religion must be regarded as subjective rather than objective, and again specially warns against the premature opening up of dogmatic questions. Religion must be an atmosphere rather than a formulated body of doctrines; these are no concern of the school at all. "*The family should be to the child the symbol of the order of the world; from the parents idealised, it should learn the attributes of the Deity.*"

Avoid Dogmas.

Herbart's remarks on this subject may have been suggested by his early experience with Ludwig Steiger, a boy whose remarkable unresponsiveness to appeal, based upon defective powers of Apperception, contributed much to the final form assumed by Herbart's doctrines. Ludwig's "religious education" had by no means been neglected. Indeed, Herbart feared that "*the thought of God had already become wearisome and repugnant*" to the pupil, the inevitable effect of too

much direct religious teaching. The boy was intellectually, morally, religiously, a "*barbarian*," despite the teaching he had received, and Herbart had to begin at the beginning.

It may be interesting, in view of the supposed "mechanical" nature of Herbart's educational doctrines, to read one of the prayers composed by him for his Swiss pupils and referred to in his first Steiger letter.

Herbart's Prayer.

Morning Prayer.—"*O Lord God! our dear Father in Heaven, take me into thy keeping! I am Thy child and wish to be good. Help me to be so. Let me more clearly and strongly feel day by day what is right and wrong, what is good and wicked. When I ask anything of anyone, let me truly feel whether what I ask be just or unjust; when I wish to speak or to act, let me see clearly beforehand if what I would say or do is mean, unseemly, or even dishonest. Help me to succeed in my work. Bless my industry. Give my parents, my brothers and sisters, and all other human beings as much happiness and as much good as is possible, Thou good Father in Heaven.*"

Readers who regard the "five moral ideas" of Herbart as unintelligible in their abstract form, may be referred to this prayer; it embodies all the five ideas, and shows their concrete significance.

Unobtrusiveness of Religion.

In his reply to Zippel (1814) Herbart illustrates the relation of religious teaching to the rest of the curriculum by the relation of jewellery to the rest of the implements and possessions kept in a house. "*The precious stones would refuse to fill* (so) *much space, it being in kind for them to concentrate their preciousness into very little space. Not otherwise can I judge of religion. I know and acknowledge that it must constitute the deepest foundation and one of the earliest beginnings of . . . . Education; but a religious instruction expanding into a great number of regular lessons makes me afraid . . . . Truly religious people often have extremely few articles of faith;*

they who have investigated most keenly testify that what we know of religion, and consequently can, in the strict sense, teach and learn, contracts very narrowly into a few extremely simple grounds in support of a reasonable faith." Herbart saw more value in devotional and musical exercises than in formal instruction; and though he did not entirely exclude the latter, he preferred to see it mainly in the hands of the clergy rather than in those of teachers. However, when the affairs of Ludwig Steiger assumed a critical form, when he was torn from his tutor and plunged amid the temptations of an idle, military life—there appeared a possible value even in "*dogmas impressed upon him without proof*," and in his "*fear of certain actions . . . . whether such fear were founded on reason or want of reason.*" In fact, Herbart saw cause, on occasion, for the adoption of methods which, though unpedagogical and wholly alien to his own views, possessed a certain rough efficacy in certain cases.

A Limited Value in Dogma.

I have no desire to commit readers to my own view on this question, but I think most observant and thoughtful people are coming to the opinion that though the school should make ample provision for "humanistic" culture, and should always keep character-forming before it as its supreme aim, the actual teaching of dogma is the business of those who have taken the study of theology as their life's work—that is, ministers of religion. Otherwise the work and training of teachers must be quite different in different countries and different sects; there can be no Science of Education on an equal footing with the Science of Medicine; and there can be no professional future before teachers.

CHAPTER XII.

Herbart and Fröbel.

31. The Doctrine of Culture-Stages. Stories from the Childhood of the World.

Student-teachers who wish to be abreast of the times cannot devote too much study to the doctrine of "Culture-stages"—one aspect of the doctrine of Evolution. It pervades the educational atmosphere; Fröbel is full of it; modern Child Study is bringing new evidence in favour of it. What is more to the present purpose, we find striking hints of it in Herbart's chief work, published twenty years before Fröbel published his. The truth is that the idea of Evolution was powerfully influencing many thinkers at the beginning of the nineteenth century, though until Darwin's time the difficulties in the way of scientific explanation were discouraging.

The Idea of Evolution.

Human beings, in their individual development, pass through stages roughly corresponding to those through which, as it is believed, their whole ancestry has passed in the countless ages of time—from a tiny cell up through sundry intermediate stages to that of fish, and then onwards to that of mammal and man.

At birth most of these stages have already been left behind, but the child is not yet a mature being. Twenty or more years have to pass before he can catch up to modern civilisation and appreciate it as his own.

In Dr. Stanley Hall's book on Adolescence, and in many other works on Child Study, will be found much evidence showing that certain moral and intellectual qualities normally appear in the child or the youth at fairly definite periods. The passion for "fairy tales" is at its height when the child is six or seven. The passion for forming bands or "gangs"—a sign that the meaning of social life is becoming understood—appears at double that age. Devotion to high ideals is prominent in the later teens; it is then that "conversions" are common, with resolutions to become a missionary, scientist, and so on.

Results of Child Study.

This principle of development is likely to prove itself very helpful in educational work. For example, if young children really correspond in many ways to the ancient races of the world, is it not likely that stories created by those ancient races will be specially suitable for school use? And may not history dealing with those races be also attractive to children? That is exactly what Herbart suggested.

Old-world Stories.

"*Here* (in history) *we are speaking of human beings to whom sympathy is due, to whom we ought to bring none but sympathising onlookers; this sympathy comes most naturally to those who cannot as yet look with us into the future, because they have hitherto not so much as understood the present, and for whom, on this very account, the past is the true present. . . . A time of youth is depicted (in ancient Greek authors) such as we ought to have passed through.*"

"*A time of youth is depicted*" in these stories of the ancient Greeks! A time with which our present-day young people can spontaneously sympathise, into which they can transport themselves, from which they can draw inspiration! Such is Herbart's pregnant thought; and certainly the child likes these ancient stories, is marvellously receptive towards them, and may thus be regarded as occupying, in certain respects, the stage of development they represent. It may be

objected that the child lives in the present, and is concerned with the flowers, animals, and material objects that surround it. This, in large measure, is true so far as Knowledge of physical nature is concerned; but on matters of Sympathy, the view of Herbart and his followers is probably the right one; the child is here more akin to the feelings of the vanished past than to those of the present age. The adult, nay, the youth, looks forward into the future, seeing

"The Vision of the World and all the wonder that shall be;"

a Vision that starts from the imperfections of the present and would fain remove them. But the young child knows little of this, and feels more at home with the unreflecting and simple-minded heroes of the past than with the wearied and thought-laden men who bear

The Past attracts the Child.

"The heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world;"

and to whom Gray's "Elegy," with its adult view of life and death, is intelligible in a way not possible to a child.

For the child, as Herbart says, the past may be the true present. "*The adult's sphere is among cultivated people, too high, and too much, determined by relationships which we would not willingly explain to the little boy if we could.*"

The old stories of the Greeks (to which might be added stories of Teutonic, Keltic, and other races) may thus possess an educational value of the highest kind.

It is by travelling along the road once travelled by our forefathers in the childhood of the world that we can become public-spirited and unselfish beings, identified with human progress. "*If sympathy for society is to arise from simple, sincere, transparent feelings . . . then it must follow the course of human conditions up to the present, beginning from that condition which is the first to express itself clearly enough. . . . Truly the past has divulged but a few of its conditions; still more seldom has it impressed itself as*

clearly and many-sidedly as Education might wish. Priceless, therefore, are those documents in which it speaks to us with full-toned, loving voice; we must complete the rest in imagination. . . . In a patriotically-minded nation . . . its little six-year old children will tell you of the 'children of an older growth,' the heroes of past ages; they relate the stories amongst themselves; they rise upwards in union with their country's history; they strive to become men of the nation, and they DO *become so. The ancients knew their Homer by heart; they did not learn it as men but as boys. He it was who formed the general character of the youth, and his pupils do him no discredit.*"

The Teaching of Patriotism.

In the long passage just given we see in what sense the teaching of ancient Greek and other legends is truly "synthetic"; it provides images of those simpler elements of human nature which enter into the more complex forms of modern society. Without an early sympathy with human nature in its naïve forms, there can arise no genuine sense of citizenship or patriotism.

Translations Useful.

Herbart proceeds to amplify his views on the use of Greek literature—poetical, historical, and philosophical. The value of it is not primarily scientific or æsthetic, but humanistic; it represents, "*above all, persons and opinions,*" and asks for these "*a friendly reception.*" Consequently translations must be extensively used, for the acquisition of the Greek language is not the main thing aimed at, but the appreciation of human thought and feeling. In the case of the more well-to-do pupils immediately under the consideration of Herbart, the Greek language itself could be acquired, but even for them the teacher must "*confine grammatical instruction within the narrowest possible limits,*" though it may be quite sound and scientific so far as it goes. The question is not one of the relative ease or difficulty of the Greek language, but that we learn it as a

means, not as an end. "*Skill* (in the language) *must not attempt to gain more than the credit of good service.*"

Books must be selected in accordance with this view of their aim. The Odyssey is to be preferred to the Iliad; in early years the Philoctetes of Sophocles,* later some of the historical works of Xenophon; still later, when the notion of citizenship is developing, the Republic of Plato—these are some of Herbart's suggestions for that humanistic Synthetic Instruction which is to complete the imperfect teaching of human Intercourse. Such Instruction "*must be begun early*"; if such has not been the case, the age for the appreciation of these writers may be passed; the teacher must then "*leave the Greeks on one side,*" and seek to realise the educational goal by an analysis and by supplementing the existent stores of thought in the comparatively adult pupil. But normally the starting-point must be with Greek; then will follow Latin; later, modern languages.

Herbart, of course, is not thinking of *primary* schools, which, indeed, scarcely existed in any numbers when he wrote the words. In 1806 Fichte had not uttered his great call for popular Education; Pestalozzi had only just gone to Yverdon; the House of Lords were about to reject the first bill for establishing a public elementary school in every English parish. No, Herbart is thinking mainly of the middle-class child. But what he says can be applied to the poor man's child in a special manner. For the child whose life is to be passed amid the dingy grey of London streets stands in special want of stories; he needs to have his imagination fed while there is time, far more than any other child.

And even Herbart's words concerning translations have their value for the primary teacher. We are too apt to think that

*Not knowing much Latin or Greek, I did not realise the exact value of this suggestion until I examined a translation of the Philoctetes. But all was clear when I read of the youthful, heroic Neoptolemus, and the simple but pathetic motives that operate in the play.

poem and story and history must always come from the printed page; that the presentation of these things through word of mouth is a poor and weak device, which prevails in the ranks of secondary teachers—that unless a boy reads Greek books in the original he should not read them at all; that translations are useless and ignominious. But the Herbartians, as already explained in Section 22, always lay stress on *substance* rather than *form*, and therefore do not despise either oral narration or prepared translations.

Application to Primary Schools. This is only another form of the fallacy

Dr. Stanley Hall, describing how certain impulses and likings make themselves felt at definite times, tells us that they are, so to speak, visitations of the Holy Ghost, which must not be "sinned away" or allowed to pass fruitless. American thought is full of the idea. Readers may be interested to know that Herbart, at the age of twenty-one, was in possession of it.

In his first Steiger letter, referring to Ludwig's desire to study natural history, he says: "*The most important thing of all is, he wishes it* NOW. *This wish, if not seized and utilised at once, will no more return than the pleasure with which Ludwig at Karl's age would have read Homer. My own sad experience makes me daily regret that so little heed was given, when I was young, to such wishes.*"

"There is a Tide."

Here we have a clear suggestion of at least two stages of child development. The words strongly remind us of some of Fröbel's, in which he says that if the spontaneous likings of childhood are ignored there will be dark places in the intellect and hard spots in the heart for the rest of life. "*We feel*," says Herbart in another place, "*that something has been left behind which we ought to have with us. Vainly would we wish to make it up by efforts.*"

There are few other hints in Herbart's chief work of a Culture Stages doctrine, though readers must keep in mind

that it is a doctrine far less prominent with him than with his follower Ziller. In fact, the notion is not very characteristically "Herbartian"; the stress is clearly upon a process of organic unfolding rather than upon a process of building up a thought-circle. Still, Herbart never ignored the principle of heredity, and, with it, the principle of unfolding. Once again, indeed, I would affirm that he never ignored *anything*.

Further Hints of the Doctrine.

In discussing "Synthetic Instruction" he prescribes "*a chronological progress from the old to the new.*" Again, the study of speculative systems is begun "*most advantageously with the oldest and simplest.*" "*The continuous study of modern times,*" we read in the *Aesthetische Darstellung* '*belongs to mature youth.*" These, and a very few more hints, are, so far as I know, all the contributions made by Herbart to the doctrine now under consideration. They are enough to show that in 1806 he was as conscious of its importance as Dr. Stanley Hall in 1906.

If space permitted, I could tell of the many attempts made to arrange, not only humanistic subjects, but others also in such an order as to conform alike to the historical development of the race and the personal development of the child—two developments that are supposed to run roughly parallel. Ziller's Concentration scheme—starting from Fairy Tales (supposed to correspond to a very primitive period of human development); going on to a Robinson Crusoe period, when man was learning the use of tools, etc.; on again, to the patriarchal period indicated in the book of Genesis; on yet again to the prophetic period, and then to the New Testament—this scheme is full of suggestiveness, and, with modifications, is obtaining a good deal of support from leaders of modern pedagogy. Dr. Hall, for example, urges that previous to the age of twelve most boys are in an "Old Testament" stage, and are incapable of appreciating New Testament ethics: such an appreciation can only come, as a

Ziller's Scheme.

rule, when adolescence has lifted the boy to a new moral plane—when he feels the claims of society and finds a new meaning in "sin."

Others are urging that just as theological creeds came historically late so they should come educationally late; that just as mathematics began in Egypt with land surveying, so practical and concrete measuring should, in our schools, precede more abstract work; that science teaching should similarly take account of the historical stages of discovery, and so on.

Other Applications.

I would only add one warning. The parallelism between racial and individual development is likely to work wonders in education, but it must ever be treated with moderation and caution. We know all too little about the early history of man; and, moreover, history does not always record a continual *advance*. To attempt to reproduce in every child the tortuous course of man's evolution in all its completeness—even if we know it completely—would probably be pedagogical folly. Our business is to study the child's own nature, and ascertain his needs at each stage. We can get many a useful hint from historical evolution, but we must be careful not to accept them uncritically.

Value and Danger of the Doctrine.

32. The Education of the very young Child; Hints of the Kindergarten in Herbart.

A remarkable passage—almost a parenthesis in his discussion of Synthetic Instruction—shows how closely, at one point, Herbart approached to the views of his contemporary, Fröbel; or, rather, how the principles he enunciated are inclusive of those enunciated by the founder of the Kindergarten.

By means of "*Synthetic Instruction*," an Æsthetic Presentation of the Universe is to be given to the child—a grasp of the sum-total of reality in its two great aspects of

Nature and Man. But the elements of this great Presentation must not be imprinted on the mind through the rote method of "learning by heart"; there must be all kinds of devices, examples, symbols, etc. "*I suggested marking out with bright nails on a board the typical triangles, and placing them continually within sight of the child in its cradle. I was laughed at. Well, people may laugh at me still more. For, I thought, place near this board, sticks and balls painted with various colours; I constantly change, combine, and vary these sticks, and later on plants and the child's playthings of every kind. I take a little organ into the nursery, and sound simple tones and intervals for a minute at a time. I add a pendulum . . . that its rhythmic relations may be observed. . . . Yes, who knows whether I would not adorn the walls of the nursery with very large, gaily painted letters?*"*

Those who have been led to believe that Herbart's system is ultra-bookish will read these words with surprise. It is true that there are not many passages in his works that lay stress on such factors as those mentioned above, and the reason is obvious; Herbart had a right to assume that *Pestalozzi's doctrines were known to his readers.* Now, the most characteristic of Pestalozzi's doctrines was the one that urged the necessity for the handling and observing of concrete objects—in fact, the doctrine of Anschauung. There was no need for Herbart to go over the old ground.

But he is fully able to justify himself for his advocacy of early and rich Anschauung. "*The abrupt and troublesome process of stamping things on the mind, called earning by heart, will be either not necessary or very easy if only the elements of synthesis are early made constituent parts of the child's experience. They will then, so far as possible, steal imperceptibly in among the incomparably greater accumulation*

* A very similar passage is found in the *A B C of Anschauung*; in fact, as the above passage shows, Herbart's plan had been before the public for some time, and had been "laughed at." This was twenty-four years before Fröbel published his *Education of Man.*

of things with their names which, at the time of learning to speak, can be comprehended with such wonderful facility. But," and here, perhaps, Herbart was thinking of the more narrow-minded advocates of Pestalozzian procedure, of whom there were already some, "*I am not the fool to think the salvation of mankind depends on such trifling aids as may, more or less, lighten and forward instruction.*"

In Herbart's *Lectures*, published five years after Fröbel's *Education of Man*, but not, apparently, influenced by it, we find further suggestions for work that may be called Fröbelian. "*Arranging . . . is appropriate for children. That two objects may change places from right to left . . . and vice versâ —this is the beginning. The next step is to show that three objects admit of six permutations in a straight line. To find how many pairs can be formed out of a given number of objects is one of the easiest problems . . . not letters, however, but objects—the children themselves—should be changed about, permuted, and varied in position. The teaching of a subject like this must, in a measure, have the semblance of play . . . Use may be made of knitting needles variously placed, of domino checks, and of similar objects. Next comes the circle . . . The play-impulse remains active for a long time, unless checked by conventionality.*" Again, "*much learning, sitting —especially useless writing in copy-books—are condemned.*"

Anyone who knows the interior of a modern infant school will recognise in these recommendations of Herbart the very methods now adopted for the teaching of number by means of sticks, planes, and groups of children. And the reference to "play" is significant. I have no desire whatever to exalt Herbart by depreciating other reformers, but in the interests of truth it should be pointed out that if Fröbel presented the world with some wonderfully helpful hints with regard to play and other matters, and invented a phrase ("kindergarten") that is occasionally useful, Herbart presented the world with the same hints (and dozens more), and invented—not one term

only (and that one open to criticism), but a whole series of helpful, illuminating, and mutually related formulæ. However, our present concern is with the "Fröbelian" aspects of Herbart's work.

His other references to the educational use of play or games are significant. In Letter XVI. he gave his approval to "*a playful kind of procedure in very early instruction*," though he condemned the elevation of play to a universal method. What could sound more Fröbelian than the following, published eighteen years before Fröbel published anything? "*We can, we ought to foster, to guide, to watch continuously the earliest employments to which the child spontaneously shows itself invited by surrounding objects . . . We may always* PLAY *with the child, guide it in playing to something useful, if we have previously understood the earnestness which lies in the child's play and the spontaneous efforts with which it will work itself out in happy moments.*" Elsewhere, he says that the true teacher "*is not misled into turning Instruction into play, nor, on the other hand, designedly into work; he sees before him a serious business, and tries to forward it with a gentle but steady hand.*" Many times he stresses the value of varied occupations and boyish games as a counteractive of lawlessness. Nay, in his last great work, he boldly defines Interest as "*Self-activity.*" "*Strenuous Effort*" is sometimes to be the pupil's duty; though "*severe tests of this kind must never be permitted to become the rule.*" Conversely, mere "*desultory play is liable to end in* ENNUI."

Again, we find Herbart laying stress upon "*counting, measuring, weighing*," as an introduction to mathematics—the very proposal recently made by the scientists of the British Association. There should be "*the measuring of lines, angles, and arcs* (*for which many children's games, constructive in tendency, may present the first occasion*)." He had made the same proposal forty years before. "*The aim is not merely to secure keenness of observation for objects of sense, but, pre-*

eminently, to awaken geometrical imagination and to connect arithmetical thinking with it. Indeed, exercises of this sort constitute the necessary, although commonly neglected, preparation for mathematics."

There are many other passages in Herbart's works which show, not only how closely he approximated to Fröbel on many matters, or rather how he anticipated Fröbel, but also how strictly "Herbartian" are those American writers who are seeking to show the identity of "Interest" with "Self-activity." He emphasises, as Fröbel does, the danger of allowing school to be sundered from the other activities of life, and he urges (for example, in Letter XXXV. to Griepenkerl) the value of active open-air work and of imitating this or that mechanic at his toil. He speaks of the pleasure in handling material to make it into some shape (Letter XXXIV.). And though, for reasons of his own, he built up a psychology on presentational foundations, he was filled with a sense of how great an influence the bodily constitution exerted upon the mind. He sees that many so-called "educational" problems are really medical or dietary.

33. Herbart's Rejection of the "Plant" Analogy of Fröbel.

We have seen that many of the practical suggestions of Herbart coincide with those of Fröbel, and that most, if not all of them, actually preceded Fröbel's in time.

But the speculative standpoints of the two men seem far apart, and there sometimes arises a sharp contrast of terminology.

Herbart asks expressly (he was not replying to Fröbel, for Fröbel was an unknown man in the early years of the nineteenth century) "*Does the principle of a man's Education lie in himself in the sense in which the whole shape of a plant lies prepared in its germ, or does the construction of his personality originate in the course of his life?*" The former view (afterwards Fröbel's) results in making education "passive, observant, protective"; the teacher is a gardener only:

the latter view—though held in limits by the facts of innate constitution—was Herbart's. "*Education*," he said, "*must regard its office in very essence as consisting of giving and withdrawing. Education by no means consists merely in supervising and tending, like our gardening art that makes only plants its care. . . . Man, capable of becoming, as you will, a wild animal or personified reason, and formed incessantly by circumstances, needs an art which shall build him up and construct him in order that he may receive the form that is right.*"

The reader is here face to face with great issues. I have already quoted words from typical modern educationists like Professor Welton and Mr. Skrine to the effect that mental life cannot be "built up from without," and that the teacher's business is to "draw out what is already in" the pupil. But I have also pointed out that, as a matter of fact, mental life *can* be "built up from without"—that this is actually being done by the Fagins of the world, by the Catholic Church, and by other agencies, criminal, ecclesiastical, bad, good, or indifferent. The Fröbelians and many other educationists say or imply that it cannot be done (perhaps they do not actually mean what they say—that is *their* business); the Herbartians say that it can. As soon as we have decided which party is right, or how far each party is right (for there must be truth on both sides), the educational atmosphere will be a little less foggy than it is.

My present concern is to call attention to what Herbart says on this vitally important subject. He, at any rate, believed that Education could "*build up*," and he saw, or thought he saw, in Pestalozzi's method, signs of agreement with his own view.

"*Its peculiar merit consists in having laid hold more boldly and more zealously than any former method of the duty of building up the child's mind, of constructing in it a definite experience . . . . not acting as if the child had*

already an experience, but taking care that he gets one." And yet, as Herbart goes on to point out, the human mind must not be regarded as a *tabula rasa*; it has an activity of its own, and to this, Instruction must in measure seek to adapt itself. Still, one of the most characteristic features of Herbart's teaching is the stress it lays upon the need of *construction from without.* As he says in his *Lectures*, the pupils must be to some extent passive, though the passivity must not be an oppressive one but one that stimulates the good in them.

In his suggestive essay of 1812 (*On the Dark Side of Pedagogy*), he again rejects the view that the life of each human being is the development along fixed lines of a germ whose constitution is settled at birth. Not at birth, but during the first one or two decades of human existence, does the "germ" take on its more or less "settled" constitution. "*All the more freedom remains to the educator's activity, who in early youth in large part himself forms the germ from which subsequently is produced what is apparently organic.*"

Any teacher who wishes to summarise Herbart's view in its opposition to Fröbel's can do so in the words just quoted; Education can, in large part, "*form the germ*" or build up the soul.

But Herbart's language, bold though it is, receives all necessary qualifications from Herbart himself. This man never gives himself away to his critics, for, to a supreme degree, he is ever his own critic. The educator is far more than a gardener, but, as time goes on (I am quoting from Herbart's essay *On the Proper Point of View for Judging the Pestalozzian Method of Instruction*), Education "*grows more and more similar to the art of gardening. The blessings of Education change more and more into mere almsgiving. . . . True giving and withdrawing diminish. In a child's mind a definite Interest may be implanted; the Interest of a youth can only be fostered. A child believes what it is told, thinks what*

it has heard, does what it has seen. We build a world for it by pictures and tales. In a youth, on the contrary, we can only widen or narrow the world in which he lives; in it he builds himself a hut, disdaining a palace built elsewhere against his sentiments."

No words could serve better to bring out the distinction between the standpoints of the two men. While Herbart does not ignore the part played by innate constitution, he realises more keenly than Fröbel the need of ideas conferred early in life; these have a force, an efficacy, that is solemnly, tragically great. After a certain age, Interest has taken on its main outlines; Character begins to stiffen; Apperception moves along fairly unchangeable lines. The germ now grows, with some inevitableness, to its final form. With Fröbel, on the other hand, this early formative influence of ideas is, in appearance at least, underestimated. The teacher must be a gardener *from the first*; "passive, observant, protective."

Is Fröbel right, or Herbart ?

34. Physical Health and Exercise.

The present moment in educational history is seeing an increased stress laid on physical training. The air is full of proposals for "organised games" and the like, Fröbel being regarded as the apostle of the movement.

In point of fact, twenty years before Fröbel wrote his *Education of Man*, and indeed a little before he became a teacher at all, Herbart, in his *A B C of Anschauung*, had laid stress on manual dexterity and inventiveness. I shall show, too, that in his great work of 1806 and his supplementary work of 1835 there is the same stress. In spite of all this, Herbart is popularly supposed to have been an advocate of purely didactic methods. If "*action springs out of the circle of thought*"; if Herbart had "*no conception of Education without Instruction*"; if the formation of the circle of thought "*is everything to the teacher, for out of thoughts come*

Did Herbart Ignore Physical Education?

feelings, and from them principles and modes of action," what logical place is there in Herbart's system for any stress on the physical?

Well, the difficulty can easily be solved; it is similar to the one that arose in connection with Discipline, Instruction, and Training. Herbart is *careful to draw distinctions when these seem necessary for clearness of thought.* He recognises—nay, he stresses in a manner that is remarkable or even prophetic in a German of the early nineteenth century—the importance of the physical factor, but he says that, if we are to develop a Science of Education or Pedagogy, we must mark off a province for it.

Now there is a Science of Medicine, and a Science of Theology: and there are two professions—those of physician and clergyman—devoted to these two sciences. Similarly, there is to be a Science of Teaching, and a profession devoted to that science. As far as possible we should distinguish between various provinces of work. If we do not, we shall find the teacher being constantly interfered with and dictated to by clergymen, physicians, and other people. *In point of fact, this is exactly what we do find at the present moment*, and we should be grateful to Herbart, alike for pointing out where the teacher's work ends and the clergyman's begins (p. 140), and for indicating that, though a teacher may be called upon to look after the health of his pupils, this task is not in his *peculiar* province, but is really a department of the physician's work, deputed to the teacher for convenience. No doubt, good health is a requisite for Character, but the care for good health is a teacher's business only in a derivative sense; his special business—I cannot too often repeat this, because it is so often denied—is to *teach.* The purpose of teaching, the methods of teaching, the arrangement of the curriculum, the principles of organisation—these are the teacher's special and peculiar concern: no other profession is

Need of Clear Distinctions.

competent to deal with them. If ever the teacher is to stand on his own feet as a self-respecting professional, it will be when he has realised that he has this definite province for his own.

Herbart's Common Sense.

I am more and more struck, as I study Herbart, by his inexhaustible common-sense. He says exactly what the "man-in-the-street" says, only he says it out of a fulness of knowledge not usually possessed by that type of modern level-headedness. The man-in-the-street says that the teacher's business is to teach; Herbart —almost alone among educationists—says the same. The man-in-the-street says that Education is more than "drawing-out"; Herbart says the same. The man-in-the-street says—— Well, I could point out a dozen matters in which Herbart agrees with the man-in-the-street and disagrees with those educationists who identify Education with Paradox; and one of these matters is that of physical training.

Herbart's Stress on Health and Exercise.

"*The care of health is essentially a part of the Formation of Character, though without belonging to the Science of Education.*" "*Education is scarcely possible when ill-health has to be considered; a healthy, ordered life therefore must be the basis and the first preparation for Education.*" In the first three years of the pupil's life, "*care for the body has precedence of everything else,*" though such care falls "*outside the limits*" of the discussion. There must be no excessive sitting still; lessons should be intermitted to allow of exercise in the open air. "*Every school should have not only spacious school-rooms, but also a playground.*" One of the advantages of singing, Herbart points out, is that it promotes health.* There were advantages, too, in Pestalozzi's plan of simultaneous class-speaking, for thus "*on none of the pupils was the yoke of inactivity and silence imposed. The craving for diversion was satisfied.*"

* In my *Educational Ideas of Pestalozzi and Frobel* (p. 69) I had half-heartedly suggested that Herbart ignored Singing; I am glad to correct the blunder.

Reference has already been made to Herbart's approval of children's games. "*We ought . . . to try and give free play to youthful energy . . . Those who grow up merely passive, as obedient children, have no character when they are released from supervision.*" Youths—even boys—must be made "*active agents.*" "*As far as safety permits, the spontaneous activity of the child should have free play . . . that he may get practice in the use of every limb.*" The value of activity is not only physical, but moral. The child must jostle with his fellows, and get to know the world; a fugitive and cloistered virtue, brought about by a too careful shielding from the evil around him, is not a good preparation for life. Children must "*accommodate themselves to and associate with each other in their own way,*" and be "*judiciously left to themselves. For where human beings, big or little, rub against each other, the relationships with which moral perceptions are connected develop abundantly and spontaneously.*" Herbart also put in a word in favour of children being allowed to form organisations, a hint which, along with the others above given, places him side by side with the most modern educational thought.

In a later section, further evidence will be adduced to show that however firmly Herbart held to his dictum that "*action springs out of the circle of thought,*" he was not, as commonly imagined, the advocate of a merely intellectual Education.

In concluding this section I must re-affirm that almost everything of importance taught by Fröbel was taught or hinted by Herbart. Fröbel, however, worked at the problem of infant training in a way that was never possible to Herbart, and has thus made a priceless contribution that may fairly be called his own, to Pedagogy. Herbart's achievement was, nevertheless, greater than Fröbel's, because while anticipating Fröbel in his own province, he also sets forth a system of clear and coherent educational ideas applicable to every grade and problem of Education.

35. Relation of Herbartianism to the "Practical" Needs of Life.

One of the advantages claimed for Fröbel's system is that, by dignifying labour and developing practical skill, it helps to solve some pressing problems of the day. In an age of competition, a system of Education must expect to be challenged on practical, if not utilitarian grounds. This has happened in the case of Herbartianism.

In one sense, the system is pre-eminently "practical"—Character-forming is its avowed aim. Knowledge has to become a vital thing, not remain a dead acquirement. Instruction has to be "Educative Instruction," Instruction that makes for Character by arousing Interest and creating apperceptive power.

Now it is clear that Herbartianism, if capable of effecting this, is in a true sense—though not in the vulgar sense—"practical." Every blow struck in the interests of Character is a blow for success in all worthy professions and occupations of life. At least half of an artisan's inefficiency is due to defects of Character, such as habits of intemperance and indifference to duty.

Character-forming is "Practical."

But the question still remains whether Herbartianism allows for that special mode of equipment known as "technical education," Education for some definite trade or profession.

In the strict sense it does not. It is true that Herbart's follower, Ziller, suggested the inclusion of special professional classes in the school system, such classes to be, of course, for elder pupils only. It is equally true that Herbart and his successors would no more have denied the necessity for technical education than they would the necessity for food, clothing, or shelter. But—Herbart would say—to permit a confusion of purposes to spring up; to allow purely technical education to be regarded as being on the same level with

Education *versus* Technical Education.

Education proper (Character-forming Education), is as foolish and fatal as to confuse mere external Discipline with genuine moral Training. This is another instance of how Herbartians draw a sharp distinction, not because the agencies in question can be rigidly separated in practice, but because, without clearness of view, Education can never save itself from stagnation and from confusion of aim and motive.

To show that Herbart did not ignore the technical side of training I would mention that in his *Lectures* he says, referring to "*trade schools and polytechnics*," that these "*presuppose a completed education, completed to the extent permitted by circumstances.*"

There is a sense, however, in which Herbartianism undoubtedly contributes to professional success. Not only does it seek to create moral fervour—this, as already said, is an essential in the battle of life—but it seeks to create an adaptability, a mental fervour, of no small value in the utilitarian sense. Premature specialisation has no severer foe than Herbart, but it is Herbart who also says, "*the man of many-sided culture possesses a many-sided equipment; his choice may be made late, for he will easily attain the necessary skilfulness in any case, and by a later choice he will gain infinitely in the certainty of not going wrong from a mistaken conception of his own character, or from changeable circumstances.*" Ziller expresses the same truth when he says that Many-sided Interest is "an aid to one's earthly activity;" and a "salvation amid the storms of fate;" the narrowly-trained man possesses no power of adaptation to the changeable conditions of life.

Many-Sidedness is "Practical."

To attempt a more special preparation for life was severely condemned by Herbart. "*Education does not work for the vocation in life.*" Some teachers may seek "*to cram the youthful mind by means of divers anxious artifices with a number of acquirements for ordinary life,*" but Herbart is

convinced that a more general training is in every way preferable; "*where health and the proper proportions of intellectual Interest have been cared for, as much judgment and flexibility as a man requires to get through life will, in the end, be spontaneously forthcoming.*" Herbart, then, never denies the necessity for technical institutions; but he does, with great emphasis, put forward the claims of general culture as a necessary preliminary to all preparation of a special kind; and he sees that unless this has been acquired, technical instruction will be in large measure wasted; the pupil's flexibility of mind will be inadequate for the demands placed upon it. "*Mental culture is the central point of all education. It is only the men who are allowed to grow up with dull minds . . . who are ignorant how to get on with the world and themselves.*"

General Education before Technical.

Towards the end of his section on Many-sided Interest he remarks: "*A well-grounded, genuine, many-sided Interest. . . will withstand narrowing or contraction, will itself give its vote on the plan of life, itself choose and reject ways and means, open out prospects, win friends, put the envious to shame.*"

Still, when one has admitted the general truth of all these contentions, the question may still be raised whether Herbart's system is adequate to meet the stress and strain of modern economic conditions. He has been accused of thinking mainly of middle-class education, and his own experience with the Steigers was not experience with pupils who had to think early of the stern realities of life;* in this respect his career stands in sharp contrast to that of Pestalozzi.

One must, perhaps, conclude that Herbart's plea for culture as a necessary pre-requisite for moral sensitiveness and force will have to undergo a certain limitation in view of the stern conditions amid which many of our poor grow up.

* In one passage of his first Steiger letter he expresses his regret that Ludwig did not feel "*the spur of external circumstances which so often force onwards the children of needy parents.*"

LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY

But a merely "utilitarian" education is out of the question. The narrower the lives of people are, the more need that they should have glimpses, when at school, of humanising truth. But the Herbartian phrase, "Many-sided Interest," may have to be displaced by some such phrase as "Several-sided Interest"; and, while a certain amount of comprehensive culture must in any case be given, the teacher's special aim may be rather to create a winning atmosphere for the humdrum tasks of life, to show the moral and civic significance of these, than to implant many heterogeneous germs of possible interests. But, after all, that is what Herbart always insisted upon; Instruction has to build upon Experience and Intercourse, not despise them. If our plans, however humanistic, are wholly in the air instead of being based securely upon these dual foundations, they will inevitably fail. Better, perhaps, a narrowly utilitarian education than one whose exalted aims are doomed never to be attained. The consoling thing is that the materials for Character-forming Instruction are simple and accessible: a few books, a few plants, the sky above . . . and —teachers!

"Many-sided" or "Several-sided"?

Looked at fairly, then, Herbartianism is as "practical" as Spencer's proposals. Almost in the words of the English philosopher, Herbart said, "*The most necessary Instruction must be that which teaches man what he most needs to know. Now, what is needful to us is needful either to our physical or our moral nature. We need it either as sensuous beings to enable us to live, or we need it as beings in the social relations of citizenship, family life, and so forth, in order that we may know and do our duty.*" (*On Pestalozzi's Most Recent Publication,* "*How Gertrude Teaches her Children.*")

36. What the Teacher Cannot Do.

From what has just been said, it is clear that Herbart never regarded Instruction as all-powerful. His critics have been prone to imagine that, because he could see no meaning in an Education that did not rest largely on Instruction—on

an Æsthetic Presentation of the Universe—he failed to perceive the limitations of this.

But it is perfectly clear that he did perceive these limitations, though he would not say, with Fröbel, that Education must be "passive, observant, protective."

In the first place there are the limitations of Individuality which may seriously interfere with the carrying out of the educational ideal. Throughout Herbart's letters to Griepenkerl we find him emphasising, again and again, how the psychological mechanism is checked or even, in extreme cases, dislocated by physical and psychical peculiarities. Our Science of Education, he tells us, cannot overcome an organic hindrance; cannot, for example, make an artist out of any child chosen at chance. The temperaments and peculiarities of pupils sometimes oppose unconquerable hindrances to the teacher, sometimes provide advantages of which he must make use.

Limiting Power of Individuality.

When, in elaborating the question of "*Steps of Instruction*," he came to discuss the appearance on the scene of Speculative and Æsthetic activity (two out of the three kinds of Interest connected with "Nature," the other being "Empirical"), Herbart declares most explicitly that "*taste, as well as speculation (or meditation), is something original which cannot be learned.*" "*We ought therefore*," he continues, "*to expect that, in the sphere of sufficiently known objects, both must become active without delay, if the mind be not otherwise distracted or oppressed.*"

There are also, in the second great department, innate forces at work. "*As the most barbarous nations are not without divinities, so the souls of children have a presentiment of an unseen power*," which presentiment, the basis of future religion, will however, in normal cases, first attach itself to parents and guardians—a hint for the best method of religious instruction.

Again, Instruction is regarded by Herbart rather as the supplement—though a priceless and indispensable one—of

Experience and Intercourse, than as an independent agency. "*We are . . . forcibly impressed with the necessity for a preliminary inquiry into the course usually taken by natures left to themselves in the gradual formation of their Character. For we know that men formed from any but the softest clay, do not wait for the Character which the teacher wishes to give them. How often in this respect are labour and anxiety thrown away, in the effort to produce what is self-formed, and in the end must be taken, when completed, as it is found.*" Even in his early "*Introductory Lecture*" (1802), Herbart had said, "*the World and Nature, take them as a whole, do much more for the pupil than Education can, upon an average, pride itself on doing.*"

Limiting Power of Environment.

About the same time (in his essay on Pestalozzi's *How Gertrude Teaches her Children*), he admits that just as "*everyone is obliged to learn his trade with a master in that trade,*" so "*man forms his moral nature for himself, and in the midst of life. The school can undertake a part only of the Instruction which a man needs. The school is to do as much as it can do. For its purposes, therefore, the first and most important are those means of Education, the efficacy of which extends furthest, begins earliest, and is most frequently renewed by opportunity.*" Similarly, in his reply to Zippel, he says (1814): "*What the world, example, converse, family, and, above all, the silent self-efficacy of mind working within itself contribute, is not under the control of the school. It does all that is possible if it puts properly in motion the educative force which resides in the sciences.*"

Again, there is much that is unpreventable even in school work itself. "*Mere change of teachers*" causes pupils to "*make comparisons*"; "*Instruction is powerless to obviate such evils.*"

The above remarks are sufficient to show that Herbart did not "neglect Individuality," and did not "neglect Environment," as he is sometimes supposed to have done. What he "neglected" was—nothing.

CHAPTER XIII.

Some Concluding Problems of Instruction and Training.

37. Direct Moral Education. Distinction between the Objective and Subjective Sides of Character.*

In the present exposition of Herbart's ideas my aim is not to set forth his proposals with regard to the teaching of this or that subject—though he made many, as will be shown in another volume, and they are wonderfully modern and helpful. My desire is that modern teachers may feel he has presented us with a *system*; a series of interconnected and highly significant concepts into which all or most matters of detail may subsequently be fitted. Instead, therefore, of dealing with the many practical hints contained in Herbart's *Lectures* (his last important work) I wish to keep somewhat close to his *Allgemeine Pädagogik*, that wonderful product of his earlier years, the most lucid, coherent, and ambitious scheme of educational work that, at any rate up to the time when it appeared, had ever been given to the world.

In the preceding pages the importance of Instruction and Interest has been indicated. But these concepts do not exhaust Herbart's resources. The supposition that he ignores

*The following sections, though dealing with very important matters, may be rather hard for the elementary student of Education. I am inclined to suggest that he relieve the tension of his mind by turning over to Part III. and, after learning there that the Herbartian questions already discussed are pertinent and modern, that he then return to the sections here beginning.

I have tried to condense and break up Herbart's teaching, but I do not suppose that all the difficulties are removed.

all other educational agencies will not bear a moment's investigation. "Many-sided Interest is not Character," say his critics. If they will turn to the third book of the *Allgemeine Pädagogik* they will discover that Herbart, leaving the question of Many-sided Interest behind, passes on to the consideration of the very topics he is supposed to have "ignored."

He opens this new subject with a helpful distinction, one which is sorely needed at the present day by all those who discuss Moral Education. He distinguishes the "objective" part of Character from the "subjective."

There comes a time in the history of our pupils when they begin to reflect on their own characters, and judge them as morally good or bad. In a sense, therefore, they find their characters already formed, though the appearance on the scene of the new subjective principle of reflection opens out new possibilities of character-forming. *That portion of their characters which appears as already existent is called by Herbart the "objective part."*

How has the "*objective part*" come into existence? Innate propensities and acquired Interests have had a large share in its formation, for they have been operative at a time when he was "*immersed in things and externals*," and had not learnt to observe himself or reflect. But "*out of an entirely different condition of soul than this a new Will has to be generated*;" in fact, out of the subjective or conscious side of Character, as contrasted with the already existent objective side. Character has to come to rest on ideas, and be no longer a matter of crude habit or impulse. The Will, with Herbart, always means the conscious, deliberate Will.

Herbart does not deny that we must make such attempts with all the power and sagacity at our disposal, for it is by thus building up a subjective Character that the imperfections of the objective can be counteracted; and, indeed, such an influence often "*works powerfully*."

But however "*powerfully*" such an influence may operate, the preliminary task of Education is the one already outlined—the task of forming inclinations and Interests—in other words, of building up the objective side of Character. "*If this first is in order, results may then be hoped for from the regulating power of good moral teaching. There will still remain to the subjective to give the sanction, the final settlement and refinement of the morally formed Character, which it will, however, easily accomplish.*" Herbart here repeats, in other words, the doctrine expounded in an earlier part of the *Allgemeine Pädagogik*: "*the individuality must first be changed through widened Interest.*" Wholesome, spontaneous Interests must be generated; then, under the shelter which these afford, and equipped with the well-nigh automatic apperceptiveness towards moral truth which is also involved, the pupil is in a fit condition to appreciate the reflective maxims of moral conduct.

In view of present-day controversies over moral and religious Education, Herbart's view is of no small significance. The increasing demand for "ethical teaching," as advocated by the Moral Instruction League, can be now judged aright. Even if premature, such teaching may "*work powerfully*"; but for its full effect it requires the previous awakening and establishment of a Many-sided Interest in Nature and Man. Herbartianism therefore gives some support to each of the current views on moral teaching. Those who claim that "Virtue cannot be taught," may draw satisfaction from the fact that Herbart lays more stress upon the creation of wholesome Interests than upon the formulation of reflective moral maxims; only *these Interests are themselves largely the results of Instruction*; thus Virtue *can* be indirectly taught, but its teaching is a long process. On the other hand those who claim that ethical teaching in schools is one of the greatest needs of the age, will learn from Herbart that such teaching "*works powerfully*," because there is a "subjective" side of

Character as well as an "objective"; for every child there is the possibility of conscious, deliberate reflection on moral truth, and though this should not be prematurely stimulated neither should it be ignored. It ultimately rests—this is Herbart's main point—upon the "objective" elements of Character. "*Only out of the number and variety of occasions for moral judgment, of which such an inexhaustible supply is afforded in the family, in general Intercourse, and in all which falls within the sphere of synthetical and analytical Instruction—only out of this wealth . . . can the pure non-sensual emotion . . . proceed, whereby Character is strengthened to true morality.*"

"*Only*" thus can true morality spring up! It is claims like this which make Herbartianism what it is; a moral movement of the first dimensions; a movement not free from arrogance, but arrogant with the same excuse as ecclesiastical movements —the conviction that it holds a great moral or spiritual secret in its keeping. Nay, scarcely has any movement, ecclesiastical or other, put forward such an impressive claim as Herbart's; for this, be it observed, is one based on the solid facts of psychological observation, not on factitious elements. Take from a child all chance of receiving that "Aesthetic Presentation of the Universe" which is provided by Experience, Intercourse, and the all-important complement of these, Instruction—do this, and the child *cannot, cannot* become a truly and fully moral man. In the proportion that the revelation is restricted—by defects in these three agencies—in that proportion is the human being's moral nature eternally stunted; in that proportion is he a dead man; in that proportion is Apperception of spiritual things impossible for him. One may here apply, in a new sense (or, perhaps, we have now discovered, for the first time, the scientific sense of the old words), the statement of Holy Writ: "the natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him; and he cannot know them, because they are spiritually judged."

Later in his book, Herbart enunciates what is probably the most telling maxim in the literature of Moral Education. "*Great moral energy is the result of broad views and of whole, unbroken masses of thought.*"

Let us see the significance of this. Morality rests on Insight; it is not a matter of mere impulse or habit, and is not created by any mechanical system of drill, though these latter factors give it momentum. The circle of Thought is thus a vital matter, for insight depends upon its richness. Unless a child has had opportunities to pass judgment on moral characters and situations he will fail to understand moral truth. Virtue has its root in ideas. "*The pure* POSITIVE *of morality, of which a man's innermost depth must be full if resolution is to be kept safe from humiliation, if the noble feeling that* VIRTUE IS FREE, *is to be anything more than a brief ecstasy—this, which . . . is a force solely of the naked judgment to which the desires bend amazed . . . this belongs entirely to the Circle of Thought, it depends wholly upon what forms that circle.*" Never has the dependence of Virtue upon Thought been expressed in a stronger form than in these words of Herbart. The uncultured man—he whose thoughts move in a narrow groove, who is deficient in imagination, who cannot project himself into other moral situations than the few which he himself has occupied—may grow up "moral" in a negative sense; he may not outrage any prohibitory rule of conduct; but his moral nature will, nevertheless, remain poverty-stricken for ever if his Circle of Thought is narrow.

Hence, we see again the need for Moral Instruction, based on concrete examples of human action, "*as means to a certain clearness and analysis, and to an encyclopædic acquaintance with the whole range of the elements of morality and with their most general motives in life.*" Herbart mentions in particular Campe's *Children's Library*—a collection of fables, historical stories, and the like—as valuable in this connection.

But, as he points out with an emphasis which his critics would do well to note, mere acquaintance with the elements, the single constituents of morality, is by no means adequate. There must be "*broad views*" and "*whole, unbroken masses of thought.*" "*To attempt to replace the masses of thought . . . by a collection of many isolated moral points of contact is folly . . . The same applies to frequent moral exhortations and sermons, indeed, even to individual religious services themselves, in so far as the primal ideas of religion have not sunk early into the depth of the mind.*"

Only an all-embracing intuition of things, the result of an Aesthetic Revelation of the Universe, has much ultimate moral potency; isolated *aperçus*, though not without value, are deficient in solid effect; and when, as so frequently happens, they are associated with ecstatic excitement, their final result is mere reaction. Herbart felt that there was far more hope for man in wide culture, based on history, literature, and the like, than in discreet exhortations, even when these (as is not always the case) are illuminated by pertinent illustrations.

Again, to keep our moral nature alive at a single source by means of one only hobby or pursuit (admirable, perhaps, in itself) involves a fatal narrowing towards other normal Interests. A man may become a sectarian, seeing a few duties clearly and ignoring others.

At this point Herbart pauses. The immensity and solemnity of the task set before Education appals even him, for the task has almost revealed itself as one containing an inner contradiction. "*We require a large tranquil body of thought as a moral power in man . . . We want a power stronger than the idea, and yet pure as the idea . . . I believe all cultured men of our day feel this difficulty. I do not mention it here in order to resolve it. Were that in my power it would have been done long ago.*"

And yet, though Herbart cannot wholly resolve the Sphinx-riddle of the conflict between cold, pure, moral truth and warm

but impure prejudices, he has done more than any other man to indicate the direction of solution. He has shown, or has helped to show, the function of the idea.

38. The Will and the Circle of Thought.

Of course, if we are to persist in the belief that Virtue and Vice are mysteries and not effects, the constant references of Herbart to the importance of the Circle of Thought are wasted labour; and Education must be regarded as a task to which only tenth-rate and impecunious men and women can justly feel themselves called. Again and again, therefore, Herbart returns to the point; again and again he decides that the Circle of Thought *is* important, overwhelmingly important. The life of the soul depends on the ideas with which it is provided; and if those ideas are poor, or few, or bad, the soul *cannot* be morally good.

Despite the predominance of Fröbelian or pseudo-Fröbelian thought in high places, and despite all deifications of the child's innate impulses, Herbartians are united on this point. Starve the soul and the soul will die; and the death is none the less real because it is partial or unconscious. "The state of a soul that is ill-supplied with good ideas calls for little comment. Such a soul can hardly be said to be tempted. The soul must be continually choosing among the ideas presented to it, and if the supply of good ideas is inadequate, it must, of necessity, choose the evil."* *Of necessity!*

Mere "Training," therefore, is not morally adequate, though, as we shall see, Herbart recognises its importance if based on Instruction.

But the true blessedness of the situation is that the Circle of Thought itself possesses potency; it is not a dead thing, requiring to be vitalised from without, or to be attached, like the coaches of a train, to some mechanism which may supply kinetic energy. There is in Herbart's system no "faculty" of

* Prof. Adams. *Herbartian Psychology.*

Will, no "faculty" of Feeling, to be linked on to the intellectual "faculties" of Imagination and the like. The Will works along the line of Interest, and Interest works along the line of ideas.

Here, let it be said, modern psychology, though sometimes rejecting the technical form given by Herbart to psychological facts, substantially agrees with him as to the potency possessed by ideas. Professor James tells us that "the states of consciousness* are all that psychology needs to do her work with." "I cannot too strongly urge you," he says to teachers, "to acquire a habit of thinking of your pupils in associative† terms . . . thinking of them as so many little systems of associating machinery. You will be astonished at the intimacy of insight into their operations, and at the practicability of the results which you will gain. I speak as if ideas by their mere presence or absence determined behaviour."§ True, the potency of ideas may really be due to obscure physiological or psychological tendencies which are *set free* by the idea—in other words, Feeling may be the vital factor—but the fact remains that the idea is the proximate cause of this liberation, and thus possesses incalculable importance, sometimes even when in comparative isolation. An idea will "act itself out" and dominate the whole nature of a neurotic person. Hang in a public gallery a picture of a suicidal act (a picture such as *Die Lebensmüden* at Berlin) and acts of suicide will follow. But the crowning evidence for the Herbartian is this: that when a fact or experience is such that old facts or experiences throw light upon it—cause it to be "apperceived"—there is a flash of pleasurable Interest; and in that flash, repeated again and again till it becomes a continuous illumination, infinite possibilities are involved. It may be the starting-point of a new mode of life; it may involve salvation itself. The humble, the much-despised

* Substitute "ideas" here, and we have Herbart's standpoint.

† "Association of Ideas" obviously means much the same as Apperception.

§ *Talks with Teachers.*

Instruction of the class teacher is shown, by the Herbartian philosophy of Education, to be one of the greatest forces in the world.

Herbart anticipates an objection. "To give to our pupils an 'Aesthetic Presentation of the Universe' is precisely what educationists have always been doing." He replies that he is contemplating no mere superficial exhibiting of historical, philosophical, and poetical representations, but a long, serious, and impressive task, "*which places* IN THE CENTRE *of the mind a weighty and interconnected (and also articulated) body of knowledge, reflections, and opinions, having such influence and such points of contact with everything added to it by the flow of time, that nothing can pass by it unnoticed, no new thought establish itself which has not first adjusted its differences with what has gone before.*" "*Points of contact,*" a constantly recurring expression in Herbart's works, stands, as we have seen, for at least half of his practical philosophy of Education.

In a footnote to the passage just given Herbart tells us that "*the proof of a perfect Instruction is exactly this—that the sum of knowledge and the concepts which it has raised by clearness, association, system, and method to the highest suppleness of thought, is at at the same time capable as a mass of Interests of impelling the Will with the utmost energy by virtue of the complete penetration of all its parts.*" The "*ordinary school rubbish*" has not proved adequate for so high an educational purpose. Mere "*memoranda,*" without vitality and interrelation, do not possess the power of "*overcoming what is unfavourable in the environment and of dissolving and absorbing into itself all that is favourable. If the manifold be loosely combined in the Circle of Thought its working, as a whole, will be weak.*"

And everybody in these early years of the twentieth century is bewailing that, for some reason or other, "*its working*" is as "*weak*" as in Herbart's time, a century ago. And, as in his days, too, men are telling us that Instruction is not

important, and that Training is the main thing to aim at in Education, Training being "*direct action on the youthful mind with a view to form.*"

39. General Remarks on Training (Zucht).*

We have seen that Government (or "Discipline" in the sense employed by the primary teacher) simply aims at the maintenance of quiet and order; it has no direct character-forming power beyond this. Nay, some observers believe that rigid discipline in school actually conduces to ill-behaviour; "the bent bow relaxes all the more."† In the United States "martinet" methods have been largely abolished as not really helpful to the child in developing reasonable will-power. Thus Herbart, instead of establishing an unnecessary distinction between Discipline and real Training (as some critics have alleged), has really established *the very distinction that our primary schools badly need to recognise.*

It is a remarkable fact that Edward Thring, in his *Education and School*, published 1867, and Mr. J. L. Paton, in his lecture at the College of Preceptors, in November, 1906, drew an exactly similar distinction. Acts which are merely prohibited by school rules, because conducing to disorder, are to be punished by a mechanical system of penalties. Acts which are indicative of moral imperfection demand a different system. Nay, Mr. Paton attributes these to a form of "delusion," and thus comes wonderfully close up to Herbart's view that real moral effectiveness is only possible through the Circle of Thought. The more I study present-day controversies, the more I am convinced that the distinctions drawn by Herbart for the purpose of clearing the educational atmosphere are exactly the distinctions we need. They are not artificial, pedantic, scholastic, but very real, necessary, and illuminating.

*See Preface for the translation of this word in Mr. Felkin's books and in the present work.

† Journal of Education, November, 1903.

In contrasting methods of Discipline with those of Training he tells us that "*the educator must be cool, concise and dry, and appear to have forgotten all as soon as the matter is over*," the reason being that Discipline takes account only of the *results* of actions, while Training looks to motives and morals, for it presupposes (on Herbart's view) that the child has a Circle of Thought and a certain power of moral judgment formed through Experience, Intercourse, and Instruction.

Training must be "*continuous, persevering, penetrating, and only ceasing by degrees*," and "*personal influence acting on the mind*" should be made use of. Whereas Discipline is "*short and sharp*," Training, which aims at moral improvement, should employ every means to win the love and respect of the pupil.

Herbart is careful to guard against the view that Training is some isolated agency, with mysterious laws of its own. It is "*primarily but a modification of the art of intercourse with men*," and is largely a matter of tact. "*It is properly not so much a conjunction of many measures, of wholly separate acts, as a continuous treatment, which only now and then, for the sake of emphasis, resorts to rewards and punishments and similar expedients.*" In his later *Lectures*, Herbart describes Training as consisting "*primarily in a certain personal attitude, where possible identical with a kind way of treating pupils.*" Without the pupil possessing a certain richness of thought, the measures adopted will prove useless. "*All will pass away like music, and no lasting effect will remain, unless the stones are raised to the sound of that music into the walls of a well-defined Circle of Thought.*"

Herbart holds that blame, apart from praise and recognition, has little cogency; until the pupil has attained to a certain self-respect—this itself is dependent on the respect of others—blame is meaningless. "*Where mere blame has any effect, self-respect should be present to a small extent; it must reach such a degree that blame can lay hold of it.*" Next in

importance to the task of forming the Circle of Thought is the task of discovering elements worthy of approbation in the growing character; however few these may be, they are of vital importance. Yet approbation should not be of such a kind as to cause pride; "merit marks," and such like, are entirely harmful. Good elements should rather stand out as contrasted with the worse self; in this way moral judgment is perfected. Sometimes real mental pain may have to be inflicted.

In an interesting passage of his last book on Education, Herbart briefly discusses what was considered at length a few decades ago by Spencer—the question of "natural punishments." He sees that they possess a certain value. "*The boy who comes late loses the anticipated enjoyment; if he destroys his things he must do without them; over-indulgence is followed by bitter medicine, tattling by removal from the circle in which matters requiring discretion are discussed.*" Such a procedure may "*warn and teach a lesson,*" just as a mechanical law of nature may do; but it "*does not subserve moral improvement.*" Herbart, in short, refuses to panegyrise the method, but does not attempt to gainsay its applicability to many cases. Even the little child must learn "*that the flame burns, that a pin pricks, that a fall or knock hurts . . . and similar experiences must be gained later, provided they do not carry the pupil to the verge of serious danger. The boy who, by a hasty promise, puts himself in an embarrassing position, must be made conscious of the fact. Let his perplexity serve as a warning for the future.*" Dr. Laurie's discussion of Spencer's doctrine (*Educational Opinion since the Renaissance*) is precisely on Herbart's lines, and should serve as a refutation of such a presentation of the "natural punishment" doctrine as is given in Mr. Llewellyn Williams's incoherent book on the subject.

40. Ineffectiveness of Training apart from Instruction.

By Training, then, Herbart means a direct effort to build up the moral Character. Instruction, on the other hand,

aims at the creation of Many-sided Interest, and thus helps Character indirectly. The relationship of the two agencies corresponds to that between the "five moral ideas" and the "second moral idea." Training takes all Virtue for its province; Instruction takes only one side of Virtue—that represented by the "second moral idea"; but this idea is the special concern of the teacher, and "*stands out above all others . . . for the business of Education.*"

Every moral agency of a direct nature thus falls under Training. More especially has the teacher to employ personal influence, warning, appeal, and the like. These would be almost useless with the very young child devoid of an effective "Circle of Thought." "*Training is unable to accomplish its work except in conjunction with Instruction.*"

Herbart seems to have arrived at this momentous result from his experiences with Ludwig Steiger, a youth who "*belonged more to the world of matter than of mind,*" and, as a result, was unusually unsusceptible to appeal. This susceptibility had, somehow, to be created; "*we must take hold of him somewhere in order to educate him. There must be wind in order to sail. Some moving spring is necessary to call out activity. But there is no such spring in him . . . What is there then left except his understanding—the* PASSIVE *capacity to receive what we, having carefully prepared beforehand, offer him slowly—and the hope that from this feeble spark, active, independent thought, and the effort to live in harmony with insight, will be kindled.*" Mere restraint, mere praise or blame, were useless with such an impassive character as Ludwig's; there was not a sufficiency of ideas to give meaning to the two last, while the first—on Herbart's view—never possessed formative power. Yet, he thought, "*with proper guidance a disposition, such as his, may be cultivated to the most complete Many-sidedness of Interest, and to extreme clearness of understanding . . . It can further be cultivated to great energy of Character on account of the*

violent struggle with sensuality, and finally, on account of his joyous temperament, to a happy susceptibility for pleasure of every kind. But what an immeasurably difficult task!"

A year later Herbart wrote:—"*What we have been able to accomplish . . . is proof to me that in a quiet time we should have succeeded in making his understanding capable of firm convictions, which would influence the Will.*"

This view of Herbart's—enunciated so early, and developed in his greatest work at considerable length—is, in large measure, an original contribution to educational doctrine. The Will of the child has to be influenced at first indirectly; healthy, objective Interests have to be built up. Then, and then only, will arrive the time for training the "subjective" part of Character. Even in his later *Lectures*, though there is in them a slight increase of stress on Training, the standpoint is substantially unaltered. The child will not learn to apply moral principles to his own conduct unless first "*his inclinations and habits have taken a direction in accordance with his judgment.*"

41. The Parentage of Volition.

I now proceed to consider a part of Herbart's teaching which has been ignored by many writers, but which serves to refute some of the ill-informed criticisms that have been directed against him. He is commonly charged with generating the Will out of the Intellect; in other words, with ignoring the motor side of life. As well try to develop angels out of sandstone as to develop Will—an active, striving "faculty"—out of Ideas. Such is the objection of the critics.

But once again the critics are wrong. A crisp, telling sentence that occurs towards the end of the *Allgemeine Pädagogik* is fatal to their charge. "*Action*† *generates the Will out of Desire.*"

† This translation of Herbart's, *Die That* (deed), is not very satisfactory, but nothing better can be suggested. In some cases "Action" is a translation of *Handeln*. Perhaps the word "Activity" might sometimes be better than "Action."

The "*Generation of the Will*"—it is the problem that faces all moral reformers, a problem so difficult that many men avoid it altogether, and, dubbing the Will a "faculty," and calling it "free," pass on to less difficult questions. Herbart is almost the only man in history who has watched and described the birth of the Will, and has traced its parentage. "*Action generates the Will out of Desire.*"

But, at first sight, this affirmation does not seem satisfactory. That we "desire" a dinner before we "will" to eat it is obvious; that we "desire" to climb Snowdon before we "will," to climb it is also obvious; but "*Action*"—how does this "*generate*" the Will?

Well, suppose we "desired" to climb Snowdon and yet were paralysed in our limbs, could we "will" to climb it? Or suppose a man's limbs had been bandaged from babyhood, could he "will" to climb Snowdon? Clearly not. He must have experience of his own limb-movements before he can "will" a muscular performance. We must all know the means to our ends before we can *will* our ends. We do not "will" to fly, for we have no *means* of flying, we can only "desire." This leads us to a brief consideration of "Desire."

"*Man's activity depends, in the first instance, on the circle of his desires. The desires, however, are partly of animal origin, and partly spring from intellectual interests.*"*

The following diagram gives some idea of the ancestral tree of the Will, according to Herbart:—



Create an Interest and you create also a Desire; but before Desire can pass into Will, there must have been Experience, Activity, or Action, so that the Desire may not remain ineffective but, through using all necessary means, realise what is aimed at. "*Action generates the Will out of Desire.*"

We have, in fact, to learn our capacities. It is no good merely to *desire* a certain course of action; we must acquire such a control over the means and such a knowledge of them that we can *will* the course of action. "*The great man acted long before in thought—he* FELT *himself acting, he* SAW *himself advancing—before the external* ACT, *the fac-simile of the internal, became visible. . . . A few passing attempts suffice to change a fluttering faith into confidence that he will be able to realise in act what he sees with inward clearness.*"

Thus there is a factor in Character-forming neglected in the previous discussions. Thought is not enough; Interest is not enough; Desire based on Interest is not enough; there must be a knowledge of the appropriate means—the Action—required to transform Desire into Will. "*The circle of thought contains the store of that which, by degrees, can mount by the steps of Interest to Desire, and then by means of Action to Volition.*" Action itself leaves its ideas behind—"motor ideas"; and these become a part of the Circle of Thought.

Thus are summarised in these telling phrases of Herbart's certain aspects of the Fröbelian philosophy of Activity. We learn our powers, we learn the means to our ends; and every priceless acquisition of this kind is added, as a new mental element, to our Circle of Thought. "*The whole inner activity, indeed, has its abode in the Circle of Thought. Here is found the initiative life, the primal energy; here all must circulate easily and freely, everything must be in its place ready to be found and used at any moment . . . The Circle of Thought contains the store upon which all the workings of prudence are founded—in it are the knowledge and care, without which man cannot pursue his aims through means.*" The ideals of life, and the means, humble or other, by which those ideals may be brought to realisation, have their places within the Circle of Thought; if this be cramped by deficient Experience, Intercourse or Instruction—on the side of Interest and Desire, or by Deficient

Capacity or Opportunity—on the side of Action, a fatal paralysis will dominate the whole nature.

There is a need, too, for readiness of adaptation to new and difficult circumstances, if as Ziller expresses it, Many-sided Interest (which rests upon the rich Circle of Thought here desiderated) is ever to be a "salvation amid the storms of fate."

With emphasis that becomes more telling with every sentence Herbart reiterates his view that in the Circle of Thought is not only contained the ideas that generate Apperceptive Interest, but the motor ideas that give us power and confidence in ourselves. Interest is useless if we have no "*inner assurance*," no consciousness of power, and both factors are elements of the Circle of Thought.

"*If inner assurance and the intellectual interests are wanting, if the store of thought is meagre, then the ground lies empty for the animal desires.* Or, as Herbart says elsewhere, "*before all other . . . purposes, the general result of Instruction should be—the filling of the mind* (*or disposition*) *. . . Energy must be given something to do.*"

I have almost ceased to wonder at the comprehensiveness of Herbart's genius. He forgets nothing, he omits nothing. At one moment he tells us that "*the first necessity to moral culture is an aesthetic judgment, whereby the pupil distinguishes rightly, in given examples, the better willing from the worse*," and the critic leaps to the conclusion that Herbart, ignoring the motor side of conduct, imagines that the Will is generated directly out of moral ideas. But if the critic reads on he will learn that *motor* ideas are needed, and that it is "*Action*" which "*generates the Will out of Desire*;" thus the whole realm of Habit is seen to be included within Herbart's ken. "*It is Action which forms the Character.*"

So little has he ignored Habit that he has actually added to the literature of Pedagogy a useful term descriptive of Habits of Willing. There is a certain endowment "*tending to stability of Character.*" What has once been willed is more

readily willed the second time; the Will remembers its own past, and this remembering is "*the chief basis of the objective part of Character. A man whose Will does not . . . spontaneously reappear as* THE SAME *as often as the occasion recurs —a man who is obliged to carry himself back by reflection to his former resolution—will have great trouble in building up his Character. And it is because natural constancy of Will is not often found in children that Training has so much to do.*" Readers will now see the meaning of Herbart's remarkable phrase, "*The Memory of the Will.*"

The *Suggestions* of the Board of Education tell us that through physical training the pupil acquires "self-reliance, decision, and a power to obey as well as to command." Herbart taught the same doctrine in 1806.

42. Herbart's Psychology.

One of the commonest allegations made against Herbart is that, starting from a false Psychology which regarded feelings and volitions as dependent upon Presentations, he greatly exaggerated the value of Instruction and underestimated that of other factors like Training.

In point of fact, his Psychology followed, not preceded, his educational views, and these latter were the result, not of rigid deduction from theoretical premisses, but of careful and thoughtful observation. If Herbart tells us again and again that apart from such Instruction as creates Many-sided Interest, no system of Moral Training in the strict sense can be of much value—if he rejects the stress placed by Rousseau upon the emotional aspects of life and regards the culture of the Circle of Thought as the chief work of the educator—the reason was that he was an observer.

Herbart's Psychology was Based on Observation.

"*He who has noticed into what an abyss of pain and misfortune a human being may fall, yes, even remain in for long periods, and yet, after the time of trouble has passed, rise up again apparently almost unchanged as the same person,*

possessing the same aims and disposition, even the same manner—whoever has noticed this will scarcely expect much from . . . swaying of the feelings. . . Above all, when we see what degrees of paternal strictness a robust youth will endure, and remain untouched; what incentives are wasted on weak natures without making them stronger; how temporary is the whole reaction which follows the action; we may well advise the educator not to prepare for himself false relations, which are usually the only residue of mere Training." Herbart regards it as a fault in foreign writers on Education, for example, Locke and Rousseau, that crude impulse is allowed to hold a sway "*barely mitigated by a highly unstable moral feeling*;" whereas with Germans like Niemeyer (and, we may add, with Herbart himself *par excellence*) there is a conviction that the moral life must not be regarded in isolation—as based on a separate "faculty," or as educable by special agencies—but that the whole nature must be moralised by the creation of a stately Circle of Thought, out of which Virtue may spring.

After an accumulation of observations, Herbart had arrived at the result—formulated definitely in his later psychological works, but slightly indicated even in the *Allgemeine Pädagogik*, that "*all feelings* (Empfindungen) *are but passing modifications of the existing presentations, and that when the modifying cause ceases the Circle of Thought must return by itself to its old equilibrium.*" It is probable that Herbart's psychological laws connecting Feeling with the Circle of Thought must be rejected in the precise form which he gave to them, a form too mathematical to do justice to the infinite complexity and subtlety of the phenomena under consideration.

Impermanence of Feeling.

But the general truth he tries to urge is of great importance; that a moral agency, to be effective, must succeed in adding to the permanent acquisitions of the mind—to the Circle of Thought; that no influence of a purely superficial kind, however emotionally violent for the time, is of much avail. There is no

potentiality, no progress, in mere emotion; while the implanting of ideas in the mind, perhaps even ideas apparently (for the time) colourless and insignificant, may result sooner or later in increased power of Apperception, and in the up-springing of a harvest of many-sided Interest.

Dr. Stanley Hall regards Herbart's view of the origin of feelings and emotions from presentations or ideas as "degrading"; feeling and emotion are primary, not secondary. But though it matters little, in the abstract, which view we take, educationally it matters considerably. For presentations or ideas are within the reach of the teacher's influence; and a system of Education that "means business" must lay the chief stress on them, not denying the potency of the less definite elements of mental life, but merely taking these last for granted. If Herbart's Psychology is educationally wrong, why does he not blunder in his educational proposals? If he *has* blundered, why do not critics point his blunders out?

I cannot argue the matter at length, but I would emphasise one thing: Herbart always had educational problems in view. His Psychology is an educational psychology which lays stress upon the factors most significant for the teacher. Some day Psychology may be able to interpret those factors in a different way from Herbart's. But as things stand, his interpretation is so practically helpful that we cannot believe it to be very wide of the mark; and, in any case, we are enabled to judge of the value of Herbart's educational proposals by the fact that they agree with Dr. Hall's of a century later.

Practical Helpfulness of Herbart's Views.

And now, with this rough-and-ready and untechnical defence of Herbart's Psychology (so far as that Psychology is patent in his educational works), and, with one or two final illustrations of Herbart's wisdom, I must bring the present exposition to a close. I have done but scant justice to those wonderful chapters at the end of the *Allgemeine Pädagogik*; but I know

that any student who once looks to Herbart will not hastily turn away.

Training, he points out, has a double purpose. It helps to make Instruction possible, and thus contributes indirectly to Character. It is impossible to instruct an unruly boy; he has no firm, deep-rooted desire such as Instruction aims at forming; thus Training renders Instruction possible, makes possible the creation of certain Interests. Secondly, Training may act directly in the formation of Character, though this function is not so important as the former one, and unless it is steady and persistent, possesses no great efficacy. "*Exceptional treatment, as well as exceptional events, special punishments, and rewards, leave impressions behind which do not last.*"

In the "Punishment Books" of many schools, "lying" appears as an offence specially meriting corporal punishment. Let us see what Herbart says, and then bid him farewell for a season.

The Cure of Lying.

A settled evil resolve on the part of a pupil is no easy thing to deal with. Punishment may be useful "*when an isolated new inclination breaks out thoughtlessly as a fault for the first or second time*"; such an inclination may be checked or destroyed by sharp measures. But when a fault, such as lying, is "ingrained," punishment merely increases the tendency to deceitfulness. Such cases can only be dealt with by the slower but surer method of acting on the Circle of Thought. "*The whole mind must be raised, the possibility of winning for himself respect, which is incompatible with lying, must be made perceptible and valuable to him. Can anyone accomplish this who does possess the art of affecting the Circle of Thought from all sides? Or do you think a few isolated speeches and admonitions will effect it?*"

"*The whole mind must be raised*"—that is Herbartianism.

PART III.

A CALL FOR COSMOS.

1. TEACHERS are "practical" people, and some who have read, more or less impatiently, the preceding pages have already, I doubt not, been condemning them as "theoretical." In point of fact, they are some of the most "practical" pages that anyone could ever write.

For "chaos," though exciting, is *not* "practical," and chaos is at present the ruling principle (if, indeed, chaos *can* be a principle) in the educational world. Half of the ineffectiveness of present-day teaching is due to the absence of a clear and coherent Theory of Education; most of the worries inflicted on teachers by inspectors and managers are due to the same absence. We are all in a fog; we are all contradicting each other; and we have no one to appeal to. Just as Dubedat, in Mr. Shaw's play, *The Doctor's Dilemma*, falls a victim to medical chaos, so there are millions of children and thousands of teachers daily falling victims to educational chaos.

In these few pages which close the present volume I propose to show, among other things, that the contradictions described in Part I. will, in large measure, cease to baffle us when we have once adopted the leading ideas of Herbart. I shall adduce, too, and try to expose a series of popular fallacies at present harassing the educational world, my aim throughout being to show that although Herbart has not exhausted the

subject of Education (thousands of interesting problems being left for advocates of Child Study to investigate) he has certainly given us a coherent and illuminating series of ideas which suggest and involve each other, so that, for example, if we start from any one of these ideas (say Interest) we shall be forced to the consideration of others. If coherence is one of the tests of truth, then Herbartianism is emphatically true. I hope it will be obvious, also, that any teacher who has the Herbartian system in his mind possesses several important qualifications: for example, the power to criticise himself (which most teachers need), the power to solve problems in educational doctrine, and the power to assimilate new truths from Fröbelian or other quarters.

Coherence of Herbartianism.

By the way, a remarkable thing about the Herbartian categories, in addition to their coherence, is their individual plausibility. Set one of them before an unwilling witness and he at once admits its truth; set another before another witness and he also admits its truth. Link them together in Herbart's fashion, and instead of being welcomed as the finest and most helpful body of educational doctrines ever framed in the mind of man, they are denounced as "theory." And then the denouncers proceed to make educational blunders that would be impossible if they had ever studied Herbart systematically and conscientiously. And then other people arise to denounce the denouncers.

2. The "Drawing Out" Fallacy.

At the root of many of these blunders lies the idea that Education is nothing but a process of "drawing out," an idea so strange to me that if asked to assign a motto to the present work I should choose: "Education is primarily the enrichment of the soul and not a process of 'drawing out.'" The motto sounds unfamiliar, for the "drawing out" doctrine has a wonderfully up-to-date and scientific sound. Nevertheless, it appears to me, if not false, at any rate immensely unsafe and misleading. Some doctrines are saved by being meaningless;

I wish I could say the same of this. There is enough truth in it to make it plausible, and, in certain circumstances, helpful. Nevertheless, anyone who has imbibed Herbart's view of Education must necessarily hold this "drawing out" doctrine in some suspicion.

Sometimes I think I have misunderstood it; that what others intend by "drawing out" is something different from what I intend; that essentially the doctrine is as much a secret and a mystery to me as Apperception is to non-Herbartians. Eminent men seem to be on the other side, and I have tried to understand what they mean. I have failed. To try to interpret Education merely as a process of "drawing out" makes the world of things and men seem to turn topsy-turvy. I cannot but think, therefore, that if one person feels difficulty in understanding the doctrine, others may feel the same, and thus my frank confession of helplessness or dissent may lead to a clearing of the educational atmosphere.

What Does Drawing-out Mean?

In the first place, I am not quite sure whether the champions of "drawing-out" mean that this is the only *possible* educational method—that any other method is completely ineffective and fictitious —or that "drawing-out" is the only *good* educational method. If they mean the former—Professor Welton certainly seems to mean it—their view appears to me demonstrably wrong. The Catholic Church, by carefully choosing certain ideas for presentation to the child, and certain methods of inculcating those ideas, can undoubtedly build into the child's mind a certain mental structure. Intellect, feelings, volitions, are all profoundly concerned in this process, which is emphatically *not* one of "drawing-out" but of "stamping-in." Again, the Education that made the Artful Dodger was no process of "drawing-out."

If, on the other hand, advocates of the doctrine mean that "drawing-out" is the only *good* educational method, and that the teacher who deliberately sets out to convey certain facts

from his own mind to the minds of his pupils is a bad teacher, all I can say is that this view renders Education meaningless to me. I mean by Education the introduction of the child to the facts of Nature, Life, and Man, and the building-up of an Interest in these facts. If this is a process of "drawing-out," well and good; but I prefer to use the Herbartian terminology as being more illuminative.

Of course the child is endowed from birth with certain proclivities, and the teacher should gratefully make use of these, or "draw them out"—if they are likely to be helpful. If they are not likely to be helpful, he must try to "draw them out" in quite another sense, intelligible to a dentist. To imagine that *all* human proclivities, however decadent or moribund, are to be fostered, seems as absurd to me as to imagine that all human organs, however rudimentary or useless (the toes and the vermiform appendix, for example), are to be subjected to careful culture. I remember when I was a boy trying to acquire the art of moving my ears; doubtless, with patience, I should have strengthened the feeble muscles of those organs, and "drawn out" their latent power. But what good purpose should I have served? Again, there is the mighty sexual passion; what do the "drawing-out" theorists say about this? From the Herbartian standpoint there is no doctrinal difficulty; we have to aim at Character-forming *viâ* Instruction, Interest, and Training; but a teacher faced by this grave problem and possessing no better philosophy of Education than the "drawing-out" theory—*and acting on it*—would be a procurer to the Lords of Hell.

Thus I cannot agree with Professor Welton or with Mr. Skrine (pp. 8-9). I cannot see that "drawing-out" is either the only *good* method or the only *possible* method of Education. I consider that the teacher's chief business is to teach. It may be an "error" to say that "human life can be built up from without," but it is no "error" at all, in my opinion, to say that "its form and tendency can be determined by an . . . .

arrangement by another of the ideas it is to assimilate." I can only infer that Professor Welton means one thing by these words and I another. If he means what I mean, will he allow me to put the matter to a test? Will he allow me, at his own expense, to try to bring up a child as a Mohammedan, as a criminal, or as some other unusual type? If not, why not? He says it is an "error" to suppose that another can determine effectively the course of a child's mental assimilation; there can, therefore, be no fear of the consequences of the experiment.

What *does* it all mean? I admit that, as we cannot "draw blood from a stone," neither can we educate a child to noble conduct or intellectual achievement unless there is the *possibility* of these things already latent in him. But I would urge that there is also the possibility of educating him to *vile* conduct and to intellectual incompetence. Consequently Education is *more* than "drawing-out."

Again, as Fröbelians have shown, the child manifests at certain ages an active bias in this or that direction; for example, towards constructive work with clay or wood. We are quite right in saying that this power may be "drawn out" by the teacher. But to claim that all Education is of this "drawing out" kind seems to me, if not psychologically false, at any rate practically harmful. The result of it is a curriculum deficient in "pabulum" (in history, literature, and informative subjects generally), and a method that lays too great stress on effort, gymnastic, training, etc. I cannot understand the universe when I have to look at it through the spectacles of the "drawing-out" philosophy. I cannot understand the importance of Suggestion, Imitation, Esprit-de-Corps, Zeitgeist, and scores of other things. I cannot understand the immense differences of Culture and Interest in the world of men.

Practical Dangers.

How far back is this "drawing-out" doctrine to extend? If every mental power is latent or implicit in a child, must it

have been latent or implicit in his parents, and in his grandparents, and in primitive men, and in the primitive amoeba? If so, the doctrine resolves itself into a kind of Weissmanism. In a sense it may be true, but a sense that is *no good for educational purposes.* The builder takes the law of gravitation for granted; he does not worry about it or write treatises upon it. The teacher must similarly take for granted that his pupils are human beings and not stones or flowering plants. It is his business to bring them face to face with the culture of the world. He must, so far as possible, take account of their individual peculiarities, but *mainly on grounds of economy*; individual peculiarities give him the best starting point, provide him with ready-made "apperception centres." To press the "drawing-out" doctrine further than this is to blunder dangerously, while merely to allege that men have *capacity*, and that this should be given a chance, is merely to utter a crude truism.

Man is Essentially Plastic.

I do not wish to dogmatise, but my view is this: Man is essentially and pre-eminently plastic; he can be influenced, moulded, built up by his environment. He cannot be transformed from imbecility to genius, or from mediocrity to genius, but his purposes, ideals, standards, tastes, interests, are very largely dependent upon the environmental forces, including Education, that operate upon him. "The ideals admired and imitated by the child are not his own, but those of his people and his times,"* consequently they cannot be "drawn out," but must be conferred. Transplanted gutter-children often and often turn out well, and the history of the Jukeses—a clan of paupers and criminals numbering a thousand—goes to prove that the only heredity which is really fatal is *social* heredity, a body of traditions and influences handed down. This is another way of saying that environment is more important than heredity (in the *physiological*

*Kirkpatrick. *Fundamentals of Child Study.*

sense); for "social heredity" is not heredity at all, but environment.

I do not deny, and Herbart certainly never denied, that each one's Individuality may influence in important ways his tastes, interests, and type of character; but the educational stress must not be on this fact; Individuality will take care of itself if only our curriculum is sufficiently nutritive. The common talk about modern Education crushing out Individuality resolves itself, in the end, to this: our stress on the "formal subjects" has been destructive of Interest.

Dickens introduces us, in "Hugh" of *Barnaby Rudge*, to a type of the wholly uneducated man; and the example may serve to elucidate the truth and the error of the "drawing-out" doctrine.

"That chap," said Mr. John Willet, "though he has all his faculties, somewheres or another, bottled up and corked down, has no more imagination than Barnaby has. And why hasn't he? . . . Because they was never drawed out of him when he was a boy. That's why. What would any of us have been, if our fathers hadn't drawed our faculties out of us? What would my boy Joe have been if I hadn't drawed his faculties out of him?"

There we have the "drawing-out" doctrine in all its plausibility—and fallacy. What can be more obvious? Hugh's faculties lay dormant, or, as John Willet expressed it, "bottled up and corked down"; they should have been "drawed out" by means, forsooth, of mathematics or grammar. Who can gainsay it?

Well, *I* gainsay it. What was really the matter with Hugh was that his mind had never been *fed*; he had never been introduced to the culture of the race. His "faculties" would then pretty well have taken care of themselves.

To bridge over the chasm between the "drawing-out" and the "building-up" doctrines we must cease our constant appeals to sub-human analogies. Herbart's rejection of the

"plant" idea (pp. 154-5) is here notable; and the educationist must similarly look with a certain amount of doubt upon analogies borrowed from the animal world. Young birds have "instincts," no doubt, and these are "drawn out" effectively by the parents. But the essential feature of human life, as distinct from animal life, is its plasticity, adaptability, capacity, and modifiability. It was probably just this that led to man's success in the struggle for existence. Well, can plasticity be "drawn out"? The question is absurd. Plasticity is essentially a receptive quality. Consequently, *the leading characteristic of human Education must be the modifying of the plastic organism in response to the claims of the highest Culture of the day.* Doubtless the organism is not *merely* plastic: it has its aspects and periods of assertiveness, and Education must use them. But the "drawing-out" theorists seem to me to ignore what is vastly more significant. They talk as if plasticity does not exist, or as if, though existing, it was to be discounted at every point. If this is modern educational science, it is a science faithless to the most characteristic feature of human nature.

Sub-Human Analogies Dangerous.

But, after all, what *does* "drawing out" mean?

Pending an answer I must continue to declare myself on the side of "knowledge," "facts," "information," despised though these are by some of our "reformers"; and shall continue to believe that Herbart's educational categories are the most helpful that have ever been put forward in the history of the world. Some further examples of fallacy and paradox may illustrate this helpfulness.

3. The Fallacy of "Secular Subjects."

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Clifton, speaking at a Newport Conference in 1902, "did not attach much (comparative) importance to the teaching of arithmetic, geography, or other (secular) subjects." Well, we Herbartians *do* attach "much importance" to all "secular subjects"; we cannot

accept the "faculty" doctrine of the Will professed or implied by many people and by the Roman Church; we believe that knowledge and culture conduce to morality by way of Interest; we suggest that an examination of the criminal statistics for England point to the fact that the poor Irish who land on our shores have nothing but their religion—however valuable that may be—between them and moral lawlessness; that culture and books would have aided them; and that, therefore, the Bishop is wrong. Clearly, too, if the teacher's most distinctive work is comparatively unimportant, if the Will, in its independence as a haughty "faculty," cannot be influenced by means of "secular subjects," the only hope for mankind is in "sacred" subjects, persons, places, and things, in priests and sacraments and conversions; for if we admit one educational mystery (the Will) we must needs admit other mysteries to keep it company. Thus the teacher must necessarily remain a very humble person indeed—*if this psychology of the Will is true.*

Protective Power of Education.

4. The Fallacy of "'How,' not 'What.'"

Take another fallacy: "It doesn't so much matter *what* you teach, as how." We hear it from platforms, we read it in books, it is whispered by Consultative Committees.* And yet it is nonsense—almost sheer and unadulterated. The non-Herbartian is puzzled, non-plussed by it, or assents to it dubiously, wearily; the Herbartian rejects it at once as the product of ignorance or confusion. *What* you teach is of the very highest importance, because it becomes Apperception material, helps to form Interests, and thus to make the soul move in this direction or in that. If "*any* subject will do," provided methods of teaching it are good, then, as Professor Adams has inimitably urged,† thieving is educationally as useful as history or mathematics, and Fagin was as good a

* See the Report referred to on p. 62. † *Herbartian Psychology.*

schoolmaster as could be desired. Why make additions to the curriculum if one subject is as good as another? Why teach History if Geography will do as well? Why Geometry if Arithmetic? It is a shame to educational thought in England that, year after year, such twaddle as the above maxim should strut forth as educational wisdom. Emphatically I must assert that the whole purpose of the "How" is to introduce to the "What," and that if only the "What" is properly selected, the problem of "How" will be simplified. For the "What" will have an attractiveness of its own for the pupil. Next to "What" comes "When," and last of all "How."

5. The Fallacy of "Formal Education" or "Effort."

Often the fallacy reappears in another dress and becomes a plea for "Formal Education" or "Formal Training." Classics, in particular, are supposed to "fortify the mind." Even though no Interest is aroused in classical study, and no real knowledge acquired, "the training comes all the same."

Professor Adams has refuted this brilliantly in the fifth chapter of his book, and no Herbartian accepts the doctrine except within narrow limits. It draws off attention from "content" to "form," from "pabulum" to "gymnastics." *Any* task, though criminal or useless, can be thus justified if only it is laborious. "What could call into play more of a boy's faculties than orchard-robbing? The necessary planning demands prudence, forethought, caution. The choosing of the right moment implies careful observation, judicious estimate of character, and intelligent calculation of probabilities. The actual expedition requires the greatest courage, firmness, self-control. Climbing the tree and seizing the fruit are only possible as the result of the most accurate adjustment of means to end. All the results aimed at in the most liberal intellectual education are

Orchard-Robbing as "Formal Training."

here secured."* It being thus easy to justify orchard-robbing by the doctrine of "Formal Education," it is still easier to justify the parsing and analysis of our elementary schools and the classical grind of the secondary.

The Herbartian is never deceived by this fallacy, though it has dogged the steps of Education for centuries and dogs it still. Herbart's clean sweep of the "faculty doctrine," whether justifiable or not on psychological grounds, was a stroke of educational genius. If anyone doubts this he has only to read what intelligent moderns, probably guiltless of any acquaintance with Herbart, are saying about the effect of this very fallacy in secondary schools. I propose to quote Mr. A. C. Benson, partly because of the frankness of his confessions on this subject, and partly because, on page 7, I seem to enrol him among those who stress "Effort" at the expense of "Pabulum," the truth being exactly the opposite.

After many years experience as a master at Eton he tells us that, "so far as the boys were concerned, very little Education was the result. They came full of Interest; they left knowing next to nothing, without intellectual interests, and, indeed, honestly despising them."

Mr. A. C. Benson on Interest.

He finds the cause of this failure in a false theory of Education and of the curriculum. "Instead of simply reading away at interesting and beautiful books . . . a great quantity of pedantic grammar was taught." "Boys know nothing of their own history or of modern geography." Interesting subjects are despised, and hard subjects adhered to because they are supposed to "fortify the mind and make it a strong and vigorous instrument. But where," asks Mr. Benson, "is the proof of it?" The system really gives "no grip, no vigour, no stimulus." Instead of being a "splendid gymnastic" the system is only a rack. In short, the "Effort" doctrine has

*Adams, *Herbartian Psychology*.

broken down. "You cannot get strenuous and zealous work unless you also have interest and belief in work."*

The very blunder that Mr. Benson exposes—the adoption of a policy of "intellectual starvation" under the impression that it affords a fine "mental training"—is exactly that against which Herbart protests. So long as the doctrine of Apperceptive Interest is ignored, the error will persist. And the wonderful thing is that official writers on Secondary Education *do* ignore it, almost to a man. It has scarcely dawned upon them at all.

I could quote similar complaints from other critics of secondary schools, like "Kappa" in *Let Youth But Know*; but my special point is that all these matters were thrashed out a century ago; and that, when an educational genius like Herbart presents the world with a system of helpful ideas, we ignore it at our peril; other men will be discovering and exposing, for centuries after, the very errors against which he has warned us.

6. The "Faculty" Fallacy—(I.) The "Faculty" of Observation.

The fallacy just considered is closely akin to that of "faculty training." One "faculty" that receives special patronage at present is "Observation"; the teacher's business is not to "teach facts" but "to cultivate the power of observation."

Now the teacher who knows the Herbartian doctrine of Apperception sees at once that he is being invited to enter a *cul de sac*. We "observe" what we are "interested" in, and Interest depends largely on Apperception, and therefore on the possession of previous Knowledge or Facts. This, too, Professor Adams has demonstrated clearly in his chapter on "Observation." Why on earth should we "cultivate the faculty of Observation," except along useful lines? What advantage is there in "observing" the number of buttons on our waistcoat, or the number of tombstones in the graveyard

* *From a College Window.*

which we pass every morning? Certainly we must be observant, apperceptive, towards all that is important in Nature and Human Life—that is true, and is precisely what Herbartians urge; but the "Faculty of Observation" in itself, and apart from the importance and helpfulness of the things observed, needs not to be cultivated, *cannot* indeed be cultivated, and *ought* not. Shift the stress from "Faculty" to "Ideas," and everything falls into its proper place; Observation (call it Anschauung if you will) is seen in its relations to Apperception and Interest and Character.

7. The "Faculty" Fallacy—(II.) The "Faculty" of Memory.

Similarly with the Memory "faculty." Why cultivate it at all except along lines of healthy Interest? Make up your mind what kind of a man you wish your pupil to become, and then—supply him with appropriate "pabulum." He will "remember" whatever he is "interested" in, and the things that bear upon it. I was once present at an interview where it was my duty to remember the leading facts of a delicate case; after the nterview was over an incident occurred that subsequently proved of considerable importance. But my memory of that failed, though I remembered the interview itself completely. The reason was that I was interested in the interview and not specially interested in the event that followed. Clearly the word "Interest" rather than the word "Faculty" needs to be stressed in dealing with "Memory." My Memory was strong at one moment, pitiably weak five minutes after. No "Faculty" doctrine can explain this, but the Interest doctrine can. Again, if Memory means mere Retentiveness, there is every reason for doubting whether it can be trained or improved at all.

8. The "Faculty" Fallacy—(III.) The "Faculty" of Reasoning.

So, too, with Reasoning. If this were an independent "faculty" we ought to begin as soon as possible with the child and, by means of hard problems in arithmetic or grammar, "teach him to think." In point of fact, such a

child might very probably grow up singularly feeble even in reasoning power. But supply him with plenty of *materials* for thinking, introduce him to Nature and Human Nature, build up his Circle of Thought, and then there will be a chance for reasoning power to develop. Again the stress is on the content of the mind rather than on any abstracted and ghostly fragment of the mind. We "think" and "reason" about what we are interested in. I have known of cases where, as indicated on a previous page, the attempt to make children in Standard II. "think" resulted merely in wild and useless guessing. What else could be expected from children of eight?

9. The "Three R's" Fallacy.

"The chief thing we should aim at is a good grounding in the Three R's." So we are told. But what are the "Three R's?" There is Writing—but no one learns to write for its own sake; it is a purely instrumental subject. There is Reading; and if "Reading" means an "Interest in Reading" then indeed it is "the chief thing we should aim at"; but if it means only power to transform printed signs into voice, it is as insignificant, from the character-forming standpoint, as Writing; the child's Circle of Thought is unfed by both. Lastly, there is Arithmetic, and this certainly fails to enrich the Circle of Thought, though, if operating on an already rich Circle of Thought, it clarifies and rationalises it.

10. The "Time Table" Fallacy.

"Reading is Reading" the teacher was told (page 1). "Geography is Geography" and "Grammar is Grammar" he will still tell us, when convicted of allowing ungrammatical answers in the Geography lesson; or "History is History" or "Scripture is Scripture" when convicted of neglecting to use a map to illustrate those subjects; or "Science is Science" when his boys' Science Notes reveal bad Writing or Composition; or "Arithmetic is Arithmetic" when he is found to have ignored the

Isolation of Subjects.

algebraic equation presented by every problem in "proportion." It is not the teacher's fault altogether; he has been forced to assign so many minutes to this, so many to that, and so many to another subject; and Inspectors have been as guilty as any men of interpreting the Time Table in this ruinous way. And yet it is not entirely the fault of Inspectors; for even in secondary schools, as Mr. Benson tells us, each of the various subjects "leads off in a separate direction and seems to lead nowhere in particular." The real fault is with our educational theories.

Accept the Herbartian view—that the stress should be not on "faculties" but on Ideas, Apperception, Interest, Mind-building—and the Time Table fallacy is no more, and Correlation, with all its vivifying influence, will take its place. "We do not chop our lives," says Professor Armstrong, "into three-quarters of an hour sections, during each of which we do something different. On the contrary, we engage in some task, and do incidentally whatever is necessary for the due performance of that task. Probably much would be gained by assimilating school methods far more closely to those of ordinary every-day life." Exactly! But Herbart was preaching Correlation a century ago. Say what we like, his "presentational," "mechanical" psychology seems to have led him right on practical matters; or rather (this is the true explanation), his presentational psychology was an honest attempt to explain the concrete facts of mental life that were ever before his mind.

11. The "Questioning" Fallacy.

I am not surprised that a prominent educationist like Professor Welton has spoken of "the fatal heresy of the supreme value of questioning." From observation in many schools I am convinced that this heresy is doing an immense amount of harm; depriving children of legitimate opportunities of information, keeping them in a state approaching to worry and irritation—and keeping teachers in a similar state. Who.

looking at the work of a teacher from an *a priori* standpoint and with the spirit of an impartial spectator of time and existence, would imagine that the teacher's chief method would be this? Surely a teacher's business is primarily to teach, secondarily, to direct his pupils where to learn, and only thirdly, fourthly, or fifthly to question them! Doubtless, questioning is a valuable means of arresting attention and discovering existent knowledge; doubtless, too, in analytic subjects like mathematics and grammar, its place is an important one; but in history, geography, literature, and perhaps science, questioning should be subsidiary.

No Herbartian would dream of trying to "question" the geography of Scotland out of a class that had never been first taught that geography. Yet attempts, hardly less absurd than this, are made under the influence of this form of the "drawing-out" fallacy.

12. The "Never Tell Anything" Fallacy.

Herbert Spencer and many others assure the teacher that he should "tell" his pupils as little as possible. Obviously this piece of advice is at the root of the "Questioning Fallacy."

Now if there is one fact more certain than another about the early history of man it is that "story-telling" or "tradition" was a prominent feature of his life. If there is one educational fact more certain than another it is that children love stories and crave for them. If deprived of such material in infancy and youth, there is every probability that they will grow up with minds deficient in certain valuable traits; possibly, like Spencer himself, finding no pleasure in many of the finest works of imaginative literature. Someone has said that the absence of "fairy-tales" from the early education of the Boers has resulted in an absence of delicacy in the character of that sturdy race, and I feel sure that many a modern Philistine has been manufactured in a similar way.

So far, then, as stories are concerned, the teacher must learn to "tell" them, whatever our wiseacres may say.

But probably the wiseacres are thinking of subjects other than these.

As to history and geography, most of the facts of these subjects must, of course, be "told," or if not "told," read. There is no other way. By all means arouse a spirit of research, even in these subjects; set problems and suggest sources of information. But in the end there must be telling, if not by the teacher, then by the writer of the books consulted.

In science and mathematics, "telling" is less important, though it is far from negligible. We hear a great deal about the evils of "mere knowledge"; but the evils of "mere ignorance" are greater. However, the main point is that with subjects like these the teacher should not "tell" things if his pupil can genuinely find them out by reflection or research. If he can!

In this case as in the last, the Herbartian denies point-blank the assertion that "telling" is always a bad method. He is not puzzled or distracted; he merely rejects the view as absurd. In his mind there lies the outline of a mighty system of doctrines, and concepts like "Instruction," "Interest," "Circle of Thought" are real and familiar to him; hence, though he has no bias in favour of one method over another, so long as they all conduce to an Immediate Interest in the things of Nature and Man, he has no bias against a "telling" method where this seems useful or necessary.

13. The "Discipline" Fallacy.

"The discipline of this school is especially good," says His Majesty's Inspector; and, indeed, there is no reason for surprise at the stress laid in past years on the power of keeping order in classes of enormous size. But I am sure that many a school (and many a class) whose "Discipline" is remarkable shows up badly when tested by the standard of Interest and Character. Do the boys crowd the doors of the Evening School, thus manifesting that they love wisdom better than rubies? They do not. Discipline,

Government, Orderliness are *only means to an end.* Herbart urged this in 1806, and we in these days need the lesson badly.

14. The "Thoroughness" Fallacy.

"Above all, be thorough." The worst of it is, as Thring pointed out, "it can't be done." To know one single thing "thoroughly" is to know the universe. Probably the advocates of "thoroughness" are really objecting to the giving of disconnected "scraps" of information, and thus their advice resolves itself into the sensible Herbartian recommendation, "Correlate your Instruction; let one subject help another." To that extent the advice is good. But if they mean, "Never give information on a subject unless it can be exhaustively followed up," they are wildly astray. I am perfectly certain that if in all primary schools three lessons a year—no more—were given on the stars, the children being directed to watch when the moon rises, or where to look for the leading constellations, and so forth, an Interest in practical Astronomy would be aroused of an intense and helpful kind. *Just a few apperceiving ideas*, and the Interest will spring up. Is this a plea for "thoroughness"? Scarcely. And yet it is good educational advice, in my belief.

Sometimes I think that the plea is really one for "exactness"; if so, the objections of Dr. Stanley Hall (pp. 3-4) would have to be met. There is much doubt whether vagueness should not precede exactness all along the line.

No Herbartian troubles much about these catchwords. He knows there is probably a place for thoroughness, and a place for diffusiveness; a place for exactness and a place for inexactness. He prefers a different set of categories altogether.

15. The Fallacy that "Virtue cannot be Taught."

I have never been able to ascertain why certain eminent educationists are convinced that "moral lessons," such as those advocated by the Moral Instruction League, are useless or dangerous. I cannot discover that there is any philosophy

or psychology at the back of this conviction; on the contrary, philosophy and psychology are on the other side. Thus the late Professor Sidgwick points out that "the obstacles to right conduct . . . lie partly in the state of our intellect, partly in the state of our desires and will. Partly we know our duty imperfectly, partly our motives for acting up to what we know are not strong enough to prevail over our inclination to do something else . . . Let us suppose that our notion of justice suddenly became so clear that . . . we could at once see what justice required . . . Undoubtedly there would be much less injustice." In other words, Morality depends partly on Insight or Moral Judgment—exactly what Herbart taught. But Herbart went further and showed that by means of Instruction the *Will* itself could also be influenced (*viâ* Interest). Thus, in a double sense, Virtue *can* be taught, and the eminent critics who say that it cannot are wrong, unless, of course, they have other grounds for their opinion. If they have such grounds they keep them strangely secret.

Moral Insight.

16. The Fallacy of "Non-Bookishness."

"Education should be less bookish," we are told. Should it? How then are we to become acquainted with History and Literature, and with the life of man in general? Was Herbart wrong in urging that the study of Human Nature has a place by the side of the study of Nature; and is not a good book "the precious life-blood of a master-spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life?" No one really denies this; but glib protests against "bookishness" serve to show in their authors the presence of bias and the absence of broad and helpful views. Thus "practice" is affected. The teacher's methods may remain much the same, but his time-table certainly will not, and his managers may lavish vast sums on scientific apparatus while one-tenth of the money, devoted to the purchase of suitable books, would be a more profitable investment.

17. The examples above adduced may, perhaps, serve to prove my main thesis, that Herbartianism is a coherent body of doctrines, sound, modern, helpful, suggestive. Difficult problems receive from it their solutions, complete or approximate; and there is nothing in the system to prevent the teacher from accepting new light from other sources. For example, none of the results of "Child-Study" are unwelcome to the Herbartian; generally he finds them confirmatory of Herbart's views, and when they do not confirm they supplement. We have read how Dr. Stanley Hall has recently been urging that the present-day stress on "exactness" and "thoroughness" in science teaching is a mistake; that the subject should be treated more broadly, suggestively, historically, humanistically. He may be right or wrong, but his rightness or wrongness can only be estimated in terms of Herbart's doctrine of Interest. Which method awakens the keenest and most permanent Interest in Nature?

Teachers who disparage "theory" frequently do so under the impression that Method, and Method only, is its subject-matter. They object, sometimes rightly, to the assumption that they could be made better teachers by a fuller knowledge of "theory."

Herbart's Doctrines Help.

Now I certainly believe that many of them *could* be made better teachers by such a knowledge. For example, the Punishment Books of many schools bear witness to "disorder," "inattention," and similar faults during a grammar lesson, or a revision lesson in geography; a knowledge of the springs of Apperceptive Interest might prevent this. Then, too, an immense amount of time is wasted and Interest unused through lack of Correlation among subjects. Despite all protests (which almost invariably come from individuals who need it most of all), many matters of detail would be on a better scholastic footing if "theory" were studied more. Teachers would possess more power of self-criticism. Any-

one who does not possess that power is an arrogant empiric, the curse and despair of his profession, whatever that profession may be.

But other functions discharged by "theory" remain to be mentioned. For one thing, it shows teachers the significance of their work by bringing the latter into relation with great moral issues and equally great scientific problems. Again, *it helps to settle the problem of the curriculum.* With a reference to this last matter I must conclude.

18. We call books on the subject of Education "School Management Books," and they are full of hints how to teach this subject or that.

But far more important than "Method" is "Matter," "What we teach," not "How." It is round this problem that most of the present-day controversies are ranging, as a glance at Part I. will show. Now the Herbartians have worked industriously at the theory of the curriculum. I believe that once we have decided what *material* is suitable and necessary for the child at each stage of his development, *method* will largely take care of itself. Children *wish* to learn; the things of Nature and of Human Nature interest them inevitably. It is because we have been engrossed since Pestalozzi's time with the comparatively sterile problems of Method that we have made so much less progress than we should.

Exaggerated Stress on Method.

Two or three examples may serve to indicate that in certain quarters the "theory" of Herbart is needed to correct the iniquities of past Education Codes.

(1). School in poor artisan neighbourhood. *Standards VI. and VII., "English."*

Parsing and analysis of simple, compound and complex sentences. Chief rules of syntax. Correction of faulty sentences, with reasons for correction. The parts of speech and their inflections taken in detail. Chief Latin roots.

Where are Shakespeare, Milton, Macaulay? . . . . At what point, with such a syllabus as that, will the boys or girls ever make *any* contact with English literature in their last year at school? The strangest thing of all is that despite this elaborate grammar grind, many of the boys and girls may leave school unable to utter a respectable sentence, "simple, compound, or complex."

(2). A better type of school whose aim is to prepare pupils to take situations as quickly as possible.

Writing and composition taught as special subjects right up to Standard VII. No literary "Reader" in Standard VI. or Standard VII., but one play of Shakespeare taught in each. History (Standard VI. and VII.) one hour a week.

I hesitate to condemn, but I know that if I were a head teacher I should wish the pupils to leave school with an Interest in the History and Literature of at least one nation of the world—their own. And I learnt that from Herbart, not from Education Codes. I am not sure that "writing" or even "composition" should need to be taught *as such* in Standard VII.

(3). Another good school.

Recitation (Standard III.) "Casabianca."

One year of *Casabianca*, nothing but *Casabianca!* Not so do I read the Herbartian doctrine of Interest. For Interest needs the new as well as the old, and where would the "new" be after three months? Or perhaps the three months may be devoted to *one half of* "*Casabianca*"; I have been told of such things. A literary whole is murdered because we imagine that our business is the training of a "memory faculty," instead of the creating of an Interest. And why this passion for poetry on *foreign* heroism? To inculcate cosmopolitan sentiments? I wish I could think it. No; it is because the Faculty Doctrine makes us forget the Apperception Doctrine, with its stress on Experience, Intercourse, and Content.

APPENDICES.

I.—Notes on a Few of the Terms Used in this Book.

Analytic Instruction.—Instruction which works over and systematises the knowledge already possessed or implicit. *Synthetic* Instruction brings forward new materials and adds them to the child's Circle of Thought.

Anschauung.—Immediate Sense Experience; commonly translated "Observation," but the latter word usually implies in addition an active, volitional attitude. The word Anschauung is also applied (by an extension of its meaning) to immediate experience of our own states of mind (love, fear, pain, etc.).

Apperception.—A very useful and comprehensive word standing for the interpretation or apprehension of a new experience in terms of older experiences. Apperception ranges upwards from a mere perception of familiarity (see Herbart's words on pp. 94-95) to the perception of the most far-reaching scientific analogies (p. 93). Apperception is always accompanied by Interest. Apperception embraces what is known to English psychology as Association of Ideas, but it is a wider, less technical, and more educationally helpful term.

"Apperception Masses."—Masses of related ideas capable of giving rise to powerful Apperception. A man who has an extensive knowledge of the history of Alfred the Great

would feel a keen "Apperceptive Interest" if, for example, a new writer brought forward the theory that Alfred was drowned at sea. Where no Apperception Masses exist, Apperceptive Interest cannot be aroused. A country labourer is not likely to be interested in the mention of Molière or Aurungzebe.

Attention, Kinds of.—Attention, such as that of a child to a bright object, is called by Herbart "primitive"; when past experience gives an added "interest" to a new experience the Attention is "apperceptive." There is also the distinction between "forced" ("voluntary") Attention and "willing" ("involuntary") Attention, these corresponding to "mediate" and "immediate" Interest respectively.

Character-forming Instruction.—Such Instruction as helps to form the moral judgment. It is the same as Instruction based on the "Humanities."

Correlation.—The bringing of the various subjects of the curriculum into mutual relationship, thus economising time and enhancing Apperceptive Interest. History, Geography, Literature, may all throw light on each other; Composition may be based on the familiar themes supplied by those subjects; Algebra may aid Arithmetic; and so on. There is also correlation with *experience*.

Concentration.—The placing of one subject, or one group of subjects, in the "centre" of the curriculum, and fitting all others on to that. Ziller invented a scheme of "Concentration" round humanistic material [first year, Fairy Tales; second year, The Story of Robinson Crusoe; third year, The Patriarchs; and so on]; and other attempts of the same kind have been made. As a result of Fröbel's influence there is often a high degree of Concentration in Infant Schools. But opinion tends to the view that Concentration, when carried to excess, passes

over to its opposite, and causes dislocation rather than unification of the curriculum. The uttermost limit of allowable Concentration would appear to be this.—The Core of the Curriculum should be Humanistic Material *and* Nature Material; "Formal Subjects" (Grammar, Mathematics), should be based on these; and mere Dexterities like Writing, Spelling, etc., should never usurp a chief place. Correlation should be extensively employed.

Culture Stages or Culture Epochs Doctrine.—The Doctrine that the child reproduces in miniature the chief stages through which the race has ascended. The Doctrine is full of suggestiveness.

Educative Instruction.—Herbart's phrase for such Instruction as awakens powerful Interest and thus helps to mould life.

Discipline.—In this book the word "Discipline" is used, in the primary teacher's sense, for "keeping order." It corresponds to Herbart's *Regierung* and Mr. and Mrs. Felkin's "Government." Often the word possesses a higher meaning, and stands for a number of formative influences exerted upon the pupil by his school work, his games, his positions of responsibility, etc. In this sense we may speak of the "discipline of consequences," the "discipline of life," "the discipline of the playing fields," and so on, but in this book, "Training" (or "Moral Training") is used for Discipline in this higher sense.

"Formal Culture," "Formal Training," "Formal Education."—It is held by some educationists that *any* subject, if sufficiently hard, gives "Formal Training." A boy trained on Mathematics is supposed to be equipped for almost any work; similarly a boy trained on the Classics. Any tolerably hard subject is regarded as a kind of whetstone, and the mind receives a permanent sharpness from it. The Herbartians reject this view, which goes counter to the whole of their teaching about Apperception and Interest.

They consider that the *kind* of ideas acquired is of the greatest importance; and, moreover, that experience is against the view that training in one subject gives power over a very different subject. Considering the amount of labour spent over grammar (English and Latin) during the last few decades, the mental keenness of the modern Englishman would be remarkable if the doctrine of Formal Culture were true.

"Faculty Doctrine."—The view that the human mind consists of a number of more or less distinct organs (or "faculties") of Memory, Imagination, Reasoning, Will, etc. The danger of the doctrine is that it tends to make the teacher ignore the relationship between the so-called "faculties"; he thus tries to cultivate them separately from each other. Herbart rejected the doctrine as psychologically false and educationally mischievous, and preferred to interpret mental facts simply by means of ideas (presentations), whose various combinations and interactions sufficiently explained the various so-called "faculties."

Interest, Mediate and Immediate.—An Interest in a subject because of certain ends to which it contributes, or because of fear of punishment, or because a loved teacher wishes the subject to be learnt, is "Mediate Interest." Interest in a subject for its own sake is "Immediate Interest." It is the latter on which Herbart lays chief though not exclusive stress.

Heuristic Method.—The "Method of Discovery," especially associated in this country with the name of Professor Armstrong. The child is to be encouraged to engage in research, in finding out for himself (with a certain amount of benevolent guidance on the part of the teacher) such laws of nature as are accessible to his experiments or observations. The doctrine is sometimes blended with that of "Culture Stages," and the child is expected to

reproduce in miniature the course taken by the history of science in the race.

Presentations.—A translation of the German *Vorstellungen* which stands for the ultimate intellectual elements—Sensations, Ideas, etc.

The Presentational Mechanism.—Herbart attempted to explain mental life by the rise, fall, interaction, coalescence, etc., of "presentations." The systematic way in which he attempted this explanation has given rise to the view that his psychology is "mechanical."

"Self-Activity."—The favourite phrase of Fröbelian educationists, stands for the outgoing, efferent, or motor side of human life, in contrast to the receptive, afferent, or sensory. The word is often used in special connection with "Individuality"; each child is regarded as possessing peculiarities of its own, which should be given full liberty to reveal or express themselves. In the Herbartian system "Interest *is* Self-Activity."

"Realism and Humanism."—Realism in Education lays stress upon giving an acquaintance with physical nature; Humanism upon giving an acquaintance with "the best that has been thought and said in the world." Science (with its "formal" handmaid Mathematics) is the favourite subject of Realists; Literature (with its "formal" handmaid Grammar) of Humanists. Herbart embraced both views of Education.

II.—Problems for Students.

1. Give illustrations of lack of Correlation, and

2. Explain why lack of Correlation is educationally bad.

3. What rival views are held as to the importance of *exactness* in the study of Science in the school?

4. State and discuss the rival views upon the question whether the children should be given abundance of "facts," "information," or "knowledge."

5. Discuss the question whether, and if so how, the power of "observation" should be cultivated.

6. Consider whether, and if so how far, Education is a process of "drawing-out."

7. Show the relation between Apperception and Observation.

8. Consider whether "faculties" can be, in any sense, created.

9. Bring out the distinction between "knowledge" and "drill," with especial reference to the doctrine of Interest.

10. Bring out the distinction between the "Effort" and the "Pabulum" doctrines, and relate each to the doctrine of "Interest."

11, Do you consider that "mechanical methods" of Education have any value?

12. Is there any moral value whatever in "secular subjects?" If so, does the value inhere in all, or only in some of them?

13. Do you consider that a child of eight ought to "think for himself," and if so, to what extent and in what manner?

14. Discuss the question whether Education should be more, or less, "bookish."

15. Analyse the value of the "Three R's" from the standpoint of Herbart.

16. Consider whether grammar helps to "train the mind."

17. Contrast "Reasoning" with "Reverence," and consider which, on the whole, should come first in time.

18. What are Natural Punishments? Consider the views of Herbart and of other educationists with regard to their utility.

19. Show some of the ways in which the doctrine of Culture Stages has helped Education.

20. What is Concentration? Give an example.

21. Mention any points in which Herbart has anticipated the proposals of Fröbel.

22. Consider whether Herbart has ignored (1) heredity, (2) environment.

23. Is there any relation between Interest and Self-Activity?

24. Consider whether Interest is destructive of Effort, or Effort destructive of Interest.

25. Discuss the reasons for approving of Fairy Tales in early Education.

26. "It is Action that forms the Character." Discuss this Show also the place of Insight.

27. What is meant by a "knife and fork" study and a "dinner" study? On which should the main stress be laid?

28. Consider the examples of educational chaos adduced in Part I., and attempt to solve them.

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